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PREFACE 
 
Over the last eight years, Ukraine demonstrates a rapid 
economic growth. This growth was preceded by the sharp 
decline in the national production, linked to the exhausting and 
ill-planned transition from the planned economy to the market 
economy. Deeper investigation of the potential sources of 
economic growth in Ukraine is needed. Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary have been selected as 
countries in transition that indicate economic growth. Preference 
has been given to the endogenous model of economic growth. 
As a result of the review of a broad spectrum of literature in 
historical perspective, it has been found that the exogenous 
models of Solow-Swan and Leontief do not offer complete and 
adequate reflection of the transition experience. The purpose of 
this study is to provide a systematic investigation of the human 
capital--economic growth nexus. The impact of human capital 
on economic growth is incorporated according to Mankiw et al. 
(1992) framework. The Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) model is 
chosen among the endogenous growth models presented in the 
literature as the most appropriate for evaluation. This model is 
developed for cross sectional analysis and shows the influence 
and importance of human capital for economic growth relative 
to other key inputs and to differences across countries. A variety 
of measures of human capital frequently used in applied growth 
studies are employed. The work also estimates a system of linear 
equations. While intuition and theories of endogenous growth 
would point towards a positive effect of human capital on 
economic growth, empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. The 
next economic advancement in Ukraine will become possible 
based on the process of renovation and investment into principal 
capital. Further institutional and structural changes in the 
economy are needed. It will increase domestic and foreign 
investment, further develop domestic market, and sustain 
already achieved substantial GDP per capita growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic growth is one of the fundamental issues in 
economics. The issue of economic growth has been one of the 
key issues of economic theory and macroeconomics for a long 
time, tied to the issues of general equilibrium and economic 
cycles. Process of growth is traditionally considered as a 
quintessence of an increased scale reproduction, socio-economic 
development and social progress. Sustainable economic growth 
within the limits of national systems and regional enclaves is a 
guarantor of sustainable development. 
The ideas of public spending and foreign investment as 
major engines of economic growth, especially in developing 
nations, are now replaced with ideas about the importance of 
reinvestment and development of domestic market. The theories 
of growth based on the fundamental assumption that a 
significant influx of the resources is necessary to initiate 
sustainable growth do not hold. They might work to a certain 
degree in the developing world, but appear to be insufficient to 
explain rapid economic growth in Ukraine and other countries of 
the former Soviet Bloc. 
The socio-economic transition in Ukraine may be 
considered as successful. Political and economic reforms lead to 
the creation of predominantly market economy. By 2004 
Ukraine achieved pre-transition level of GDP per capita. The 
positive economic growth takes place since 1999. At the same 
time, the theme of economic growth did not receive much 
attention in the scholarly literature in the region. Ukrainian and 
Russian economists has only produced a very insignificant 
number of works on this issue. As a result, scholarly 
publications lag behind the economic realities, at best explaining 
them, but not analyzing them well wnough and not rpesewnting 
well-grounded forecasts. This may be explained, in part, by the 
low level of familiarity of the Soviet and post-Soviet economists 
with the Western literature on economic growth, major concepts 
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and theories of growth, macroeconomics, and analytical 
techniques, including statistical and economietric analysis. 
Works on the issues and different aspects of economic 
growth in transition and post-transition economies are presented 
by such Ukrainian economists as Aleksandrova (2003), Bazhal 
(2002, 2003), Bolhovitinova (2003), Boreiko (2005), Vahnenko 
(2000, 2003), Vovkanich (2005), Vozhzhov (2004), Gal’chinski 
(2004), Heyets (1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004), Hrytsenko 
(1997, 2001, 2003), Danylishin (2006), Dem’yanenko (2003), 
Kvasnjuk (2000, 2003), Kendjuhov (2005), Kireyev (2003), 
Krjuchkova (2000), Kutsenko (2006), Levochkin (2004), 
Novitskij (2005), Olejnik (2003), Petkova (2005), Pokrytan 
(1997), Prihod’ko (2003), Sidenko (2003), Skrypnichenko 
(2003), Suhorukov (2006), Tarasevich (2003), Tochilin (2001), 
Chuhno (1996), Shubravs’ka (2005), Shchedrina (2003), 
Yaremenko (2001, 2003), Yatskevich (2006). 
Certain contribution to the research of economic growth 
in transition and post-transition economies was made by Russian 
economists Balabanova (2004), Bessonov (2005), 
Veretennikova (2005), Perminov, Egorova, Pjatkovski (2004), 
Garipova, Gizatulin, Garipov (2005), Golub (2006), Fridmna, 
Vidjasov, Mel’jantsev (1998), Grushevskaja (2004), 
Dubjanskaja (2005), Evstigneyeva, Evstigneyev (2005), Zhits 
(2000), Zas’ko (2004), Zverev (2005), Zamskova, (2005), 
Ivanter (2006, 2004), Ivlev (2004), Hristenko, Mikul’skij, 
Nizhegorodtsev (2002), Simkin (2002), Kalinina (2005), 
Kvashnina (2004), Kosenkov (2005), Koshkin, Shabaev (2004), 
Kuznetsova (2000), Lashov, Spizharskaja (2004), L’vov (2004), 
Ovchinnikova (2004), Pavlova (2001), Perepelkin (2001), 
Ponomarev (2004), Vilenskij, Buhval’d, Runov (2002), 
Romanova (2002), Savchenko (2005), Saktoev (1999), Salijchuk 
(2004), Seleznev (2001), Sokolovskij (2001), Solovejkina 
(2002), Spirjagin (2005), Tolmachev (2005), Tjurina (2005), 
Ungaeva (2005), Cherednichenko (2004), Chechelev, Ivlev, 
Kozlov (2001). 
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The goal of this work is to fill the gap between the rapid 
economic growth as an objective economic reality of Ukriane 
and the lack of scholarly literature on the issue. This book 
presents theoretical and empirical investigation of economic 
growth and the possible impact of human capital on economic 
growth in transition economies of Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and 
Hungary during the period of 1989-2009. It defines place and 
role of human capital in the process of transition from the 
exogenous to the endogenous forms of growth and socio-
economic development. Substantial part of the book is devoted 
to the integrative scholarly synthesis of the Western literature on 
economic growth with the special emphasis on theoretical 
aspects of growth. 
Part I contains an integrative literature synthesis of the 
major contributions to the theory of economic growth. It 
presents both exogenous and endogenous theories of economic 
growth. In this Part, we argue that exogenous economic growth 
models of Solow-Swan and Leontief do not offer an adequate 
description of the transition experience. Among the endogenous 
models, presented in the literature, the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) 
model is chosen as the most appropriate for our evaluation. Part 
II presents an analysis of the process of transition and points to 
the exogenous and endogenous components of current economic 
growth in Ukraine. This Part argues for the neede to move from 
predominantly exogenous to endogenous type of growth. Part III 
is focused on the data analysis. It presents a substantial bloc of 
data on the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, including, first 
of all, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Part IV presents 
description of the model, the data, and empirical results. It also 
presents the results of estimating a set of equtions and impulse 
response function. Conclusions and policy recommendations are 
presented in Conclusion. 
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PART I 
 
GENESIS OF THE GROWTH THEORIES 
 
This review is a combination of chronological changes 
and focuses around particular issues in theories of growth. This 
synthesis allows demonstrating incremental development of the 
models turned into qualitative transitions and rivalry of 
exogenous and endogenous concepts of growth. The review is 
built around the ideas that the economists formulate rather than 
around the economists themselves. It is not overloaded with the 
complex mathematical equations and keeps the major ideas and 
critiques easily understandable for the reader while placing the 
topic in the broader scholarly literature. Deeper understanding of 
economic growth requires evaluating the theory of growth in an 
historical perspective. 
 
1.1. Early Concepts of Growth 
 
Later mercantilists may be considered as founding fathers 
of the modern theories of growth. At the early stages of 
development of growth theory economists considered growth as 
a process of an increase in the national wealth. Theories of 
economic growth have acquired a major direction during the 
time of mercantilists’ domination in XV – XVII centuries and 
Physiocrats of XVIII century (Kregel, 1973). Mercantilists 
considered accumulation of wealth as the major source of 
economic growth and the major goal of economic activities of 
merchants and the state (McDermott, 1999). 
Representatives of the early mercantilism gave their 
preference to precious metals and metallic money as materials 
with perfect liquidity. The late mercantilists considered 
economic wealth of a nation in terms of total volume of 
produced commodities and supported positive trade balance. 
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This tendency can partially be explained by the development 
of manufacturing and domestic markets. 
According to mercantilists opportunities of obtaining 
profit from commodity production and access to credit resources 
facilitate multiplication of wealth. Presence of sufficient amount 
of metal money, i.e. golden and silver coins, gives necessary 
access to credit and relatively low affordable borrowing interest 
rate in the country. For this reason mercantilists insisted on 
limiting gold outflow from the country. 
Presence of golden and silver coins in monetary 
circulation was given a status of the necessary ground for 
economic growth. The active trade and commerce was 
considered as a precondition for economic growth. This 
approach can be considered as historically justified. All the 
capital in that era was represented by the trade capital, while 
there was no manufacturing capital in substantial quantity. 
Mercantilists favored export since it was a primary source 
of metal money and at the same time supported restrictions on 
import of goods in the country. Such a policy was intended to 
maintain positive trade balance, sufficient amount of money, 
and hence stable economic growth. 
Mercantilist voted for the low wages and thought that 
high wages will lead to a decrease in productivity, volume of 
produced goods, and slow down accumulation of wealth. 
Weakness of systemic approach and absence of sufficient 
theoretical grounds were characteristics of mercantilism. 
Domination of mercantilist doctrines ended in early XVIII 
century, when mercantilists were replaced by Physiocrats. 
Physiocrats considered economic life as a natural process that 
has its own natural laws. They proclaimed a principle of “natural 
law.” Physiocrats opposed interference of the state in economic 
processes. 
The major principles of Physiocrats were statements 
about the leading role of agriculture, surplus product, and a 
unified system of monetary and commodity circulation. 
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According to Physiocrats, the real product was produced only 
in agriculture. Other branches of the national economy could 
only change its form. 
Physiocrats also accepted an idea about the existence of 
surplus as a part of the produced product that was not used in 
consumption or in production. This surplus was accumulated in 
the society and created increase in the national wealth. Francois 
Quesnay was a leading Physiocrat. He developed the system of 
economic reproduction and distribution of national product on 
the national scale. 
 
1.2. Classics of Economic Growth 
 
The first economist to write about the correlates of growth 
was David Hume. Hume (1711-1776) emphasized foreign trade 
as a primary engine for economic growth saying that both 
nations get an advantage from international trade (Rostow, 
1990). 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) focused on the accumulation of 
capital as crucial for the development of early capitalism. His 
advice was to accumulate capital and to pay for this 
accumulation by paying workers minimal wages. Accumulation 
of capital leads to long-term growth. Competition is in the 
nature of a contest and the economy is regarded as being 
propelled forward by technical progress, the driving force of 
which is the division of labor. The consequences of competition 
are viewed as equilibrating, with the outcome of the process of 
equilibration being socially desirable (Reid, 1989). 
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) considered the relationship 
between the growth of population and the growth of agriculture 
without technological change. He also supported using tax 
revenue to fund capital accumulation and investment. He 
emphasized proportions in development in order to avoid over 
saving, idle capacity, and unemployment. In his understanding 
proportions in development means proportional increases in 
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population, capital, and savings rates, which in turn lead to 
full capacity utilization and full employment. Malthus suggested 
that population was affected by economic conditions, and he 
showed a positive connection between income growth and 
population growth. However, population was considered a non-
economic factor in the production process; he believed that it 
did not affect economic growth (Rostow, 1990). 
David Ricardo (1772-1823) suggested the existence of a 
natural market wage, and wrote that new technology leads to a 
decline in the demand for labor assuming a particular form of 
technological change. He also emphasized proportions, as did 
Malthus, and diminishing and increasing returns on capital 
(Rostow, 1990). 
John Stuart Mill (1808-1873) supported the general idea 
that output is a function of labor, capital, and land, and 
suggested that an increase in output depends on an increase in 
inputs or their productivity. Mill, therefore, distinguished 
between the quality and quantity of inputs and between 
extensive and intensive types of growth. Such progressive ideas 
are logically explained by the fact that he wrote during the 
industrial revolution in England. A typical production function 
is given in (1) below: 
 
Yt = F ( , , )                                              (1) Kt Lt Nt
 
N – land is fixed and exogenous and slowly goes out of 
the model over time; 
K – capital, with its primary accumulation and then 
reinvestment, is a factor in extensive economic growth; 
L – labor comes from the outside, but is not generated 
within the system of production, without consideration of its 
quality. 
Diminishing returns to capital and labor were assumed. 
The capital stock was modeled as (2) below: 
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There was a physical capital accumulation rule. The key 
issue is how the level of investment is determined. According to 
Smith, investment is related to the level of profit. From the 
neoclassical point of view, investment is proportional to GNP, 
assuming that land grows with GNP (Rostow, 1990). 
 
1.3. Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction and Beyond 
 
Schumpeter (1883-1950) made a significant contribution 
to the theory of economic development and business cycles and 
its historical patterns, in particular. Emphasizing the role of 
innovator, he supported general equilibrium theory, and at the 
same time stated clearly that in his view such theory could not 
cope with innovation. He writes: “But static analysis is not only 
unable to predict consequences of discretionary changes in the 
traditional ways of doing things; it can neither explain the 
occurrence of such productive revolutions nor the phenomena 
which accompany them. It can only investigate the new 
equilibrium position after the changes have occurred.” 
(Schumpeter, 1911, p. 62-63) 
Nelson notes that Schumpeter was curiously uninterested 
in where the basic ideas for innovations, be they technological 
or organizational, come from. “The “entrepreneur” is not viewed 
by Schumpeter as having anything to do with their generation. It 
would appear that it is this passage that lies at the root of the 
argument, often made, that Schumpeter considered invention 
and innovation very different acts.” (Nelson, 1996, p. 90) 
Later, however, Schumpeter realized the importance of 
technological change and that the venue for innovation is the 
large firm with an attached R&D laboratory that creates new 
products that the firm introduces. He wrote: “The first thing a 
modern concern does as soon as it feels it can afford it is to 
establish a research department every member of which knows 
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that his bread and butter depends on his success in devising 
improvements.” (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 96) 
Aghion and Howitt (1998), drawing implications from 
their tests for endogenous growth, suggested that the long-run 
rate of growth should be positively correlated with the flow of 
patents, the flow of entry of new firms, and the flow of new 
product introduction. They say: 
The central role in creative destruction in Schumpeterian 
growth theory can be tested by looking at the correlation 
between growth and two other variables, the flow of exit 
of firms and the rate of obsolescence of capital. The 
former is identical to the flow of entry in a steady-state 
equilibrium, while the latter is the rate of arrival of new 
innovations, which we have seen is equal to the rate of 
growth. Hence, the long-run rate of growth should be 
positively correlated with the flow of exit of firms and 
with the rate of obsolescence of capital. (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998, p. 429) 
 
1.4. Modern Theories of Growth 
 
Modern growth theory may be traced to the classical 
article by Ramsey (1928) “A Mathematical Theory of Savings” 
(Rich, 1994). In this article Ramsey introduced an inter-
temporarily separable utility function and derived an optimality 
condition from it. He points out that if current consumption were 
reduced in favor of current savings, then future consumption 
would increase. Therefore, if the marginal product of capital is 
high, the cost of foregone current consumption is lower than the 
benefits from increased future consumption. 
Writing on the problem of economic growth, Ramsey 
(1928) suggested the following: 
The first I propose to tackle is this: how much of its 
income should a nation save? To answer this simple rule 
is obtained valid under conditions of surprising generality; 
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the rule, which will be further elucidated later, runs as 
follows. The rate of saving multiplied by the marginal 
utility of money should always be equal to the amount by 
which the total net rate of enjoyment of utility falls short 
of the maximum possible rate of enjoyment. (Ramsey, 
1991, vol. 2, p. 5) 
 
The main simplifying assumptions made by Ramsey were 
the following: the community goes on for ever without changing 
either in size or in its capacity for enjoyment or in its aversion to 
work; enjoyment and sacrifices at different times can be 
calculated independently and added together; no new inventions 
or improvements in organization are introduced without a 
certain degree of accumulation. Distributional considerations 
were also ignored. He assumed that the way in which 
consumption and labor are distributed among the members of 
the community depends solely on the total amount of 
consumption and labor. Total satisfaction is a function of total 
consumption of goods and labor hours. 
Ramsey suggested that the rate of interest is governed 
primarily by the demand price, and may greatly exceed the rate 
ultimately necessary to induce abstinence. Similarly, in the 
accounting of a Socialist State, the function of the rate of 
interest would be to ensure the wisest use of existing capital, not 
to serve in any direct way as a guide to the proportion of income 
which should be saved. 
After Frank Ramsey, John M. Keynes (1935) pointed out 
that the savings ordinarily do not equal the amount of 
investment. As a result, the market economy is naturally 
unstable. 
Sen mentioned that: 
While the classical economists – Marx in particular – 
were much concerned with growth, its modern revival 
started with a remarkable paper of Roy Harrod published 
in 1939. Interest in growth revived at first slowly and then 
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by leaps and bounds. This was to a considerable extent 
the result of an immense practical concern with growth 
after the Second World War. The war-damaged 
economies were trying hard to reconstruct fast, the 
underdeveloped countries were attempting to initiate 
economic development, the advanced capitalist countries 
being relatively free from periodic slumps were trying to 
concentrate on raising the long-run rate of growth, and the 
socialist countries were determined to overtake the richer 
capitalist economies by fast economic expansion. Growth 
was everybody’s concern and it is no wonder that in such 
a milieu growth theory was pampered by the attention of 
economists. (Sen, 1970, p. 9) 
 
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) attempted to integrate 
Keynesian analysis with elements of economic growth. They 
used production functions and mathematical analysis to argue 
that the capitalist system is inherently unstable. The extended 
model is concerned with the problem of stability-instability in 
the system. 
Harrod noted that: 
The axiomatic basis of the theory which I propose to 
develop consists of three propositions, namely: (a) that 
the level of a community’s income is the most important 
determinant of its supply of saving; (b) that the rate of 
increase of its income is an important determinant of its 
demand for saving; and (c) that demand is equal to supply. 
It thus consists in a marriage of the “acceleration 
principle” and the “multiplier” theory… (Harrod, 1939, p. 
14) 
 
Harrod suggested that if investors anticipate more than 
the warranted rate of growth, the actual growth rate of demand 
will exceed even the high expected growth rate, and investors 
may decide that they expected too little from the economy. If 
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investors anticipate a growth rate lower than the warranted 
growth rate, then the actual growth rate will fall short of the 
expected growth rate, and investors may decide that they 
expected too much rather than too little from the economy. “The 
market thus seems to give a perverse signal to the investor, and 
this is the source of Harrod’s problem.” (Sen, 1970, p. 12) Also 
Sen noted that Harrod’s model of instability is undoubtedly 
incomplete, but it cannot be denied that he was focusing 
attention on an immensely important part of growth economics 
which subsequent preoccupation with growth models with 
perfect foresight has somewhat tended to obscure (Sen, 1970, p. 
14). 
Domar (1946) noted that, in the economic literature on 
the relation between capital accumulation and employment, 
Marx made a notable contribution. More recently, Keynes (1935) 
and his followers suggested that labor productivity is not a 
function of technological progress in the abstract, but 
technological progress embodied in capital goods, and the 
amount of capital goods in general. Even without technological 
progress, capital accumulation increases labor productivity, at 
least to a certain point, both because more capital is used per 
worker in each industry and because there is a shift of labor to 
industries that use more capital and can afford to pay a higher 
wage. Domar criticized Keynes on the basis that: 
The standard Keynesian system does not provide us with 
any tools for deriving the equilibrium rate of growth. The 
problem of growth is entirely absent from it because the 
explicit assumption can be justified only over short 
periods of time; it will result in serious errors over a 
period of a few years. Clearly, a full-employment level of 
income of five years ago would create considerable 
unemployment today. We shall assume instead that 
employment is a function of the ratio of national income 
to productive capacity. Because investment in the 
Keynesian system is merely an instrument for generating 
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income, the system does not take into account the 
extremely essential, elementary and well-known fact that 
investment also increases productive capacity. This dual 
character of the investment process makes the approach to 
the equilibrium rate of growth from the investment 
(capital) point of view more promising: if investment both 
increases productive capacity and generates income, it 
provides us with both sides of the equation the solution of 
which may yield the required rate of growth. (Domar, 
1946, p. 140) 
 
Following the principle that the total increase of capital is 
equal to the total saving in the period, the fundamental equation 
G= S/C may be modified as (3): 
 
G  = w
s k K x
C
− − ( / )
                                                 (3) 
 
where G is growth, s is savings, and C is capital. 
The simple Harrod-Domar model assumes that 
investment is determined entirely by planned savings and there 
is no independent investment function based on expectations of 
the future. The Harrod-Domar growth model provides a very 
simple framework within which the relationships among the 
aggregate macro variables can be examined. Even though it is 
simple, Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick noted: 
A host of planning problems and a wide range of 
possibilities can be analyzed within the H-D framework. 
In fact, the H-D model or some variant of it is the most 
widely used quantitative planning technique and, even 
though many plan documents do not explicitly present the 
H-D model, elements of it can be found in the way 
investment requirements and the role of savings are 
analyzed in the formulation of the economic growth plan. 
(Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick, 1994, p.12) 
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The basic Harrod-Domar model (1946) makes the 
following assumptions. First, savings is proportional to national 
income. Hence, 
 
S= sY                                                                         (4) 
 
where S is savings, Y is national income, and s is the average 
propensity to save. Second, the amounts of capital and labor 
required to produce a given amount of output are given. The 
aggregate production function can be presented in (5): 
 
Y= min(K/v, L/u)                                                        (5) 
 
where u= L/Y is the amount of labor required to produce one 
unit of output, or the reciprocal of labor productivity, and v = 
K/Y is the amount of capital required to produce one unit of 
output, or the reciprocal of capital productivity. 
According to this production function, output is 
determined by the lesser of the available quantity of labor and 
capital. Capital and labor are not substitutes, but perfect 
complements. From this assumption Chowdhury and 
Kirkpatrick conclude that “since the developing countries are 
usually labor surplus (relative to capital) economies, it follows 
that capital is the determining factor for the growth of output.” 
(Chowdhury and Kirkpatrick, 1994, p. 13) 
Assuming investment (I) is equal to savings, and 
 
I = K Δ ΔK t K/ &=                                                        (6) 
 
where t is time, and &K  is capital growth, we get 
 
S = &K  and, sY = &K                                                    (7) 
 
In marginal terms, v = Δ ΔK Y/ , 
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v
K t
Y t
K
Y
= =Δ ΔΔ Δ
/
/
&
& .                                                    (8a) 
 
&K vY= &                                                                     (8b) 
 
By substituting (7) into (8b), we obtain 
 
sY vY= & ,                                                                 (9a) 
or 
& / /Y Y s v=                                                             (9b) 
 
The rate of growth of output is determined by the ratio 
between savings and capital-output ratios. The rate of growth of 
capital stock is constant and equal to s/v. Replacement of Y in 
(9b) by K/v in (8b) gives (10a) and (10b) below: 
 
& ( / )K s v K=                                                           (10a) 
Thus 
& / / & /Y Y s v K K= =                                              (10b) 
 
This fundamental equation of the Harrod-Domar model 
indicates that with historically determined and constant values 
of s and v, the maximum rate of growth of the capital stock is 
determined by the ratio s/v. This relation determines the 
maximum possible rate of growth under the existing economic 
and other conditions in each country. In many developing 
countries, the savings rate (s) is low, and a function of national 
income, which is also low, and unequal (in per capita terms). At 
the same time v, that is the capital to output ratio, is high, 
implying a low level of technology, low productivity, and 
inefficiency of investment. Therefore, economic growth is a 
priory low and insufficient to absorb a rapidly growing 
population, i.e. labor force. This results in a high level of 
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permanent unemployment. From this perspective, in order to 
absorb a growing labor force, the country has to accelerate 
economic growth beyond the limit set by the traditional values 
of s and v. Growth acceleration requires an increase in savings 
to generate a rate of growth sufficient to absorb the new labor 
force. For example, if the population is growing by 2 percent a 
year and the country wants to achieve a steady state rise in per 
capita income of 4 percent, GDP must grow at the rate of 6 
percent annually. If we assume an aggregate capital-output ratio 
v of four, then s must be .24 as demonstrated below: 
 
s*= v( &Y /Y)= 4 × 0.06= 0.24                                  (11) 
 
Hence, 24 percent of GDP must be saved in order to achieve a 6 
percent growth of GDP. Savings is assumed to be equal to 
investment. This is the basis of Lewis’s comment that the key to 
solving the development problem is to raise the proportion of 
national income saved from 4-5 percent to 12-15 percent (Lewis, 
1984). 
Uzava formulates the Equilibrium Theorem as the 
following: “Let the initial capital stock K* and labor forces L* 
satisfy 
f K A Lk [ * / ( ) *]0 = +λ μ , 
where λ  is the rate of growth in labor, defined by 
>0, and &( ) /L t = λ( )L t μ  is the rate of growth in the efficiency 
of labor, defined by (t)/A(t) = &A μ  >0. Then, for the solution 
[Y*(t), K*(t), L*(t)] to the neoclassical growth process (*), the 
capital-output ratio x* = K*(t)/Y*(t) remains constant, output per 
worker y*(t) = Y*(t)/L*(t) increases at the same constant rate as 
the capital-labor ratio k* = K*(t)/L*(t). The capital-output ratio 
x* is uniquely determined and may be referred to as the 
equilibrium capital-output ratio of the process (*).” (Uzava, 
1961, p. 123) 
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Stability Theorem is presented as the following: “Let 
the growth equilibrium exist. Then the neoclassical growth 
process (*) is globally stable; namely, for the solution [Y(t), K(t), 
L(t)] to the process (*) with arbitrary initial K(0) and L(0), the 
capital-output ratio x(t) = K(t)/Y(t) converges to the equilibrium 
capital-output ratio x*.” (Uzava, 1961, p. 123) 
Nicholas Kaldor (1961) summed up the broad facts about 
the growth of advanced industrial economies that a well-told 
model must be capable of reproducing six “stylized facts”. First, 
real output per person (or per hour) grows at a more or less 
constant rate over fairly long periods of time. There are short 
run fluctuations, of course, and even changes from one quarter-
century to another. But at least there is no clear systematic 
tendency for the rate of increase of productivity in this sense to 
accelerate or to slow down. If, in addition, labor input grows at a 
steady rate, aggregate output must also grow, since output is the 
product of labor input and output per unit of labor, the rate of 
growth of labor, and labor productivity. 
Second, the stock of real capital, crudely measured, grows 
at a more or less constant rate exceeding the rate of growth of 
labor. Capital per person can also be said to grow at a more or 
less steady rate over fairly long periods of time, subject to 
qualifications about short-run irregularities and occasional 
breaks in trend. 
Third, the rates of growth of real output and the stock of 
capital tend to be about the same, so that the ratio of capital to 
output shows no systematic trend. 
Fourth, the rate of profit on capital has no long-run trend, 
apart from occasional violent changes, associated with sharp 
variations in effective demand. 
Fifth, the rate of growth of output per person can vary 
quite a lot from one country to another. 
And, finally, economies with a high share of profit out of 
total income tend to have a high ratio of investment to output 
(Kaldor, 1958). 
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1.5. Solow Model of Exogenous Growth 
 
Solow notes that an economy growing according to the 
first three (or perhaps four) of the rules listed in the previous 
section is said to be in a steady state. Its output, employment, 
and capital stock grow exponentially, and its capital/output ratio 
is constant. Steady state is normally defined by the requirement 
that the output and employment be growing at some constant 
proportional rates and that net saving and investment be a 
constant fraction of output. Net investment should grow at the 
same rate as output and the stock of capital, which is the sum of 
past net investment. The capital/output ratio will therefore be 
constant. “Most of the modern theory of economic growth is 
devoted to analyzing the properties of steady states and to 
finding out whether an economy not initially in a steady state 
will evolve into one if it proceeds under specified rules of the 
game.” (Solow, 1988, p. 4) 
Solow noted that the fourth fact is more controversial 
than the others for two sets of reasons: 
First, there are problems of definitions and measurement: 
(a) the ratio of capital to output is very volatile in any 
fluctuating economy, because the stock of capital is 
necessarily a sluggish time series, while output is capable 
of making wide swings in short intervals; (b) we ought 
really to be interested in the flow of services from the 
stock of capital, while we actually have measurements of 
the stock of capital, and the two can diverge not only 
through changes in the margin of idle capacity (which is 
really point made under (a)), but also through variations 
in shift work, “down time”, running speed, and the like; 
(c) although I shall be reasoning in terms of a model with 
only one commodity, so that relative prices do not enter, 
our data do not come from such a world. If we think of 
capital as a factor of production, it is presumably the 
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“real” capital stock that matters, but if we think of it as 
a store of wealth, it is presumably the value of the capital 
stock in terms of consumer goods that matters, and both 
capital/output ratios can be constant only if the price of 
capital goods relative to consumer goods is constant, as it 
has not in fact always been. Secondly, the data are far 
from clear about the constancy of the capital-output ratio, 
however the measurement problems are resolved. (Solow, 
1988, p. 3) 
 
Harrod (1937) proposed a new definition of neutral 
inventions primarily intended for applications to the problem of 
economic growth. According to Harrod, a technical invention is 
defined as neutral if at a constant rate of interest it does not 
disturb the value of the capital coefficient. Harrod’s 
classification was discussed by Robinson who showed 
graphically that a neutral invention is equivalent to “an all-round 
increase in the efficiency of labor.” (Robinson, 1937, p. 140) 
The model presented by Kaldor and Mirrlees (1969) 
introduces technical progress in the specific form of the rate of 
improvement of the design and technique of newly produced 
capital equipment as the main engine of economic growth, 
determining not only the rate of growth in productivity, but, 
together with other parameters, rate of obsolescence, the average 
lifetime of equipment, the share of investment of income, the 
share of profits, and the relationship between investment and 
potential output. In fact, it shows future expected capital-output 
ratio on new capital. Kaldor and Mirrlees suggested that the 
model is Keynesian in its mode of operation and considers 
entrepreneurial expenditure decisions as primary and incomes 
and profits as secondary. Also the model is non-neo-classical in 
that technological factors, marginal productivities or marginal 
substitution ratios, play no role in the determination of wages 
and profits. “A “production function” in the sense of a single-
valued relationship between some measure of capital, , the Kt
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labor force  and of output Y  (all at the time t) clearly does 
not exist. Everything depends on past history, on how the 
collection of equipment goods, which comprises Kt (as 
measured by historical cost) if a greater part of the existing 
capital stock is of more recent creation; this would be the case, 
for example, if the rate of growth population has been 
accelerating. 
Nt t
Whilst ‘machines’ earn quasi-rents which are all the 
smaller the older they are (so that, for the oldest surviving 
machine, the quasi-rents are zero) it would be wrong to 
say that the position of the marginal ‘machine’ determines 
the share of quasi-rent (or gross profits) in total income. 
For the total profit is determined quite independently of 
the structure of these ‘quasi-rents’ … by the factors 
determining the share of investment in output and the 
proportion of profits saved and therefore the position of 
the “marginal” machine is itself fully determined by the 
other equations of the system. It is the macro-economic 
condition, and not the age-and-productivity structure of 
machinery, which will determine what the (aggregate) 
share of quasi-rents will be. (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1969, p. 
188) 
 
According to this statement, the technical progress 
function is very consistent with a technological investment 
function, i.e., a shifting in time functional relationship between 
investment per worker and output per worker. However, it 
would not be correct to say that the marginal product of 
investment in the creation of new capital plays a role in 
determining the amount per man. Since the profitability of 
operating the machines and equipment is expected to diminish in 
time, the marginal addition to the stream of profits, which 
Kaldor and Mirrlees call the “marginal value productivity,” will 
be something quite different from the marginal product in the 
technological sense, and it will not be a derivative from a 
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technological function only, but will depend on the all system 
of the relationships. 
The authors raise the question of to what extent the 
technical progress function imposes some restraint on the nature 
of technological change. Every change in the rate of investment 
per worker implies a change in the extent to which innovations 
are actually utilized. Since the capital saving innovations, which 
increase the output-capital ratio and output-labor ratio, are much 
more profitable to the entrepreneur than the labor saving ones 
that give the same rate of increase in labor productivity, and the 
balance of technological change will appear with higher capital 
consumption the greater the rate of increase in investment per 
worker. 
The main suggestion for economic policy is that any 
scheme that leads to the accelerated retirement of old machinery 
and equipment, such as taxes on use of morally and/or 
physically old equipment, technologies and plants, and 
environmental pollution, and lower or no taxes on investment 
funds is bound to accelerate for a short period the rate of 
increase in output per head y/y since it will increase the number 
of workers available for the new machines n, and hence 
investment I, and will involve a reduction in p/y . Kaldor and 
Mirrlees conclude that “A more permanent cure, however, 
requires stimulating of the technical dynamism of the economy 
(raising the technical progress function) which is not only (or 
perhaps mainly) a matter of more scientific education and more 
expenditure on research, but of higher quality business 
management which is more alert in searching for technical 
improvements and less resistant to their introduction.” (Kaldor 
and Mirrlees, 1969, p. 190) 
Behind technological change only, knowledge acquiring 
by learning and training in the process of production should be 
also emphasized. Arrow starts his investigation on the economic 
implications of learning by doing saying: 
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It is by now incontrovertible that increases in per capita 
income cannot be explained simply by increases in the 
capital-labor ratio. Though doubtless no economist would 
ever have denied the role of technological change in 
economic growth, its overwhelming importance relative 
to capital formation has perhaps only been fully realized 
with the important empirical studies of Abramovitz (1956) 
and Solow (1957). These results do not directly contradict 
the neo-classical view of the production function as an 
expression of technological knowledge. All that has to be 
added is the obvious fact that knowledge is growing in 
time. Nevertheless a view of economic growth that 
depends so heavily on an exogenous variable, let alone 
one as difficult to measure as the quantity of knowledge, 
is hardly intellectually satisfactory. From a quantitative, 
empirical point of view, we are left with time as an 
explanatory variable. Now trend projections, however 
necessary they may be in practice, are basically a 
confession of ignorance, and, what is worse from a 
practical viewpoint, are not policy variables. (Arrow, 
1991, p. 155) 
 
Arrow suggests that the concept of knowledge which 
underlies the production function at any moment needs analysis. 
Knowledge has to be acquired before and during the process of 
production. Different students with the same educational 
experiences may have different amount of knowledge and so the 
different countries, at the same moment of time, have different 
production functions even with the same natural resource 
endowment (Arrow, 1991). 
Two generalizations of psychologists on learning are 
emphasized. First, learning is the product of experience. 
Learning can only take place through attempts to solve a 
problem. Second, learning associated with repetition of 
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essentially the same problem is subject to sharply diminishing 
returns. 
Verdoorn (1956) applied the principle of the learning 
curve to national output. He used the “Horndall effect” in 
Sweden to motivate this extension to the analysis of growth. 
Horndall iron works in Sweden had no new investment, and 
therefore presumably no significant change in its methods of 
production, for a period of fifteen years, but productivity rose on 
the average close to two percent per annum. This steadily 
increasing performance can only be imputed to learning from 
experience. 
Verdoorn (1956) developed a model in which capital and 
labor are non-linear functions of output, assuming the rate of 
output a measure of cumulative output including learning. He 
notes that full employment of capital and labor simultaneously is 
impossible. Arrow states that another of Vendoorn’s conclusions, 
that the savings ratio must be fixed by some public mechanism 
at the uniquely determined level which would ensure full 
employment of both factors, is wrong. Arrow says, that one 
factor or another will be unemployed (Arrow, 1962, p. 160). 
Arrow’s model ignores the possibility of capital-labor 
substitution. Profits are assumed to be a result of technical 
change. The rate of investment will be less than the optimum. 
Net investment and the stock of capital become subordinate, 
with gross investment taking a leading role. The main 
hypothesis is that technical change in general can be ascribed to 
experience. Some economic implications can be drawn from the 
model. 
We introduce learning into our historical review of 
growth models by first examining how exogenous technological 
change affects output. In the Cobb-Douglas production function 
(Sen, 1970), output is presented as: 
 
Y = L K , 0<1−α α α <1                                            (12) 
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The per capita production function can be written as: 
 
Y = f(k) = k                                                        (13) α
y = Y/L 
 
The rate at which saving increases, k, is the rate of saving per 
person, sy, where saving is a function of personal income. 
The rate of depreciation of k is the amount of depreciation 
per person, δ k. Population growth causes k to fall at the rate nk. 
The net rate of increase in k therefore, depends on three factors – 
the rate of depreciation (δ ), the rate of population growth (n), 
and k - and can be presented in the following equation (14): 
 
k = sf(k)-δ  k- nk= sf(k)- (  δ  + n)k= sk  - (n+  α δ  )k    (14) 
 
Constant returns to scale are assumed, so that the absolute size 
of the economy or total output is irrelevant to per capita growth. 
In the Solow model, 
 
Y TK L= α β                                                              (15) 
0 1< <α  
( )Y Q L K= + + −α α1                                            (16) 
Q a x e= + +                                                           (17) 
 
In the long run, the rate of growth is independent of the 
rate of investment. Exogenous improvements in technology 
generate productivity growth. Solow (1957) modeled economic 
growth using a standard neoclassical production function with 
decreasing returns to capital. Taking the rates of saving and 
population growth as exogenous, he showed that these two 
variables determine the steady-state level of income per capita. 
If saving and population growth rates vary across countries, 
different countries reach different steady states. Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992, p. 1) noted: “Solow’s model gives simple 
 50
testable predictions about how these variables influence the 
steady-state level of income. The higher the rate of saving, the 
richer the country. The higher the rate of population growth, the 
poorer the country.” 
We start by considering some of the theoretical 
approaches to exogenous economic growth. The Solow model is 
our starting point for detailed consideration of exogenous 
models and their implications. 
Assume the following production function for national 
output, Y. 
 
( )Y A L K= + + −α α1                                           (18) 
 
Where: Y is output, L is labor, K is capital, α  is labor’s share in 
total product, ( )1− α  is capital’s share in total product, A 
denotes technical progress. All variables are in logs. Economic 
growth could be achieved in the short run by increasing capacity 
utilization, and, in the long run, by changing capacity (k) itself. 
 
Y=Q+α  L+ (1 -α  )K                                          (19) 
 
Q=a+x+e 
 
Where x is capacity utilization, e is efficiency in the allocation 
of resources (allocative efficiency) (Solow, 1970). 
 
1.6. Leontief’s Poverty Trap 
 
Leontief (1958) emphasized the role of savings in 
economic growth: “Among the many factors which determine 
the growth or stagnation – as the case may be – of a national 
economy, its rate of saving out of current income and the 
subsequent increase in income resulting from the investment of 
these savings play an important role.” (Leontief, 1958) The key 
point here is that preferences of a given national economy 
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between present and future levels of consumption in terms of 
a conventional set of social indifference curves affect growth. 
Of course, the problem of maximizing utility – by planning the 
allocation of income between consumption and investment – 
over long intervals of time is certainly of considerable interest 
itself, despite the fact that it was first brought up by Frank 
Ramsey 70 years ago. 
In the study of linear programming, Dorfman, 
Samuelson, and Solow (1958) analyze, among other things, 
efficient programs of capital accumulation on the assumption of 
Leontief-type (fixed coefficient) technologies. Except for the 
fact that their model of capital accumulation permits nonzero 
consumption, its characteristics are basically the same as those 
defining the situation with savings presented by Leontief. 
Dornbush (1996) expanded the growth equation to 
include these insights on savings and growth. Domestic saving 
and current account deficit are determinants of growth through 
capital investment: 
 
( )Y Q n r S= + + +α λ                                                      (20) 
 
where S is the national saving rate, λ  is no interest current 
account deficit expressed as a fraction of GDP, r is the marginal 
return on capital formation, n is labor. This equation highlights 
the role of domestic savings. Higher saving rates (S) finance 
capital accumulation and growth. However, the equation makes 
the important point that the immediate impact of saving on 
growth is minor. Assume that the return to capital is 10 percent. 
Raising the saving rate by 5 percentage points of GDP will then 
raise the growth rate of output by only 0.5 percentage points. Of 
course, the compound growth effects of an extra 0.5 percent 
growth are considerable, but only in the long run. 
Michael Carlberg (1997) examined the effects of savings, 
labor, and the interest rate on international economic growth and 
obtained the following results: “An increase in the saving rate 
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does affect neither capital per head nor output per head. It 
reduces foreign debt per head. And it improves consumption per 
head. An increase in the rate of labor growth leaves no impact 
on capital per head and output per head. It increases foreign debt 
per head and worsens consumption per head. An increase in 
foreign interest rate depresses both capital per head and output 
per head. Besides, it brings down foreign debt per head. As long 
as the foreign interest rate is low, the shock deteriorates 
consumption per head. But as soon as the foreign interest rate is 
sufficiently high, the shock improves consumption per head.” 
(Carlberg, 1997, p. 5) 
Foreign credits and saving were introduced into growth 
models by Leontief (1966). 
 
 
 
MP
TP 
D B 
A C 
MP, TP 
Figure 1.1. Leontief’s poverty trap 
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The Leontief model is presented graphically in Figure 
1.1. TP measures the marginal time-preference (slope of 
indifference curves). Starting with a very small stock of capital 
and income below the lowest equilibrium point, A, the system 
expands toward A. If its initial position in the economy were 
located some place between A and B, equilibrium also moves 
toward A. In this case, the process is a regressive one 
characterized by gradual diminishing of the stock of productive 
capital, reduction in the rate of output (income) and incidentally 
– as the MP (marginal productivity of capital, slope of the 
capital-output line) curve shows – an increase in the real rate of 
interest. 
Once A is reached, the system “stagnates” at that low but 
stable equilibrium position. When pushed to the left by the 
action of some outside force, such as an accidental loss of 
productive capital, it would move back again toward A but not 
beyond. 
If, as beneficiary of a foreign loan or gift, this country 
finds itself in the possession of some additional capital and 
correspondingly increased income, our country at once proceeds 
to “live above its means,” that is, consume its capital and 
gradually reduce its output until the stationary state at A is again 
reached. Even a constant flow of foreign aid could, in such a 
case, do no more than help the system to maintain its income 
and consumption at some point between A and B, without, 
however, releasing any tendency toward further growth. Robert 
Barro and Xavier Sala-I-Martin point out: “We can think of a 
poverty trap as a stable steady state with low levels of per capita 
output and capital stock. This outcome is a trap because, if 
agents attempt to break out of it, then the economy has a 
tendency to return to the low-level steady state.” (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 1999) 
These observations apply, however, only to gifts or loans 
not large enough to push the rate of output beyond B. Once on 
the other side of that unstable equilibrium position, B, the 
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economy begins to save, accumulate, and increase its revenue; 
in short, it proceeds to develop under its own power. 
According to the graph, the new stable equilibrium is 
approached from the much higher income level, C. Had the 
structural conditions been such as to keep MP above TP, and 
thus the D – curve below the zero line throughout its entire 
stretch to the right of B, the process of economic growth – once 
that threshold has been passed – would go on indefinitely until 
high income level, C (Leontief, 1966). 
The entire scheme assumes that all complementary factors 
except capital are held constant. Later Leontief notes that 
changes in the basic structural conditions of the economy shift 
the equilibrium positions A, B, and C. He even assumes that 
“some of these positions of stationary state might even disappear 
or new ones might be created” (Leontief, 1966). 
Some of the most recent studies that consider impact of 
foreign financial aid on economic growth are by Boon (1996), 
Lensink and Morrissey (1999), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1999), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Hansen and Tarp (2001). The 
authors examine the interaction between foreign financial 
assistance and growth. During the recent decades unilateral and 
multilateral donors provide a substantial amount of financial 
assistance to the developing countries. The stated goals of this 
aid are often formulated as poverty alleviation and promotion of 
economic growth. The results of such projects are not 
satisfactory in many cases. This necessitates further research of 
the issue. 
Peter Boon (1996) investigates possible correlation 
between foreign aid effectiveness and government 
macroeconomic policy. He studies mechanisms through which 
foreign aid helps to alleviate poverty and initiates economic 
growth. He uses Barro’s model of endogenous growth according 
to which foreign aid has a significant impact on growth because 
aid inflow contributes to an increase in investments and growth.  
Boon finds that a positive impact of foreign aid on investment 
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and growth is conditional on government policy. Government 
policy, in its turn, can be represented with the three different 
approaches: elitist, egalitarian, or “laissez-faire.” Boon states 
that elitist governments are concerned only with the welfare of a 
rich group in the population that supports the political elite. 
Egalitarian governments attempt to maximize the welfare of the 
poor. 
The “laissez-faire” approach in governmental policy is 
characterized by minimal government intrusion into the market-
based system of distribution of wealth. In this case government 
attempts to maximize only the welfare of the most economically 
and socially vulnerable stratum of the population. Boon 
concludes that the best condition for foreign aid effectiveness is 
the elitist regime. Foreign aid in this case does not have 
significant effect on investments and growth, but substantially 
increases government size, government consumption and the 
welfare of the political elite (Boon, 1996). Boon established that 
foreign aid “does not promote economic development for two 
reasons: Poverty is not caused by capital shortage, and it is not 
optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary policies when they 
receive aid flows.” (Boon, 1996, p. 322) 
Lensink and Morrissey (1999) assume that foreign aid 
does have an impact on growth, and there are government 
policies that make aid more effective. They argue that “…the 
principal factor determining the impact of aid on growth appears, 
in many results, to be investment” (Lensink and Morrissey, 1999, 
p. 3) The authors point out that macroeconomic performance 
determines country vulnerability to shocks and aid instability 
and thus the lack of aid efficiency with regard to its impact on 
growth. Using cross-country growth regressions Lensink and 
Morrissey (1999) conclude that aid has a positive impact on 
investment and a significant effect on growth if to control for aid 
inflow uncertainty. 
Leontief does not give broad explanation for the meaning 
of the zero line in his model. However, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
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(1999), using the neoclassical model of Solow (1957) and 
Swan (1969) and the golden rule of capital accumulation and 
dynamic efficiency, derived this line. 
The fundamental differential equation of the Swan-Solow 
model is: 
 
( ) ( )&k sf k n k= − + δ 0                                         (21) 
 
Where n + δ  is the effective depreciation rate for the capital-
labor ratio, k = K/L. If the saving rate, s, were 0, then k would 
decline partly due to depreciation of k at the rate δ  and partly 
due to growth of L at the rate n. In fact, ( n + δ ) is Leontief’s 
zero line. 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin noted the following: “We define 
a steady-state as a situation in which the various quantities grow 
at constant rates. In the Solow-Swan model, the steady-state 
corresponds to k= 0, that is, to the intersection of the s f(k) curve 
with the (n + δ ) k line. The corresponding value of k is denoted 
k*. Algebraically, 
 
s f(k*)= ( n + δ  ) k*                                             (22) 
 
“Since k is the steady state, y and c are also constant at 
the values y*=f(k) and c*=(1-s) f(k), respectively. Hence, in the 
neoclassical model, the per capita quantities k, y, and c do not 
grow in the steady state. The constancy of the per capita 
magnitudes means that the levels of variables – K, Y, and C – 
grow in the steady state at the rate of population growth, n.” 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1999, p. 19) 
Development of the production forces in society, changes 
in technique within firms, and technical progress lead to changes 
in the skills of workers, income and consumption. With the 
increasing importance of human capital in development, the 
shifts along the horizontal axis in Figure 1.1 should be 
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considered with the new current rate of savings and 
accumulation of capital. 
These ideas are more clearly presented in Figure 1.2: 
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Figure 1.2. Poverty trap according to the modern 
interpretation by Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
 
A sufficiently large donation would place the economy on 
a path that leads eventually to a high level of the steady state or 
possibly to endogenous steady-state growth. Thus, a relatively 
large quantity of foreign aid might allow an escape from the 
poverty trap. Note that the policy of high saving can help a 
country escape the poverty trap even if the high saving is only 
temporary. It will also work if the economy’s temporary high 
ratio of domestic investment to GDP is financed by international 
loans, rather than from domestic saving (Barro, and Sala-I-
Martin, 1999). It is important to note, however, that 
technological change, the utilization of new production 
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technologies, and quality and productivity of labor force 
would shift the system to the left. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) analyzed the relationships 
among foreign aid, economic policies and economic growth 
using neoclassical growth theory as a theoretical framework for 
their study. According to the theory poor countries have a higher 
marginal rate of return on capital than rich countries and, 
therefore, a faster growth towards the steady-state.  The theory 
also suggests that foreign aid has a positive impact on growth 
when a recipient country is in transition to its steady-state and 
there is a negative correlation between tax distortion and growth. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggest that unsuccessful 
government economic policy might decrease the rate of return 
on capital and slow down the rate of growth. The authors state 
that the aid impact on growth depends on such macroeconomic 
factors and processes as budget surplus, inflation, and other 
measures of monetary policy and trade openness can have a 
positive or negative impact on growth, depending on the level of 
inflation and the budget deficit. If inflation is relatively low and 
manageable and the budget deficit is insignificant, the policy 
indicator is positive. Burnside and Dollar (2000) conclude that 
there are diminishing returns to foreign aid, a small, on average, 
impact of aid on growth, but a positive impact of aid on growth 
in the “good” policy environment that busts macroeconomic 
performance. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) disagree with the empirical 
results obtained by Burnside and Dollar and argue that 
relationships between foreign aid and growth are not conditional 
on recipient country economic policy. The authors take into 
consideration the fact that aid affects growth via capital 
investments, both physical and human. Inclusion of human 
capital and investment in the model may be considered as an 
innovative step toward investigating the relationship between 
foreign aid and growth. 
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1.7. Growth Reconsidered: Endogeneity of Human 
Capital 
 
Paul Romer, in his 1990 paper entitled “Endogenous 
Technological Change” includes technological changes into the 
model of growth (Barro, 1995, and Jones, 1998). He considers 
technology as the method used in a production process that 
transforms inputs into output and specifies research and 
development as sources for technological changes. He 
emphasized ideas that drive progress are specific types of goods 
considering them as non-rival in contrast to other goods. 
According to Romer non-rivalry nature of ideas implies 
increasing returns to scale (Barro, 1995, Jones, 1998). 
The implications of the Romer’s model might be found to 
be very similar to the neoclassical ideas. His model can be 
viewed as a “semi-endogenous” model because it predicts 
sustainable growth only in the case of endogenous technological 
progress and exogenous population growth. The labor force 
participates in the production process making capital productive 
and produces ideas which drive technological progress and, 
therefore, economic growth. Hence, investments in human 
capital are necessary in order to increase the productivity of 
labor and capital. For Romer, education is the main source for 
knowledge and a guide for the implementation of this 
knowledge in the production process. Health care development 
is another way to increase labor force productivity (Pomfret, 
2000). 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) developed an 
Augmented-Solow type model. They conclude: “We have 
suggested that international differences in income per capita are 
best understood using an augmented Solow growth model. In 
this model output is produced from physical capital, human 
capital, and labor, and is used for investment in physical capital, 
investment in human capital, and consumption.” (Mankiw, 
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Romer, and Weil, 1992, p. 432) The production function that 
is consistent with the empirical results is: 
 
Y K H L=
1
3
1
3
1
3                                                          (23) 
 
The model has several implications. First, the elasticity of 
income with respect to physical capital is not substantially 
different from capital’s share in income. This conclusion 
indicates that capital receives approximately its social return. 
There are no substantial externalities to the accumulation of 
physical capital. 
Second, the accumulation of physical capital has a larger 
impact on income per capita than the Solow model implies. A 
higher saving rate leads to higher income in the steady state, 
which in turn leads to a higher level of human capital. 
Third, population growth also has a larger impact on 
income per capita than the Solow model indicates. In the 
augmented model, human capital must be spread more thinly 
over the population of workers as well as capital because the 
higher population growth lowers measured total factor 
productivity. 
Fourth, the model has implications for the dynamics of 
the economy when the economy is not in the steady state. In 
contrast to endogenous-growth models, this model predicts that 
countries with similar technologies and rates of accumulation 
and population growth should converge in income per capita. 
“More generally, our results indicate that the Solow model is 
consistent with the international evidence if one acknowledges 
the importance of human as well as physical capital. The 
augmented Solow model says that differences in saving, 
education, and population growth should explain cross-country 
differences in income per capita. Our examination of the data 
indicates that these three variables do explain most of the 
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international variation.” (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992, p. 
433) 
There is research on low-development traps within the 
endogenous growth theories as well. Aghion and Howitt (1998 b) 
consider the model, based on Acemoglu (1994, 1997) and 
developed by Redding (1996). The model concludes that 
complementarity between workers’ education decisions and 
firms’ R&D decisions surprisingly will not open the possibility 
for multiple steady-state growth paths, including a low-
development trap. The more workers invest in education, the 
more will entrepreneurs invest in R&D. This can be formalized 
as the following: 
 
μ * = 1 if α < ρ ( λ -1)(1+ )(1-γυ θ β ), 0 otherwise,  (24) 
 
Thus, the more workers invest in education, i.e., the higher υ , 
the more will entrepreneurs invest in R&D. 
Such a trap will involve μ = 0 and therefore υ *= υ = 
( )βρθγ θ11− . For it to exist we simply need 
 
α > ( )( )δ β λ1 1− − (1+γ ( )βρθγ θ11− )                       (25) 
 
Conversely, in order to a high growth steady-state path to 
exist, we need 
 
α < ( )( )δ β λ1 1− − (1+γ ( )βρθγ θ11− )                       (26) 
 
The corresponding growth rates will be g = g = ln λ  in 
the high-growth equilibrium and g = g = 0 in the low-
development trap (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 342). 
Aghion and Howitt conclude that: “Because of the 
strategic complementarity between R&D and education, we did 
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not have to introduce threshold externalities in the 
accumulation of human capital in order to generate multiple 
equilibria and low-development traps. Second, targeted 
education policies and R&D subsidies appear as substitutable 
instruments for moving the economy away from a low-
development trap. In practice, however, education subsidies may 
be easier to monitor than R&D subsidies to industries (the scope 
for diversion and manipulation being presumably larger in the 
latter case).” (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 342) 
In summary, we find from our review of the literature that 
historically economic growth was considered indivisibly from 
industrial capital. However, empirical evidence indicates that the 
primary accumulation of capital was not confined to the 
industrial sector. Technological changes before the industrial 
revolution were exogenous to the production process. 
With technological maturity (Rostow, 1990), industry 
became the engine of production, and the accumulation of 
capital occurred within manufacturing and was followed by 
reinvestment. However, technological change was still assumed 
to be exogenous to production, and the theory of exogenous 
economic growth dominated until 1970s. 
Beginning in the 1980s economists began to 
conceptualize technological changes from within production. 
Emphasis was placed on R&D, and the problem of the 
accumulation of capital was transferred into the problem of 
investment and the balance between saving and consumption. 
Labor was an input that could be developed by investing in 
human capital, and growth was stimulated by improvements in 
labor quality. The quality of labor was considered as 
accumulated capital, and firms faced new choices among 
physical capital and human capital investments. The endogenous 
theory of economic growth currently dominates the literature on 
economic growth. 
As Valdes (1999) points out: 
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Ever since the new wave of research on growth theory 
began in the late 1980s, proponents of the two theories 
have been (on and off) arguing over which of the two 
approaches is better. One (possibly the first) round of the 
dispute was fought in the empirical arena. To meet the 
empirical finding that λ  = -0. 022, (α ) the parameter in 
the aggregate production function ( )Y K A Lt t t t −α α1=  has 
to be approximately to 0.7 (consequently, 1- α  = 0.3). 
In the Solow-Swan (S&S) model factor inputs are paid 
their marginal products, thus in this model α  is the share 
of K (and 1- α is the share of L) in national income. So 
the model predicted (this was the interpretation at the 
time) that K must receive about 70 percent of the 
national income and L about 30 percent of it. However, 
the national income accounts were indicating the 
opposite: a 30 percent share for K and a 70 percent for L. 
The proponents of the new theory took it for certain that 
it was the S&S model which failed. 
Specifically, it assumed that K and L were paid their 
marginal products but in reality K is paid less and L more 
than that. Why? Because each new bit of K generates an 
externality for which it is not compensated. 
The important point is that the new theory, by means of 
this externality effect, could explain the observed 
discrepancy between each factor’s marginal product and 
their actual redistributions.  
Then, as it often happens in intellectual disputes, the old 
theory had its turn on the issue and the human capital 
augmented S&S model came to its rescue. 
Another round in the debate between the two theories 
seems to have been constructed over their (as-of-today-
known) implications for economic policy. (Valdes, 1999, 
pp. 168-169) 
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The literature on growth has examined other issues that 
are important to the understanding of the growth process. It is 
useful to highlight some of this research. First, within the broad 
discussion of exogenous versus endogenous growth, we find the 
following research particularly noteworthy: Von Neumann 
(1946), Johansen (1959), Vanek (1968), Kendrick (1976), 
Morgan and Hageman (1999), and Grafts (1995), who 
reconsiders the British industrial revolution in historical 
perspective staying on both positions of exogenous and 
endogenous growth theories (Grafts, 1995); effects of inequality 
on growth (Barro, 2000; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Easterly, 
2001; Gould et al., 2001); institutional structure and economic 
growth (Barro, 1996, 1997; Durham, 1999; Ghost, 1999; 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Lal, 2000; Lensink and Kuper, 
2000; Bleaney et al. 2002); human capital and economic growth 
(Black, 1962; Schultz, 1963, 1970, 1981, 1990, 1993; Romer, 
1986, 1989, 1990, 1994; Scott, 1989; Aghion and Howitt, 1996; 
Mincer, 1996; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Ruth, 1998; 
McDermott, 1999; Zagler, 1999; Berthelemy, Pissarides, and 
Varoudakis, 2000; Kalaitzidakis et. al., 2001); growth in the CIS 
(Havrilishin, 1999). These issues are briefly discussed below. 
 
1.8. Major Directions in Research of Economic Growth 
 
1.8.1. Inequality and growth 
Barro examined data from a broad panel of countries and 
found little overall relation between income inequality and rates 
of growth and investment, but he did find a negative relationship 
in low-income countries. “For growth, there is an indication that 
inequality retards growth in poor countries but encourages 
growth in richer places. Growth tends to fall with greater 
inequality when per capita GDP is below around $2000 and to 
rise with inequality when per capita GDP is above $2000.” 
(Barro, 2000) However, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) found, 
using a broader historical perspective and starting from the 19th 
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century worldwide, that countries with greater income 
inequality had lower growth (Argentina, for instance), but 
countries with lower initial inequality grew faster over time. 
 
1.8.2. Institutional structure and growth 
Jones and Williams (2000) consider research and 
development as a key determinant of long run productivity and 
welfare. They develop an endogenous growth model that 
incorporates parametrically important distortions in R&D: the 
surplus appropriability problem, knowledge spillovers, creative 
destruction, and duplication externalities. The authors assert: 
“Calibrating the model, we find that the decentralized economy 
typically underinvests in R&D relatively to what is socially 
optimal.” (Jones and Williams, 2000) 
Aghion and Howitt (1996) examined heterogeneity in the 
structure of innovative activity by making a distinction between 
research and development. They pointed out: “One advantage 
that Schumpeterian’s growth models is their greater specificity 
concerning how knowledge is used, how it is generated, and 
how it creates losses as well as gains… There are many kinds of 
innovative activity, generating many different kinds of 
knowledge. An aggregate theory that fails to distinguish 
between these different activities is potentially misleading if the 
distinction matters.” (Aghion and Howitt, 1996) They concluded 
that the level of research tends to covary positively with the rate 
of growth, even in the extreme case where the general 
knowledge that underlies long-run growth is created by 
secondary innovations arising from the development process. 
R&D effects on long-run growth were researched by Segerstorm 
(2000) and Sorensen (1999). 
 
1.8.3. Measurement of human capital and issues of 
allocation 
Measurement of human capital and issues of allocation 
are presented by Mincer (1996), Ruth (1998), Barro (1999), 
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Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000). Emphasis on measurement 
of human capital and its implication for economic growth are 
made by Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001). Based on cross country 
growth regressions and measures of human capital, presented in 
studies by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Benhabib and 
Spiegel (2000), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), Pritchett (1996), 
Barro (1997), Krueger and Lindahl (2000), they argue that a 
semiparametric, partially linear regression model specification 
of the cross country growth regression function is a particularly 
useful way of studying the contribution of human capital to 
economic growth. The semiparametric partially linear regression 
model is written as: 
 ( )Y x q Z Uit itT it it= + +γ                                           (27) 
 
Where  is a variable of dimension q, xit γ  is q × 1 vector of 
unknown parameters, Z  is a continuous variable of dimension 
p and g() is an unknown function.  refers to various measures 
of human capital. Human capital is measured by the level of 
education and gender. They conclude that the effect of human 
capital accumulation on growth is nonlinear and that there are 
threshold levels of human capital and growth for each country. 
it
Zit
Shioji (2001) incorporates human capital into his 
conception of public capital, and he estimates dynamic effects of 
public capital on output per capita. The other components of 
public capital are: infrastructure, conservation of national land, 
and agriculture and fishery. Based on an open economy growth 
model, he derives an income convergence equation augmented 
with public capital (PUP). The relationship between steady state 
output per unit (Y) of labor and public capital (PUP) is presented 
by following equation: 
 
 67
YY PUPit j jit
j
J
* = × +−
=
∑ φ τ
1
i ,                                   (28) 
 
where ( )φ i iC a= −/ 1 . 
φi  represents the long-run elasticity of output with respect to 
public capital per capita, and C is a short-run elasticity. 
Shioji found that each component of PUP had positive 
effects on Y, but infrastructure was more important to growth 
than education and had a more significant positive effect on 
productivity than education. These results can be interpreted as 
support for endogenous growth. 
 
1.8.4. Economic growth in the works of Ukrainian and 
Russian economists 
The major directions of research on economic growth 
conducted by the Ukrainian and Russian economists may be 
formulated as follows: 
The role of innovations, intellectual capital and human 
resources, presented in the works of Aleksandrova (2003), 
Bazhal (2002), Bazhal and Odotjuk (2003), Brydun (2003), 
Vovkanich (2005), Garipova Gizatulin, and Garipov (2004), 
Heyets, (2000, 2001, 2003), Golikova, (2003), Danilishin and 
Kotsenko (2006), Dem’janenko (2003), Dubjanskaja (2005), 
Zhits (2000), Ivlev (2004), Kendjuhov (2003, 2005), Kireyev 
and Shnypko (2003), Lapko (2003), Oleynik (2003), Onyshko 
(2003), Pavlova (2001), Perminov, Egorova, and Pyatkovski 
(2004), Revenko (2003), Simkina (2002), Suhorukov (2006), 
Cherevko and Lukash (1998), Chechelev, Ivlev, and Kozlov 
(2001), Hristenko, Mikul’skij, and Nizhegorodtsev (2002), 
Shchedrina (2003); 
Investment and investment resources for growth, as 
reflected in the works of Bolhovitinova (2003), Bolhovitinova 
and Mar’enko (2003), Gal’chins’kyj (2004), Kvashnina (2004), 
Levochkin (2004), Ovchinnikova (2004), Romanova (2002); 
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Institutions, institutional reforms, and institutional 
environment, including works of Dan’ko (2003) Golikov and 
Fedorenko (2003), Hrytsenko (2001, 2003), Grushevskaja 
(2004), Koshkin and Shabaev (2004), Novitskij (2005), 
Tarasevich (2003), Ungaeva (2005), Chechelev, Ivlev, and 
Kozlov (2001), Shnypko (2003), Yaremenko (2001, 2003); 
Macroeconomic modeling, economic growth models, 
measurements and estimations, macroeconomic dynamics, and 
economic forecasting, including works of Heyets (1999, 2000, 
2001, 2003), Zverev (2005), Ivanter (2006, 2004), Kosenkov 
(2005), Krjuchkova (2001), Ovchinnikova (2004), Samojlov 
(2005); 
Finance, stock market, and monetary policy, as presented 
in Vozhzhov (2004), Golub (2006), Kvasnjuk (2000, 2003), 
Krichevskaja (2003), Lunina (2000, 2003), Prihod’ko (2003), 
Snigir’ and Shumskaja (2003), Fedorenko (2003); 
The role of the state, state regulations, governance, fiscal 
policy, and the state budget, presented by Balabanova (2004), 
Bazhal (2002), Vahnenko (2000, 2003), Kalinina (2005), 
Kvasnjuk (2000, 2003), Prihod’ko (2003), Fridman, Vidjasov, 
and Mel’jantsev (1998) Perepelkin (2001); 
Theories of transformation and economic growth, 
presented in the works of Veretennikova (2005), Vilenskij, 
Buhvald, and Runov (2002), Heyets (2000, 2001), Hrytsenko 
(1997, 1999), Evstigneeva and Evstigneev (2005), Zemskova 
(2005), Kvasnjuk (2000, 2003), Kuznetsova (2000), Lavrov and 
Kapoguzov (2006), L’vov (2004), Perepelkin (2001), Petkova 
(2005), Pokrytan (1997), Ponomarev (2004), Rokochaja and 
Moroz (1998), Savchenko (2005), Saktoev (1999), Salijchuk 
(2004), Seleznev (2001), Sokolovskij (2001), Solovejkina 
(2002), Spirjagin (2005), Tochilin (2001), Tjurina (2005), 
Cherednichenko (2004), Chuhno (1996), Shubravskaja (2005), 
Yatskevich (2006); 
Economic integration, competitiveness of the national 
products in the open market, and growth, presented by Heyets 
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and Shumskaja (2003), Zas’ko (2004), Kireev (2003), Kireev 
and Shnypko (2003), Krjuchkova (2000), Lavshov and 
Spizharskaja (2004), Lir and Podolets (2003), Sidenko (2003), 
Tolmachev (2005), Shnypko (2003). 
The strong features of the research on economic growth, 
conducted by the Ukrainian economists, lie primarily in the 
domains of the theory of transformation, vision of economic 
growth in line with transition from predominantly exogenous to 
endogenous forms of growth, institutional aspects of growth, 
and the role of innovations and intellectual capital in economic 
growth. Works of the Russian economists, devoted to economic 
growth, are presented first of all in such sub-fields, as theories of 
transformation, analysis of the basic Western concepts and 
theories of economic growth, including issues of the 
macroeconomic dynamics and general equilibrium, models of 
economic growth, and impact of macroeconomic variables on 
economic growth. 
The common feature of the research done by both the 
Ukrainian and the Russian economists is the popularity of 
studying the role of investment and finance for economic growth. 
For us, the structuralist approach has certain advantages along 
with the neo-liberal approach. It might be beneficial to pay more 
attention to such aspects of economic growth, as methodology 
and categorization, structural reorganization of the national 
economies in the post-transition societies, national accounts and 
macroeconomic balance, macroeconomic modeling, and long-
run economic forecasting, rather than to the issues of foreign 
direct investments, currency exchange rate fluctuations, and 
alike. 
 
1.9. Concluding remarks 
 
Theories of transition were loosely tied to the theories of 
growth. While the Western theorists of economic transition 
focus on such neo-liberal concepts and aspects of transition, as 
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privatization, inflation, free pricing, supply and demand, 
economists in the Russian Federation and Ukraine continue 
using Marxist and post-Marxist conceptual frameworks for 
analysis of transition. In their view these frames seem to be 
more appropriate for understanding of the current events and 
phenomena that take place in the former Soviet Bloc. 
Different approaches highlight different aspects of 
transition and post-transition development. In this sense all 
variety of approaches and positions may be considered as 
beneficial. At the same time exogenous models of growth often 
specifically designed for the developing economies in the third 
world countries are not sufficient in theorizing growth and 
development in transition economies. Nor are aging concepts 
borrowed from Marxism up to this task. The economists in 
transition economies have to familiarize themselves with the 
different concepts of growth, including both exogenous and 
endogenous models of growth and learn to synthesize ideas of 
neo-liberalism and post-structuralism. 
In our view, the prioritization of the structuralists’ 
approach to the post-transition economies and structuralism 
overall has an objective ground. Economic growth in the post-
transition societies is based on the development of the domestic 
market. Accordingly, sustainability and rate of growth will be 
based on the total volume of the domestic market and dynamics 
of its development. Structuralism as applied to post-transition 
societies can accommodate institutionalism and studies of 
institutional transformation, and contain macroeconomic 
modeling, statistical analysis, stability of the national economies 
and points of equilibrium, as well as economic cycle and the 
theory of long waves. 
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PART II 
 
ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
UKRAINE 
 
2.1. Possibility of Endogenous Growth in Ukraine 
 
Sustainable GDP growth in Ukraine of 5.9 percent in 
2000, 9.4 percent in 2003, and 12.1 percent in 2004 with 
predicted growth of around 5 percent for 2005 is impressive, 
indeed, especially as it happens along with the stable and 
continuing decline in population. While in the year 2000 Gross 
National Income per capita was only $690, it constituted $970 in 
2003, and has risen to $1260 in 2004 with predicted increase in 
2005. These numbers are in nominal USD. Same trends 
characterize recent economic development in the Russian 
Federation and other countries of the former Soviet Bloc (see 
Appendices II and III). 
Economic growth in the former Soviet Union was mostly 
extensive, and always required new injections of capital and 
labor. Volume of capital and labor increased over time. Human 
capital development as expressed by the level of educational 
attainment of population was among the highest in the world for 
the last five decades (see Appendix VIII). Technical progress 
was also very impressive. At the same time, capacity utilization 
was very poor for all factors of production. For instance, 
products of research were utilized mostly in the military industry. 
In addition, allocative efficiency was low because the allocation 
mechanisms were based on plan and directives or orders. 
Retrospective analysis shows that by the year 1999 
Ukraine was in the deep transition. This transition was 
multidimensional and had deep roots. It was a change in 
economic, social and political life, ideology, religion, and so 
forth. Indeed, by 1999 Ukraine was undergoing a deep socio-
economic transformation. This transformation found its 
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reflection not only in the economy, but in changing ideology, 
religion, culture, and other non-economic spheres of human 
activities. At the same time problems that appeared during the 
transition period were not caused by transition. Nor they were 
creations of the reform. These problems accumulated well 
before the reform and made the transition more complex than it 
would be otherwise. 
According to the official statistics that does not take into 
account shadow economy, GDP per capita in Ukraine was only 
$850 in 1998 and $750 in 1999. It had a 50 percent decline from 
1991 to 1997. Industrial production declined 63 percent while 
output in agriculture decreased 40 percent. Depreciation rates of 
fixed capital stock in the manufacturing industries were around 
35-40 percent during 1991-1995. Many plants did not invest in 
fixed capital. Machinery, equipment, and other facilities were 
deteriorating. This caused decline in productivity and 
manufacturing capacities. National income per worker decreased 
50 percent during 1990-1995. The average rate of decline in 
productivity was calculated at 8.6 percent per annum. 
Social conditions and living conditions of population 
were deteriorating as well. Approximately 40 percent of the 
population were below the poverty line. Food expenses were 
around 78 percent of the family budget in Ukraine, around 54 
percent in the Russian Federation, and 34 percent in Poland. 
Minimum wage in the Ukraine in 1990 was twice as high as the 
living wage. Minimum wage declined to the level of living wage 
in 1992 and was five times less than living wage by 1995. The 
official statistics does not reflect two major things: undeclared 
incomes from the shadow economy and illegal activities and 
housing cost. While food expenses in Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation were above 50 percent of the family budget, housing 
expenses were minimal. Many families did not pay for housing 
and utilities for months and even years. The payments 
themselves were incredibly small as compared to Eastern 
European countries and even more so Western Europe. 
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Inequality in income distribution increased during the 
1990s. In Ukraine in 1995, income of the richest decile was 
equal to 30 percent of the total income of population while 
income of the poorest decile was equal to 2.3 percent only, i.e. 
income of the richest decile was 14 times higher than of the 
poorest decile. The minimum wage in the Russian 
Federation in 1990 exceeded twice the living wage, but in 
1992 they were equal, and in 1995 the living wage was five 
times larger than the minimum wage. The minimum wage 
situation in Ukraine was similar to the situation in the Russian 
Federation. The richest 10 percent of the population in Ukraine 
in 1995 received 30 percent of aggregate income, and the 
poorest 10 percent received 2.3 percent. The Gini coefficient in 
1996 was 0.382 for Russia, and 0.386 for Ukraine. In 1997, 
there was little change in the Gini coefficient in either country 
(Osipian, 2001). 
Assuming that access to undeclared income was much 
higher among the families that belonged to the richest decile we 
can think that the real difference was even higher than 14 times. 
Inequality in income distribution increased 1.6 times from 1991 
to 1997. The Gini coefficient was calculated from data on the 
declared income only, and thus the measure of inequality likely 
increased more than 1.6 times during the six-year period of 
1991-1997. 
Such a sharp increase in inequalities and deterioration of 
living conditions, reported based on the official statistics, 
necessitates an explanation to the presence of potential resources 
for future sustainable growth. Indeed, change of sharp decline 
with sharp increase in GDP requires a conceptual explanation. 
This worsening in socio-economic conditions of the population 
in Ukraine motivates research on the causes and consequences 
of this disruption so that effective policy can be developed and 
implemented to assist those most in need, to maintain economic 
stability and sustainable growth. 
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The question one should address is to what extent was it 
possible to predict the growth of 2000s in the mid- and late 
1990s? Did it seem possible to have economic growth in 
Ukraine at that time? The IMF addressed this issue in 1995, and 
its analysis and proposed forecasts were based on discussions 
with the Ukrainian authorities. These projections are presented 
in Table 2.1. 
 
TABLE 2.1 
 
IMF macroeconomic forecasts for Ukraine, 1995-2000 
 
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Average wage 
per month, in 
USD 
49 76 103 126 155 155
(percentage change over previous period) 
Real GDP -12 -8 3 4 6 6
(Percentage change within period) 
Consumer prices 182 43 24 12 10 10
Producer prices 172 27 21 12 10 10
Real exchange 
rate (producer 
prices, against 
USD) 
60 23 19 8 7 -
(in percent of GDP) 
Consumption 83.4 83.8 83.6 82.3 81.3 80.7
Private 
consumption 
61.3 63.6 65.4 64.8 63.6 63.0
Public 
consumption 
22.1 20.2 18.2 17.5 17.7 17.7
Gross fixed asset 
accumulation 
16.0 16.8 18.4 19.5 19.9 20.3
Private gross 13.4 15.7 16.4 16.5 16.9 17.3
 75
fixed asset 
accumulation 
Public gross 
fixed asset 
accumulation 
2.6 1.1 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Net exports -3.4 -2.6 -1.9 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6
Exports of goods 
and nonfactor 
services 
45.7 42.9 36.3 33.1 30.4 29.5
Imports of goods 
and nonfactor 
services 
49.1 45.5 38.2 34.4 31.1 30.1
Domestic saving 16.6 16.2 16.4 17.7 18.7 19.3
Private 18.6 18.0 16.3 16.7 17.7 18.3
Public -2.0 -1.8 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
National saving 15.8 15.9 15.4 16.8 17.9 18.5
Current account -4.2 -3.0 -2.8 -2.1 -1.7 -1.4
Memorandum items 
Consolidated 
budget balance 
-4.6 -3.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0
Revenue 38.9 36.3 35.2 35.1 35.1 35.1
Expenditure 43.5 39.2 37.1 37.1 37.1 37.1
Total external 
liabilities 
22.6 21 19.3 18.7 17.2 15.4
Debt-service 
ratio (percent of 
exports) 
9.3 6.6 8.3 9.7 12.0 11.2
Source: IMF staff projections based on discussions with 
the Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine: Recent Economic 
Developments. IMF Staff Country Report #96/21. Washington, 
D.C.: IMF, 1996. 
 
As follows from the data presented in Table 2.1, positive 
growth in real GDP was projected to be 3 percent in 1997 and 
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increased to 6 percent in 2000. The projected average wage 
per month, expressed in US dollars, increased threefold during 
the period of 1995-2000. The percentage changes in both 
consumer prices and producer prices were projected to decrease 
from 182 and 172 in 1995, respectively, to 10 percent in 2000. 
Domestic saving was projected to slightly increase from 16.6 
percent of GDP in 1995 to 19.3 percent in 2000. Finally, 
projected total external liabilities decreased from 22.6 percent of 
GDP in 1995 to 15.4 percent of GDP in 2000. These projections 
were too optimistic, as shown in Table 2.2, and some of them 
were not realized. Table 2.2 is based on IMF estimates derived 
from information provided by the Ukrainian authorities. 
Under Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement, the 
IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every 
year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and 
financial information, and discusses with officials the country's 
economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, 
the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion 
by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the discussion, the 
Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the 
views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to 
the country's authorities. This PIN summarizes the views of the 
Executive Board as expressed during the December 19, 2000 
Executive Board discussion based on the staff report. Selected 
macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine for the period of 1997-
2000 are presented in Table 2.2. 
According to Table 2.2, real GDP growth in 2000 was 4.2 
percent, which was below the 6 percent growth rate projected. In 
addition, as mentioned in the IMF report of 2001: “The 
economic situation in 2000 has been encouraging. Following the 
gradual stabilization of the economy in 1999 in the aftermath of 
the Russia crisis, real GDP growth in 2000 turned positive for 
the first time since independence, and was expected under the 
program to reach some 4 percent for the year as a whole. The 
nominal exchange rate remained broadly stable in 2000. 
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TABLE 2.2 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine, 1997-2000, 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
Program 
Projectio
ns 1 
 (Percent change, unless indicated otherwise) 
Production and prices      
Nominal GDP (in millions of 
hryvnia) 93,36 102,59 127,13 165,959 
Real GDP growth  -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 4.2 
Consumer price index (period 
average) 15.9 10.5 22.7 28.4 
Consumer price index (end of 
period) 10.1 20.0 19.2 27.1 
      
 (In percent of GDP) 
Public finance       
Consolidated government 
budget balance, cash basis -5.4 -2.8 -2.4 -1.5 
Of which: Primary balance -3.6 -0.4 0.0 1.5 
Revenue 38.8 36.0 34.7 34.4 
Expenditure 44.2 38.7 37.1 35.9 
      
 (Annual change in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 
Money and credit      
Base money 44.6 21.9 39.2 30.3 
Broad money 33.9 25.3 40.4 35.8 
Net domestic assets of the 
banking system 32.0 117.9 37.7 0.1 
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Velocity (annual GDP divided 
by period-average broad 
money) 
8.5 7.3 6.7 6.4 
      
External sector      
Current account balance (in 
percent of GDP) -2.7 -3.1 2.7 4.8 
External public debt (in 
percent of GDP) 23.4 27.4 39.0 36.2 
Debt service ratio, after 
rescheduling (in percent of 
exports of goods and nonfactor 
services) 
7.5 13.5 18.5 13.4 
Terms of trade (annual change 
in percent) -4.7 3.6 11.4 -8.2 
Gross reserves (end of period; 
in weeks of current year 
imports of goods and nonfactor 
services) 
5.6 2.2 3.7 3.0 
Sources: Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff estimates 
and projections. Data for 2000 are staff estimates and program 
projections. Since the Board discussion, official estimates for 
2000 have been updated; these indicate, in particular, GDP 
growth of 6 percent, a budget deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP, and 
end of period inflation of 25.8 percent. 
 
Arrears in the social sectors were reduced by 1.1 percent 
of GDP, with pension fund arrears eliminated by end-September. 
Some payments arrears, however, were accumulated in the 
energy and utility sectors. 
Some progress has been made on structural reform. 
Executive Directors welcomed the recent improvements in 
economic policy implementation, and endorsed Ukraine’s 
overall economic strategy based on a sound budget, tight 
monetary policy, and supportive structural reforms. Directors 
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were encouraged by the recent economic performance, noting 
that real GDP growth in 2000 is expected to be positive… and 
approach 5 percent.” (IMF, 2001, p. 7) 
We do not discuss all aspects of these positive 
achievements, but we note that if real pensions and other social 
transfers would be reduced to an anecdotal $1 per month, arrears 
would disappear immediately. We focus on economic growth, 
and our task is to test whether the accumulation of human 
capital has a positive impact on GDP per capita growth in 
transition economies. 
In Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 1990s output 
growth was negative. This can be clearly seen from the data, 
presented in Table 2.3. 
 
TABLE 2.3 
 
Selected indicators of economic growth in Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation, 1991-1997 
 
Year Ukraine Russia 
1991 -11.9  -5.0 
1992 -17.0 -14.5 
1993 -14.2  -8.7 
1994 -22.9 -12.6 
1995 -12.2  -4.0 
1996 -10.0  -2.8 
1997  -3.2   0.4 
Source: Havrylyshyn, O., Izvorski, I., and Rooden, R. 
(1999). Growth in Transition Economies 1990-1997: An 
Econometric Analysis with Application to Ukraine. In A. 
Siedenberg and L. Hoffman (Eds.). Ukraine at the Crossroads: 
Economic Reforms in International Perspective. Berlin: 
Physica-Verlag. 
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There was always a large amount of available labor 
force present in the economy, because of high real and hidden 
unemployment in the country. At the same time Ukraine had a 
very high rate of capital accumulation, possibly even higher than 
during the Soviet times. However, accumulated capital has been 
leaving the country. There was no process of reinvestment 
taking place. Low capacity utilization (underemployment, for 
instance), low allocative efficiency as a consequence of the 
corporate-monopolistic type of allocation, depreciation of 
principal capital, human capital outflow, slowdown in technical 
progress, and the lost time and missed opportunities for timely 
changes made the problem of initiating growth even more 
difficult. At the same time, the authorities in Ukraine 
emphasized the development of the domestic market rather than 
steering the economy towards export orientation at the 
beginning of transition. They requested more foreign credits and 
foreign direct investments (FDI) without creating welcoming 
conditions for businesses in the country. 
Unemployment was around 1 million people in 1998, 
with the official rate of unemployment of around 5 percent for 
the year 2000 (Kravchuk, 2002). These indicators did not 
account for latent unemployment, underemployment, long-term 
leaves, and arrays in salaries and other compensatory payments. 
As Kravchuk (2002) points out: “Wages tend to bear little 
relationship to labor productivity level, which vary broadly. In 
any case, labor productivity rates in Ukrainian industry have 
been falling since 1991, and by 1997 were but 70-75 percent of 
their 1990 levels. As such, Ukraine has not been able to take 
advantage of its relatively low-cost, well-educated work force.” 
(p. 28) 
Intensive human capital outflow, the so-called “brain 
drain,” along with intensive “capital flight” that took place in 
Ukraine, Russia, and other CIS countries, was especially 
significant during the period of 1993-1999. The primary venue 
for capital outsourcing was import-export operations, when 
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profits were deposited in foreign banks instead of being 
returned to the country and reinvested. By some estimates, the 
amount of Ukrainian capital abroad constituted somewhere 
around $25 to $50 billion in 1996 (Kravchuk, 2002, p. 32). This 
outflow of capital had a negative economic impact on growth. 
The implication for Ukraine was that a very large inflow 
of foreign capital was needed to compensate for this drain of the 
nation’s own capital resources, but this was not likely to happen 
soon. Ukraine had “to live above its means” and depend upon 
the foreign credit it received. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
conclude that foreign aid is, at best, only partially successful at 
promoting growth and reducing poverty. The reasons are poor 
institutional development, corruption, inefficiency and 
bureaucratic failures in developing countries (Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994). Moreover, the situation becomes more difficult 
with the necessity to service foreign debt, which, in contrast to 
domestic debt in wages and social payments (pensions, stipends), 
is always serviced on time. Some of the chief vehicles for debt 
reduction are debt-equity swaps and debt-debt swaps, which are 
going to take place particularly between the Russian 
Federation and Germany and are described by Dornbush 
(1996). Dornbush concludes that these swaps rarely serve the 
interests of the creditor. In addition, Brazil and other countries 
recognized in the 1990s that their interests were poorly served 
by swaps. 
Ukraine’s positions on the international credit markets 
were very favorable at the beginning of the reform. As the 
Russian Federation took over all financial obligations of the 
USSR, Ukraine was considered quite credible by potential 
creditors and at the same time did not have any foreign debt. In 
this regard Kravchuk (2002) notes the following: “In 1992, 
Ukraine had no foreign debt outstanding. This provided the 
country’s most significant inherited economic resource: an 
enormous amount of debt capacity. As might be expected, 
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Ukraine’s foreign debts steadily increased over the 1990s. 
From an estimated $1.4 billion in late 1992, Ukraine’s 
indebtedness grew to over $12.1 billion by early 2000. The debt-
to-GDP ratio stood at between 15 to 20 percent in 1998 but rose 
to over 40 percent in 1999.” (p. 33) Servicing foreign debt 
becomes more and more of a burden. 
The financial system in Ukraine was supposed to 
accumulate savings and convert them into investments, but it 
was not up to this task: it was poorly developed and 
mismanaged. According to the research on the role of financial 
development in growth and investment by Benhabib and Spiegel 
(2000), such a financial system could not support economic 
growth. 
The detailed studies of particular areas of economic 
activities and industries in Ukraine, including foreign trade, 
institutional reform, modern growth trends, finance, fiscal 
regulation, investment, infrastructure, state regulation, 
restructuring, role of natural resources and regional aspects of 
development are presented in works of Akimova (2002), 
Gavrilenkov (2002), Gylfason (2002), Dabrowski (2002), 
Dodonov, Hirschhausen, Opitz and Sugolov (2002), Eremenko 
(2002), Hejets (2002), Havrylyshyn, Lissovolik, and Shadman-
Valavi (2002), Jahnke (2002), Kobzev (2002), Kravchuk (2002), 
Mankovska and Dean (2002), Ogutcu (2002), Scherbakov 
(2002), Thiel (2002), Volosovych (2002), and others. 
Indicators of economic development presented in Table 
2.4 are useful for seeing whether, on the basis of exogenous 
variables included in economic growth models, it was possible 
to predict or explain economic growth in Ukraine. As one can 
see, all the indicators in Table 2.4 indicate that the initiation of 
economic growth was quite problematic. 
Barro (2000) suggests that inequality retards growth in 
poor countries but encourages growth in richer places. Growth 
tends to fall with greater inequality when per capita GDP is 
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below around $2000 in 1985 US dollars and to rise with 
inequality when per capita GNP is above $2000. 
 
TABLE 2.4 
 
Selected indicators of economic development in Ukraine, 1996 
and 1998 
 
Indicator Ukraine 
GDP per capita $ 750 as for 1998 
productivity of labor 60-70 percent of 1991 
depreciation of capital immeasurable 
foreign credits $12.5 billion as for 1998 
foreign credits per capita $250 as for 1998 
total debt services $2 billion as for 1998 
debt services per capita $40 as for 1998 
FDI net inflows $743 million as for 1998 
FDI per capita $15.5 as for 1998 
aid per capita $7.6 as for 1998 
National capital outflow Varies, $20 to $60 billion 
savings of population $12 billion for 1996 
Gini coefficient 0.38672 in 1996 
invested savings of population less than $1 billion for 1996 
Source: www.worldbank.org 
 
We would like to notice the following: 
(1) In Ukraine in 1997, per capita GDP was $1040, and 
per capita GNP calculated based on the basis of purchasing 
power parity was $2170. According to the estimates, presented 
by the World Bank, per capita GDP in 1997 was $850 and in 
1998 it was about $750, and income inequality, indicated by the 
Gini coefficient, continues to grow. 
(2) According to some commonly accepted estimates, 
Ukraine needed approximately $60 billion in long term 
investments and credits for restructuring. During the period from 
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1992 to 2000 it received only $12.5 billion in the form of 
credits, less than $1 billion in FDI, and a small amount of 
portfolio investments. 
For comparison, Mexico received $40 billion in 1989 
during its crisis; Republic of Korea received approximately $50 
billion in 1998 to support its national currency. These were 
short-term credits from the currency stabilization funds. Poland 
received $60 billion in foreign credits and FDI at the beginning 
of transition in the early 1990s for restructuring and renewal of 
its principal capital in the industry. 
(3) The significant capital outflow along with the personal 
savings not being converted into investment caused negative 
economic growth in Ukraine. Diminishing population, depletion 
of resources, depreciation of principal capital, low productivity 
of labor, structural problems, poor management, and absence of 
a well-developed state economic policy all contributed to the 
long run negative economic growth in Ukraine. 
Inequality is likely to have a negative impact on growth in 
low-income countries (Barro, 2000). The low level of foreign 
capital can keep growth at a low rate (Leontief, 1958). From this 
discussion, one might conclude that Ukraine would not grow 
rapidly without large initial infusions of capital. We, therefore, 
seek some other “engine of growth”- in addition to the 
accumulation of capital. Solow proposed technological change, 
a steady flow of new ideas. The neoclassical growth model 
focuses on the capital accumulation decision, but it is growth in 
ideas – not merely in capital – that drives the system. A shift in 
emphasis from physical to human capital accumulation is 
needed, as well as a focus on decisions – such as the allocation 
of time among activities – that affect the rate of learning and the 
rate of accumulation of skills and ideas. In Ukraine human 
capital constitutes 6 percent of the overall world potential, with 
population 0.1 percent in 1993. Nevertheless, this capital was 
used in the system of the planned economy, and now the new 
system does not use this capital effectively in production. 
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Dobrowski (2002) points out on two groups of 
hypotheses of the recent economic growth in Ukraine: 
The first one refers to various temporary factors such as 
the low statistical base and presence of free production 
capacities after many years of output decline. Other 
‘windfall’ factor can be connected with effects of 1998-
1999 devaluation of Hryvnia, and strong external 
demand, particularly for the metallurgy products in year 
2000. The second approach believes that long-term 
structural factors such as effects of privatization and 
restructuring carried out so far, and moving a part from 
the shadow sector into the official one created a 
favorable environment for economic growth. While the 
latter leads to conclusion that the current growth may be 
sustainable in longer term, the former suggests a 
gradually decreasing growth trend. (p. 77) 
Havrylyshyn, (1999), Shen (1996), Fisher, Sahay, and 
Vegh (1996), and Blanchard (1997) examined the following key 
measures of the reform in transition economies: 
• macroeconomic stabilization; 
• price and market liberalization; 
• liberalization of the exchange and trade system; 
• privatization of state-owned firms; 
• establishing a competitive environment with few 
obstacles to market entry and exit; 
• redefining the role of the state as the provider of 
macro stability, a stable legal framework, enforceable property 
rights, and occasionally as a corrector of market imperfections. 
Based on such concepts the authors anticipate the 
following implications for growth that differentiate the transition 
economies from developed market economies: “First, output 
will necessarily decline initially. Second, growth of the new will 
not occur until the new incentives are in place and made credible. 
Third, the proximate mechanisms in the early recovery period 
are most likely a variety of efficiency improvements rather than 
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expansion of factor inputs such as investment and labor.” 
(Blanchard, 1997) 
As Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) point out, future 
research should be directed at explaining why the variables 
taken to be exogenous in the Solow model vary so much from 
country to country. They expect that differences in tax policies, 
education policies, tastes for children, and political stability will 
end up among the ultimate determinants of cross-country 
differences. 
By 2004, Ukraine achieved pre-reform level of per capita 
income. This indicates that the economic crisis is over. 
Nevertheless, overcoming the crisis along does not present 
necessary grounds for a suggestion that the national economy is 
now a pure market economy. Ukraine can rather be 
characterized as a predominantly market-type mixed economy, 
where a substantial public sector coexists with the dominating 
private sector. The private sector functions based on the market 
mechanisms, while there are also transitional forms and 
mechanisms of economic organization present in the country. 
These transitional forms continue to exist since early 1990s and 
slowly disappear, giving way to the market ones. 
Economy of Ukraine in 2007 can still be characterized 
with a certain level of mosaics. This level of mosaics, or mixed 
forms of economic activities and mechanisms, is less significant 
and not as noticeable as it was during the transition of 1990s. 
Characterization of Ukraine’s economy as a predominantly 
market-type mixed economy should not be considered as an 
indicator of the economy’s insufficiency for at least three 
reasons. First, pure market economy is non-existent and cannot 
be found anywhere in the world. Even in the US economy, 
probably the nearest approximation to what is known as a pure 
market economy, there are such features as the high degree of 
monopolization of the national economy, the large state sector, 
the growing public sector, including non-governmental 
organizations, and numerous non-economic restrictions and 
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regulations. All of those utilize non-market mechanisms and 
prevent from achieving a highest possible degree of economic 
effectiveness and efficiency. Second, Ukraine’s economy is still 
encounters a presence of some elements of transition economy, 
distinct from both planned economy and market economy. Third, 
Ukraine will likely preserve a substantial public sector, 
including healthcare, education, transport, and infrastructure. 
Ukraine has the European mentality with its welfare state, rather 
than the US mentality. This anticipates broad access to medical 
services and quality education. 
In order to identify the nature of economic growth and 
the role of human capital in the initiation of sustainable growth 
in the post-transition economies of market type it is necessary to 
use the following estimation criteria: 
volume, density, and structure of external inflows to the 
national economy, including foreign direct and portfolio 
investments, capital outflow, external debt volume and service; 
level of socialization of the economy, and presence or 
absence of the social trajectory in the current development; 
level of socio-economic development and presence of 
economic environment that favors involvement of human capital 
in production, including development of the labor market and 
the stock market; 
level of involvement of human capital in the national 
production for each national economy; 
scale of reproduction of human capital (increased, stable, 
reduced); 
forms of connecting workers with the means of 
production, the system of production relations, and the trajectory 
of its development; 
vectors of economic transition; 
level of development of socio-economic and 
organization-economic relations in the system; 
rate of economic growth and macroeconomic dynamics 
overall; 
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degree of prioritization of innovative development and 
its structure; 
presence of positive correlation between human capital 
and economic growth and its estimates; 
presence of the necessary conditions for an increased 
scale reproduction of human capital; 
presence of the conditions necessary for transition from 
predominantly exogenous to endogenous economic growth and 
socio-economic development. 
 
2.2. Place of Growth in the Transition Economy 
 
The recent calls for innovative development are 
numerous. The new terms and economic categories are being 
developed in support of the claims for innovations in the 
economy. Unfortunately, modern economic thought in Ukraine 
and in the Russian Federation does not go far beyond the 
general discussion of the advantages of innovative path of 
economic development. It remains within the limits of pseudo-
theorization and rarely attempts empirical research. 
The necessity of creation of the conditions favorable for 
the innovation-based economic development requires 
determining whether such process is possible and what is the 
degree of such possibility. This can be done based on the study 
of the major determinants of transformation and finding the 
place of such a process within the market transition and 
development of the post-transition economy. 
After the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine and other 
newly independent states were in the process of deep socio-
economic transformation. The transition of the national systems 
from one major condition to another was not linear, smooth, and 
gradual. While the general vector of transition was defined as 
moving toward the market, the reality presented former 
republics with a mixture of forms and mechanisms of economic 
development, including recession, crises, and social and 
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economic disintegration. Local crises turned into 
simplification of the economic mechanism and lead to shortages 
in entire industries. Well-developed market mechanisms 
coexisted with the primitive form of economic organization in 
countryside. There was a rapid increase in the differential 
between the center and the periphery. 
The system was initially reformed from the emerging 
market economy with agriculture dominating the entire 
economy into the centralized and bureaucratized system of 
planned economy with the substantial process of militarization. 
Domination of the defense industry and a large military complex 
are characteristics of centralized systems. 
The transition had an immense attention from the 
economists. We will briefly characterize major points of the 
scholarly discussion of economic transition that took place in 
1990s and continues today. 
Lisovitsky points out that the reform of 1990 led to the 
inversion of the previous system, while the degree of inversion 
was predetermined by the degree of its involution (Lisovitsky, 
1994, p. 20). Pokrytan characterizes market transition in Ukraine 
as a move to capitalism (Pokrytan, 1997, p. 18). Buzgalin says 
that the transition is a change of economic relations, including 
allocation of the resources, property rights, mode of production, 
incentives, goals and means of economic development, 
institutions, and legal conditions (Buzgalin, 1995, p. 40). 
Buzgalin sees non-economic determinants as dominant in 
transition and points out the mosaics of the transition economy 
that consists of many pieces of the new and the old. 
Economic development is influenced by non-economic 
processes and events, including political, geopolitical, socio-
cultural, ideological, military, and other factors. Accordingly, 
the transition economy is predetermined to be unstable. 
Market transition faces harsh critiques as well. Gosh sees 
process of transition as a process of emerging financial 
oligarchy and its alliance with the state (Gosh, 1998, p. 59). 
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Both political events and inertia of the past system influenced 
the process of market transition. Gosh supports gradual 
transition as the only possible productive form of market 
transition and relies on the examples of China and Vietnam. He 
also points out that the destructive character of the reform is 
directly connected to the degree of the reform. In his view, the 
Ukrainian economy suffered much more, than did the economy 
of Belarus, because economic and political reforms in Belarus 
were less significant and more gradual, than in Ukraine (Gosh, 
1998, p. 22). 
Buzgalin marks three major trends in the transition 
economies, including the gradual death of the mutant socialism, 
the emergence of the modern capitalism, and the humanization 
and socialization of socio-economic life (Buzgalin, 1997, p. 41). 
He gives priority to the last trend that includes innovative 
development and priority of human capital (Buzgalin, 1997, p. 
43). 
Chukhno delineates two major possible models of the 
economic transition and the future system. The first one is the 
way of classic capitalism that slowly evolves to the developed 
forms. It includes unavoidable formation of the army of 
workforce, alienation of workers from the means of production, 
high level of economic exploitation along with some elements of 
non-economic methods or forced labor, slow development of 
social partnership and humanization of labor (Chukhno, 1996, p. 
18). The second model is way more idealistic and relies on 
plurality of property rights, profit-sharing, worker participation, 
social partnership, and the move toward post-industrial society 
(Chukhno, 1996, p. 19). 
Kolganov makes emphasis on institutional diffusion as a 
characteristic of the transition economy (Kolganov, 1995, p. 57). 
This includes legal vacuum, unclear and changing property 
rights, and broken connections between different civil, economic, 
and regulatory institutions. The continuous redistribution of 
property rights takes place along with the process of legalization 
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of criminal capital and shadow or unofficial economy, and 
money laundering. Redistribution of property rights during the 
exogenous transformation is influenced by the local and 
corporate regulation and non-economic determinants. 
Forms of property and property rights embedded in the 
legislation are often inadequate to the realities of transition. 
Around 70 percent of large privatized enterprises were open-
membership joint-stock companies under the control of the state 
and the workers. This meant de facto concentration of the 
property rights in hands of the plant administration and the state 
bureaucrats. Zadorozhny points out that the existing forms of 
property are not supported by the necessary legal mechanisms 
(Zadorozhny, 1996, p. 134). 
The process of distribution and redistribution of property 
rights is often oversimplified and viewed as a development of 
private property. For instance, Sachs says that former state 
property is distributed for free among workers and population 
(Sachs, 1994, p. 48). This view is based exclusively on the 
legislation and does not take into account real processes in the 
economy. 
In soviet times alienation of workers from the means of 
production was hidden behind the fact of virtually absent 
unemployment and so-called state and collective forms of 
property. Private property did not exist, at least in legal terms. 
Economic transition included the process of conversion of the 
state property into monopolistic property of newly emerged 
corporations, where private capital shared property rights with 
the state nomenklatura, i.e. former and present state bureaucrats. 
Alienation of workers from the means of productions on both 
levels--process of production and property rights—lead to a 
dramatic increase in unemployment. Gritsenko points out that 
under the inversion-type transition alienation of workers from 
the means of production was formalized in legal terms 
(Gritsenko, 1997, p. 7). 
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The state started introducing the new system of 
economic relations and mechanisms of functioning in the old 
soviet system that had yet to use all of its resources and potential 
for the development. This process defined economic 
transformation as exogenous, made under the influence of 
external non-economic forces, such as the state (Gritsenko and 
Kim, 1993, p. 127). Exogenous transition led to the mixture of 
different forms and mechanisms of economic activities in the 
newly independent states, including the remnants of the soviet 
economy and the new emerging elements of the market 
economy. Mixed character of the market transition is different 
from the mixed economy. The mixed economy is a stable form 
of the national production that exists in all developed societies. 
In distinction of the classic historical way of 
development where market relations preceded industrial 
revolution and later industrialization, in the former USSR 
market relations were introduced in the industrialized system of 
production. As a result, the state property was transformed into 
the private property, planned prices were replaced with the free 
pricing mechanisms, and full obligatory employment gave way 
to the slowly emerging labor market. Under the classical type of 
transition from non-market economy to the market economy 
workers are alienated from land. At that time land along with 
labor was major factor of production. A good historical example 
would be the primary capital accumulation and early stages of 
capitalism in England. Under the inversion-type transition from 
the centralized system to the market system workers are 
alienated from the means of production, created by the previous 
generations of workers. These are primarily machinery, 
equipment, and buildings, i.e. products of industrialization. This 
process is described by Gritsenko along with the processes of 
socialization of primary capital accumulation during the market 
transition (Gritsenko, 1997, p. 6). 
The economic transition influenced forms of 
socialization as well. In the planned economy people were 
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guaranteed workplace, certain level of consumption, free 
access to elementary, secondary, higher, and graduate education, 
free access to healthcare, distribution of housing, and a well-
developed social security system. This system is to be replaced 
with the new system of social guarantees, typical for a market 
economy. However, the market system is only at the stage of its 
formation and not development. Such a mismatch led to the 
weakening of the system of social guarantees without its 
immediate replacement by the new system. 
Vorobyev, Gritsenko, and Kim see the contradiction 
between the old and the new system of social guarantees as one 
of the major characteristics of the inversion-type transition. The 
growing income inequality and distribution of property create 
incentives for economic growth (Vorobyev, Gritsenko, and Kim, 
1997, p. 70) Gosh suggests that the total volume of production 
in Ukraine declined 58.9 percent over the 1990s and that this 
proves the destructive character of market transition (Gosh, 
1997, p. 59). Rokochaya and Moroz argue the opposite, 
suggesting that economic transformation in which exogenous 
factors dominate is an effective way of evolutionary 
development (Rokochaya and Moroz, 1998, p. 59). 
The disintegration of the USSR led to the partial 
disintegration of the unified monolithic national economy with 
all of its ties. Only 20 percent of all the production in Ukraine 
was so-called full-cycle production. In most of the instances 
resources and parts were brought from the other republics and 
the final product was exported outside the republic. Despite the 
process of disintegration and other negative processes for the 
economy, the decline in production never reached 59 percent. It 
was less significant. 
The capitalization of the economy is also a positive 
process. The national economy will likely preserve a substantial 
public sector with the guaranteed access to healthcare and 
education. This will be to a certain extent a product of the 
Ukrainian mentality. In Ukraine, as well as in Russia, access to 
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medical services and quality education is traditionally 
considered as a human right. This is not typical for many 
countries. In the US in 2006 over 50 million people did not have 
health insurance and hence did not have access to healthcare. 
The share of workers who have health coverage through their 
employers declined from 73 percent in 1975 to 60 percent in 
2006. This means that one out of every six people in the US 
effectively does not have access to medical services. And this is 
in the most advanced nation where healthcare industry 
constituted in 2006 sixteen percent of GDP. It seems necessary 
for every developed nation to have universally accessible 
healthcare. In fact, the US might be the only exception in this 
sense. All of the developed countries, including Western Europe, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, Eastern Europe, and the RF, have 
systems of universal health coverage. 
A successful process of socialization is characterized by 
the sustainable and increased reproduction of human capital. 
Continuous process of reproduction of human capital 
necessitated a significant presence of the state in the national 
economy during the market transition. The leading role of the 
state for the initial stage of the transition was clear from the very 
beginning. Mocherny pointed out the necessary evolution of the 
state’s functions due to the fact that so-called market failures 
will be unavoidable (Mocherny, 1993, p. 18). 
We can name the following major characteristics of the 
process of market transition in Ukraine: 
property redistribution and alienation of workers from 
the means of production; 
economic restructuring; 
creation of market institutions; 
integration of the national economy into the world 
economy; 
partial dismantling of the socialist system of social 
guarantees and creation of the new system, based on the 
predominantly market economy. 
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In 1990s the economists expressed both pessimistic 
and optimistic views on the transition and the future of the 
nation. Gosh pointed out that there are no technologies, natural 
resources, human resources, and other socio-economic factors in 
Ukraine that would allow for transition from industrial to post-
industrial production (Gosh, 1998, p. 57). This opinion appears 
to be quite pessimistic. Ukraine as well as the Russian 
Federation is an industrially developed society with a significant 
amount of human capital. It needs structural and institutional 
changes in order to sustain technological advancements and 
increase productivity. Abalkin sees the opportunity for a 
significant technological advancement during the transition 
(Abalkin, 1997, p. 622). 
A specific feature of human capital as a factor of 
production is that its total amount can increase even when the 
total population declines. While such factors of productions as 
labor and capital can increase thanks to an increase in the total 
labor force and capital accumulation, respectively, human 
capital can reproduce on an increasing scale even when the total 
work force declines and the productive capital is constant. This 
lays down the first principle that establishes possibility of future 
sustainable growth and socio-economic development in Ukraine 
even under the conditions of relatively slow capital 
accumulation and negative growth in population in the long run. 
This principle points to insufficiency of the exogenous theories 
of growth as applied to Ukraine. 
The second principle that comes out of the first one is 
that the endogenous growth model connected to human capital 
may be the only perspective option for the future development 
in Ukraine in the long run, especially when the resources of the 
exogenous growth will be depleted. 
The third principle establishes that human capital is 
capable to grow based on its internal potential and already 
accumulated human capital. Such process is based on the human 
nature to produce and accumulate new knowledge. 
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The fourth principle says that the process of human 
capital reproduction on an increased scale expressed in the usage 
of human capital in the societal production as a major factor of 
production lays in the basis of the total factor productivity 
increase. 
Human capital as a factor of production makes service 
industry specific. If earlier consumption was traditionally 
divided on personal consumption and production consumption, 
now a certain part of consumption becomes personal and at the 
same time productive. Consumption facilitates reproduction of 
work force and accumulation of human capital. The process of 
development of each individual is of value to the society 
because it means accumulation of human capital, development 
of certain characteristics and skills that are in demand in the 
economy. A substantial part of the basis for an increased 
reproduction of human capital consists of the systems of 
healthcare and education. 
Healthcare and education industries in Ukraine as well as 
in the Russian Federation and countries of Eastern Europe in 
many instances continue to operate on the same basis and with 
the same mechanisms as they did during the soviet times. The 
national systems of higher education experience slow, but 
significant changes, while secondary education and health care 
preserved most of their old features. 
Until recently, the high level of medical services and 
education in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc allowed 
them a luxury of not changing much in these industries. One 
might expect that universal access to healthcare will be 
preserved as it is in the Western European welfare states. The 
same will be true for the secondary education, as the access to it 
will likely remain universal, compulsory, and free for immediate 
consumers. However, higher education industry faces dramatic 
changes in the near future, including its further decentralization, 
deregulation, privatization, marketization, and 
commercialization. Such changes will make the industry more 
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effective and efficient in creation of new knowledge and 
human capital accumulation. This includes higher level of 
flexibility and responsiveness to the market demand. 
Some of the industries that traditionally belonged to the 
public sector should be rebuilt on the basis of shared 
responsibility between the state and the public, including 
businesses and individuals. In higher education this will include 
introduction of the concepts of plurality of forms of organization 
and property rights, and cost-sharing in education funding. 
In addition to the essence of transition, it is important to 
consider views about the major stages of the process. Chukhno 
sees three major stages in transition. The first stage includes an 
overcoming the crisis, economic stabilization, and initiation of 
growth. The second stage includes privatization, 
demonopolization, and effective functioning of the enterprises. 
The third stage includes restructuring of the national economy 
and technological advancements. Chukhno anticipates the third 
stage to take at least two to three decades (Chukhno, 1996, p. 
20). 
The major stages of transition according to Sachs and 
Pivovarsky include: stabilization or critical phase, when the 
government fights inflation and other negative consequences of 
the disintegration; phase of market-building, when market 
institutions are developed; and phase of the structural 
adjustments, when the character of production and employment 
change (Sachs and Pivovarsky, 1996, p. 54). 
Major stages of social transition include a compensatory 
socialization during the privatization and restructuring; a 
reduction of unemployment; socialization of property through 
joint-stock companies; and technological innovations. 
Economists discuss the opportunities for socially-oriented 
transition and see among the major characteristics of the 
socially-oriented mixed economy are social stability and 
increasing social welfare (Sidorovich, 1997, p. 594; Cherevko 
and Lukash, 1998, p. 48-49). 
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2.3. Growth Forecasts and Their Explanation 
 
Long-run forecasts of economic growth in Ukraine and 
their interpretation will be presented in addition to the 
macroeconomic indicators considered earlier in this chapter. 
Long-run forecasts for the key macroeconomic indicators till 
2030 are presented in Tables 2.5-2.9. They include a variety of 
indicators for GDP, GDP growth, contribution to GDP by 
expenditures, demographics, labor, and productivity. Dynamics 
of the macroeconomic indicators are presented in Figures 1-4 of 
Appendix XII. 
Selected statistics for GDP in Ukraine for the period of 
1989-2006 and in the forecasts till 2030 are presented in Tables 
2.5 and 2.6. 
 
TABLE 2.5 
 
GDP indicators for Ukraine, 1989-2030 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
GDP (% real 
change per 
annum) 
 
 
GDP per 
head, USD 
 
 
 
GDP per 
head (USD 
at PPP) 
 
 
Real GDP 
growth per 
head, % per 
annum 
 
1989 ... ... 7,250.00 ... 
1990 -4.0 ... 7,241.60 -4.241 
1991 -8.7 ... 6,823.80 -8.954 
1992 -9.9 ... 6,267.00 -10.225 
1993 -14.2 638.20 5,515.00 -13.985 
1994 -22.9 711.80 4,375.00 -22.322 
1995 -12.2 724.30 3,950.10 -11.522 
1996 -10.0 879.90 3,654.00 -9.217 
1997 -3.0 998.10 3,631.60 -2.240 
1998 -1.9 840.20 3,630.60 -1.124 
1999 -0.2 638.60 3,705.10 0.597 
2000 5.9 637.50 4,043.50 6.806 
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2001 9.2 787.90 4,596.00 11.001 
2002 5.2 887.10 4,961.50 6.198 
2003 9.6 1,056.70 5,566.00 10.398 
2004 12.1 1,377.50 6,386.90 12.913 
2005 2.6 1,772.90 6,786.50 3.371 
2006 5.5 1,980.00 7,400.00 6.100 
2007 5.8 2,100.00 8,120.00 6.400 
2008 6.0 2,430.00 8,930.00 6.500 
2009 6.2 2,770.00 9,810.00 6.700 
2010 5.8 3,190.00 10,720.00 6.300 
2011 5.2 3,610.00 11,620.00 5.700 
2012 4.8 4,070.00 12,540.00 5.200 
2013 4.5 4,580.00 13,490.00 4.900 
2014 4.2 5,140.00 14,490.00 4.600 
2015 4.0 5,750.00 15,520.00 4.400 
2016 3.9 6,420.00 16,610.00 4.200 
2017 3.7 7,160.00 17,760.00 4.100 
2018 3.6 7,970.00 18,980.00 4.000 
2019 3.6 8,860.00 20,270.00 4.000 
2020 3.5 9,830.00 21,650.00 3.900 
2021 3.5 10,890.00 23,120.00 3.900 
2022 3.5 12,030.00 24,670.00 3.900 
2023 3.5 13,260.00 26,320.00 3.900 
2024 3.5 14,590.00 28,080.00 3.900 
2025 3.5 16,030.00 29,950.00 4.000 
2026 3.6 17,560.00 31,940.00 4.000 
2027 3.6 19,210.00 34,060.00 4.000 
2028 3.6 20,990.00 36,320.00 4.000 
2029 3.6 22,900.00 38,720.00 4.000 
2030 3.6 24,960.00 41,280.00 4.000 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
Selected statistics for GDP in Ukraine in constant 1996 
prices are presented in Table 3.40. 
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TABLE 2.6 
 
GDP indicators for Ukraine, 1989-2030 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP 
(billion USD 
at 1996 
prices) 
 
Real GDP 
(PPP billion 
USD at 1996 
prices) 
 
GDP 
deflator, 
1996=100; 
average 
 
GDP 
deflator, % 
change; 
average 
 
1989 107.942 448.236 ... ... 
1990 103.624 430.307 ... ... 
1991 94.609 392.870 ... ... 
1992 85.242 353.976 ... ... 
1993 73.138 303.711 1.12 ... 
1994 56.389 234.161 11.63 937.613 
1995 49.510 205.594 60.17 417.274 
1996 44.559 185.034 100.00 66.196 
1997 43.222 179.483 118.07 18.074 
1998 42.401 176.073 132.25 12.012 
1999 42.316 175.721 168.49 27.400 
2000 44.813 186.088 207.44 23.116 
2001 48.936 203.209 228.08 9.947 
2002 51.480 213.775 239.76 5.122 
2003 56.422 234.298 258.99 8.023 
2004 63.249 262.648 298.25 15.156 
2005 64.894 269.477 357.76 19.954 
2006 68.463 284.298 371.20 3.700 
2007 72.434 300.787 371.80 0.200 
2008 76.780 318.834 407.00 9.500 
2009 81.540 338.601 438.20 7.700 
2010 86.269 358.239 478.20 9.100 
2011 90.748 376.838 512.60 7.200 
2012 95.089 394.864 547.70 6.900 
2013 99.328 412.466 583.60 6.600 
2014 103.517 429.864 620.20 6.300 
2015 107.686 447.174 657.50 6.000 
2016 111.838 464.418 695.30 5.800 
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2017 115.996 481.684 733.70 5.500 
2018 120.192 499.105 772.60 5.300 
2019 124.464 516.846 812.10 5.100 
2020 128.844 535.035 852.30 5.000 
2021 133.349 553.742 894.00 4.900 
2022 138.002 573.065 937.10 4.800 
2023 142.824 593.087 981.80 4.800 
2024 147.836 613.900 1,028.30 4.700 
2025 153.061 635.600 1,076.50 4.700 
2026 158.513 658.236 1,126.40 4.600 
2027 164.190 681.813 1,178.00 4.600 
2028 170.109 706.393 1,231.40 4.500 
2029 176.270 731.977 1,286.30 4.500 
2030 182.671 758.555 1,342.90 4.400 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
There is a significant difference between the values of 
GDP in billions of dollars expressed in constant 1996 prices and 
GDP in billions of dollars expressed in constant 1996 prices in 
purchasing power parity. Such a significant and consistent 
difference of almost four times can not be attributed exclusively 
to the deviations of exchange rates from the purchasing power 
parity or volatility in the national currencies. The Ukrainian 
national currency always was and still is much stronger in 
respect to the US dollar than expressed in the currency exchange 
rates. This bias affects statistics as well as the technical and 
country reports. 
Another significant characteristic of the data used in the 
statistical analysis is that the dynamics of GDP in Ukraine are 
presented in billions of dollars expressed in constant 1996 prices 
while it is a well-known fact that the Ukrainian national 
currency was relatively strong in relation to the US dollar at that 
time. This preceded the currency crisis of 1998 when exchange 
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rate of the Ukrainian national currency in relation to the US 
dollar declined from around 2:1 to 4:1 within a six-month period. 
Accordingly, if the dynamics of GDP in Ukraine were presented 
in billion dollars expressed in constant 1998 prices, then the 
difference between the values of GDP and GDP in purchasing 
power parity would be even more significant. 
Dynamics of the components of GDP in Ukraine for the 
period of 1989-2006 and in the forecasts till 2030 are presented 
in Table 2.7. Dynamics of the components of GDP in Ukraine, 
including government consumption and import and export, are 
also presented in Figures 5-9 of Appendix XII. 
 
TABLE 2.7 
 
GDP by expenditures in Ukraine (billion UAH), 1989-2030 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real 
govern
ment 
consum
ption, 
billion 
UAH 
Real 
gross 
fixed 
investm
ent, 
billion 
UAH 
Real 
private 
consum
ption, 
billion 
UAH 
 
Real 
imports 
of 
G&S, 
billion 
UAH 
 
Real 
exports 
of 
G&S, 
billion 
UAH 
 
Growth 
of real 
capital 
stock 
(%) 
 
 
1989 ... ... ... ... ... ... 
1990 12.841 ... 55.216 ... ... -7.0 
1991 13.792 49.847 50.039 ... ... 23.1 
1992 14.323 43.352 45.406 ... ... 14.3 
1993 14.339 28.341 33.618 23.093 30.151 5.2 
1994 12.596 14.096 30.639 30.007 22.251 -1.2 
1995 11.595 12.692 30.055 27.380 25.700 -1.7 
1996 10.964 10.149 27.199 28.893 26.959 -2.7 
1997 10.715 10.518 26.754 29.414 27.364 -2.4 
1998 10.341 10.972 27.111 29.474 27.856 -2.1 
1999 9.524 11.051 26.526 22.165 23.204 -2.0 
2000 9.343 12.449 27.894 26.364 26.871 -1.2 
2001 9.539 13.613 29.426 30.334 31.439 -0.6 
2002 8.900 14.076 32.221 31.456 34.301 -0.4 
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2003 10.217 16.300 36.217 36.827 37.837 0.7 
2004 10.401 19.641 41.106 42.107 43.985 2.2 
2005 10.682 19.582 47.930 42.989 39.067 2.0 
2006 10.895 20.561 52.255 48.157 39.770 2.3 
2007 11.331 22.412 56.697 53.344 42.582 2.9 
2008 12.011 24.653 61.799 59.474 45.453 3.6 
2009 12.852 26.502 68.288 67.845 49.908 4.0 
2010 13.752 28.755 74.776 78.256 55.866 4.4 
2011 14.574 30.678 80.612 87.032 60.979 4.6 
2012 15.333 32.339 85.981 94.508 65.428 4.7 
2013 16.042 33.798 90.999 100.997 69.378 4.6 
2014 16.713 35.113 95.793 106.795 72.987 4.5 
2015 17.359 36.337 100.459 112.177 76.401 4.3 
2016 17.989 37.515 105.066 117.398 79.755 4.2 
2017 18.613 38.692 109.695 122.695 83.176 4.0 
2018 19.241 39.904 114.439 128.285 86.777 3.9 
2019 19.880 41.185 119.393 134.367 90.662 3.8 
2020 20.538 42.562 124.641 141.118 94.924 3.7 
2021 21.221 44.058 130.250 148.698 99.645 4.0 
2022 21.934 45.693 136.288 157.246 104.899 4.3 
2023 22.683 47.480 142.818 166.882 110.745 4.6 
2024 23.471 49.427 149.902 177.707 117.235 4.9 
2025 24.300 51.538 157.600 189.803 124.409 5.2 
2026 25.174 53.814 165.957 203.232 132.295 5.5 
2027 26.092 56.247 175.001 218.037 140.913 5.7 
2028 27.056 58.827 184.774 234.240 150.271 6.0 
2029 28.066 61.540 195.300 251.845 160.366 6.2 
2030 29.118 64.365 206.594 270.838 171.185 6.4 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
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TABLE 2.8 
 
GDP by expenditures in Ukraine (billion USD), 1989-2030 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real 
govern
ment 
consum
ption 
(billion 
USD at 
1996 
prices) 
Real 
gross 
fixed 
investm
ent 
(billion 
USD at 
1996 
prices) 
Real 
private 
consum
ption 
(billion 
USD at 
1996 
prices) 
 
Real 
imports 
of G&S 
(billion 
USD at 
1996 
prices) 
 
 
Real 
exports 
of G&S 
(billion 
USD at 
1996 
prices) 
 
 
Growth 
of real 
capital 
stock 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
1989 ... ... ... ... ... ... 
1990 4.545 ... 64.360 ... ... -7.0 
1991 4.882 30.811 58.326 ... ... 23.1 
1992 5.070 26.350 52.925 ... ... 14.3 
1993 5.076 20.133 39.185 17.169 22.741 5.2 
1994 4.459 20.977 35.713 22.310 16.783 -1.2 
1995 4.104 11.481 35.032 20.357 19.384 -1.7 
1996 3.881 10.112 31.703 21.482 20.334 -2.7 
1997 3.793 9.594 31.185 21.869 20.639 -2.4 
1998 3.660 8.536 31.601 21.914 21.010 -2.1 
1999 3.371 7.472 30.919 16.479 17.502 -2.0 
2000 3.307 9.088 32.513 19.601 20.267 -1.2 
2001 3.377 10.829 34.299 22.552 23.712 -0.6 
2002 3.150 11.189 37.557 23.387 25.871 -0.4 
2003 3.617 12.944 42.215 27.380 28.538 0.7 
2004 3.682 15.660 47.914 31.306 33.175 2.2 
2005 3.781 15.495 55.867 31.962 29.466 2.0 
2006 3.857 16.276 60.908 35.804 29.996 2.3 
2007 4.011 17.752 66.086 39.660 32.117 2.9 
2008 4.252 19.537 72.033 44.218 34.283 3.6 
2009 4.549 20.981 79.597 50.442 37.642 4.0 
2010 4.868 22.775 87.159 58.182 42.136 4.4 
2011 5.159 24.302 93.961 64.707 45.993 4.6 
2012 5.427 25.628 100.219 70.265 49.348 4.7 
2013 5.678 26.796 106.068 75.090 52.327 4.6 
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2014 5.916 27.851 111.657 79.400 55.049 4.5 
2015 6.144 28.834 117.096 83.401 57.624 4.3 
2016 6.367 29.783 122.465 87.283 60.155 4.2 
2017 6.589 30.731 127.861 91.222 62.735 4.0 
2018 6.811 31.708 133.390 95.378 65.451 3.9 
2019 7.037 32.740 139.165 99.900 68.381 3.8 
2020 7.270 33.850 145.282 104.919 71.595 3.7 
2021 7.512 35.055 151.820 110.554 75.157 4.0 
2022 7.764 36.370 158.858 116.910 79.119 4.3 
2023 8.029 37.807 166.469 124.074 83.529 4.6 
2024 8.308 39.372 174.726 132.122 88.424 4.9 
2025 8.602 41.068 183.699 141.116 93.834 5.2 
2026 8.911 42.895 193.439 151.100 99.782 5.5 
2027 9.236 44.849 203.981 162.106 106.282 5.7 
2028 9.577 46.921 215.373 174.153 113.340 6.0 
2029 9.934 49.099 227.642 187.243 120.955 6.2 
2030 10.307 51.368 240.806 201.364 129.115 6.4 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
Dynamics of the selected indicators in Ukraine, 
including demographics, labor, and productivity, for the period 
of 1989-2006 and in the forecasts till 2030 are presented in 
Table 3.43. 
Dynamics of population growth, workforce, and growth 
in productivity in Ukraine for the period of 1989-2006 and in the 
forecasts till 2030 are presented in Figures 9 and 10 of Appendix 
XII. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit utilise a supply side 
framework for long term forecasting. In this framework, output 
is determined by the availability of labour and capital equipment, 
and the growth in productivity. 
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TABLE 2.9 
 
Demographic, labor and productivity indicators for Ukraine, 
1989-2030 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
Popu 
lation, 
million 
 
 
 
Populat
ion, % 
change 
 per 
annum) 
 
Labor 
force, 
million 
 
 
 
Record
ed 
unempl
oyment 
(%) 
 
Labor 
produc 
tivity 
growth 
(%) 
 
Total  
factor  
produc 
tivity 
growth 
 (%) 
1989 51.528 ... ... ... ... ... 
1990 51.658 0.252 ... ... -2.1 -0.3 
1991 51.802 0.279 ... ... -7.2 -15.8 
1992 51.989 0.362 ... ... -8.4 -13.9 
1993 51.860 -0.249 ... ... -12.1 -14.4 
1994 51.474 -0.744 23.193 ... -19.9 -20.0 
1995 51.079 -0.766 23.795 ... -14.4 -13.3 
1996 50.639 -0.863 23.436 1.3 -8.1 -7.7 
1997 50.245 -0.777 23.128 2.3 -0.4 -0.5 
1998 49.851 -0.785 23.125 3.7 -0.6 -0.3 
1999 49.456 -0.792 22.907 4.2 2.1 2.0 
2000 49.037 -0.848 21.353 4.1 14.4 11.2 
2001 48.241 -1.622 21.029 3.6 10.3 10.1 
2002 47.787 -0.940 21.120 3.7 4.6 4.9 
2003 47.442 -0.722 21.186 3.5 9.2 9.3 
2004 47.101 -0.720 21.271 3.5 11.4 10.9 
2005 46.749 -0.746 21.568 3.1 0.7 0.8 
2006 46.477 -0.600 21.689 3.5 4.8 4.3 
2007 46.235 -0.500 21.827 3.8 5.5 4.6 
2008 46.020 -0.500 21.979 4.1 5.4 4.4 
2009 45.808 -0.500 22.132 4.4 5.8 4.6 
2010 45.598 -0.500 22.286 4.8 5.5 4.1 
2011 45.377 -0.500 22.280 5.1 5.2 3.6 
2012 45.178 -0.400 22.145 5.1 5.4 3.5 
2013 44.992 -0.400 21.909 5.1 5.6 3.5 
2014 44.823 -0.400 21.597 5.1 5.7 3.6 
2015 44.664 -0.400 21.234 5.1 5.8 3.6 
 107 
2016 44.502 -0.400 20.840 5.1 5.8 3.6 
2017 44.332 -0.400 20.434 5.1 5.8 3.6 
2018 44.155 -0.400 20.033 5.1 5.7 3.5 
2019 43.977 -0.400 19.651 5.1 5.6 3.5 
2020 43.798 -0.400 19.300 5.1 5.4 3.4 
2021 43.618 -0.400 18.991 5.1 5.2 3.1 
2022 43.436 -0.400 18.730 5.1 4.9 2.9 
2023 43.254 -0.400 18.523 5.1 4.7 2.6 
2024 43.073 -0.400 18.373 5.1 4.4 2.3 
2025 42.896 -0.400 18.279 5.1 4.1 2.0 
2026 42.723 -0.400 18.242 5.1 3.8 1.8 
2027 42.550 -0.400 18.255 5.1 3.5 1.5 
2028 42.381 -0.400 18.314 5.1 3.3 1.3 
2029 42.213 -0.400 18.410 5.1 3.1 1.1 
2030 42.045 -0.400 18.532 5.1 3.0 1.0 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
The forecasts completed by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit and presented above are not perfect, as is the case with any 
other economic forecasts. One of the major problems with such 
forecasts is that they do not account for economic cycles. A 
business cycle is the predominant form of economic 
development in market economies in the long run. It would be 
reasonable to expect that the economy of Ukraine, as well as of 
the Russian Federation and countries of CEE will reach the 
stage of cyclical development in a decade or so. 
The process of economic changes can be divided into 
stages depending on the rate of growth of real GDP. The data 
above indicate an initial decline in the rate of growth of real 
GDP in Ukraine in 1989 that later turned into the negative rate 
of growth. This negative growth continued according to the 
most pessimistic estimates from 1990 to 1999. The period of 
2000 to 2004 is characterized by a significant increase in 
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business activities and positive economic growth that reached 
12.1 percent in 2004. The period of 2005-2010 will most likely 
be characterized as a period of slow-down in the rate of GDP 
growth, fluctuating around 6 percent per annum. Further slow-
down in economic growth is expected in 2011-2015 with the 
rate of growth declining from 6 to 4 percent. Real GDP in 
Ukraine during the period of 2015 to 2030 is expected to 
increase at the rate of around 3.6 percent annually. 
Based on the forecasts the stages of GDP growth can be 
presented as follows: 
Decline in the rate of growth (till 1989); 
Negative economic growth (from 1990 to 1999); 
Significant economic growth along with a significant 
increase in business activities in the country (from 2000 to 
2004); 
Slow-down in the rate of growth (from 2005 to 2010); 
Further decline in the rate of growth (from 2011 to 2015); 
Stabilization of the rate of growth at the moderate level 
(from 2015 to 2030). 
The above stages can be presented as follows: 
Low rate of economic growth; 
Negative rate of growth; 
Significant growth; 
Significant but declining rate of growth; 
Average and declining rate of growth; 
Moderate economic growth. 
 
The prognoses are based on average and moderate values. 
This strategy is normally used to ensure that possible significant 
deviations will not occur. At the same time such a strategy is not 
necessarily the best at reflecting the economic future and thus it 
is not always appropriate. 
The stages of economic growth presented above are not 
the phases of economic cycle. First of all, economic cycle is 
typical for market economies, while the presented stages of 
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growth were initiated by the exogenous impact and were 
stages of the process of transition. Secondly, the phases of 
growth characterize the transition economy. Thirdly, economic 
growth that takes place in Ukraine is a sustainable growth, not a 
part of economic cycle. Finally, the very understanding of the 
economic cycles and possible future cyclic development of the 
nation’s economy is missing in the presented forecasts. 
Another problem of long run forecasts is that they freely 
interpret the term long run. In economics long run is a period 
sufficient enough to renovate principal capital, if such necessity 
exists and is supported by the major structural changes in a 
particular firm, industry, or national economy. The reaction of 
the businesses on the major shifts in demand in the long run is 
expressed in the changing capital structure or an increase in 
production capacities. 
In macroeconomics, long run should be interpreted as a 
period of time sufficient for a substantial renovation of principal 
capital in the national economy. Such a renovation would be 
quite normal in a post-transition economy. Nevertheless, in the 
forecasts, the term long run normally means a significant period 
of time and very often a period of twenty years, yet unrelated to 
its economic meaning. 
The two comments on the long run forecasts presented 
above that address the necessity of taking into consideration 
economic cycles and considering long run as it is intended in 
economics are closely linked, because every economic cycle has 
in its fundament a renovation of principal capital. 
The long run forecasts for Ukraine, as well as the 
Russian Federation, Poland, Hungary, and other post-transition 
economies should be linked to the concepts of economic cycles 
and cyclic development as well as the time when these 
economies will reach the stage of cyclic development. It is hard 
to point an exact date when Ukraine’s economy will enter its 
first economic cycle. Moreover, unclear phases of modern 
economic cycles make the task even more challenging. 
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Nevertheless, it is possible to present most likely scenarios in 
the country’s development that will eventually lead to the cycle. 
Undoubtedly, the first economic cycle will start after the 
massive renovation of the principal capital. The slowdown in the 
accumulation of amortization funds during 1990s along with the 
growing depreciation of principal capital was considered as a 
time bomb for the industry. Now it becomes obvious that a 
significant renovation of principal capital is necessary and 
almost unavoidable. One can say with a high degree of certainty 
that Ukraine during the next decade, i.e. from 2007 to 2017, will 
have to renovate at least third of its principal capital. 
If a massive technical renovation and incremental growth 
in production capacities will take place right after the period of 
significant growth of 2004-2006, then the national economy will 
enter the stage of cyclical development earlier. If, however, the 
massive renovation of principal capital will be preceded by the 
period of economic growth slow down, predicted for 2007-2010, 
then the nation’s economy will enter the cycle later. 
We tend to consider the second scenario as more viable 
and likely to take place in Ukraine. The slow down in economic 
growth will indicate stabilization of the system. Later, based on 
this already achieved stabilization, renovation of principal 
capital will began. This renovation will start from the most 
viable, economically effective and profitable industries, which 
are, nevertheless, were utilizing old and morally outdated 
machinery and equipment. Here technological changes will be 
accompanied with the incremental increase in principal capital 
based on reinvestment of profits, earned in these industries over 
the last decade. 
Economic integration is another argument for the 
irreversibility of the process of transition to the cyclic 
development and the necessity to account for it in the long run 
forecasts. The process of economic integration of Ukraine, the 
RF, and countries of Eastern Europe in the world economy, 
participation in the global socio-economic processes, are to be 
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considered in the forecasts. Economic forecasts presented by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit indicate all the significance of 
export and import in the Ukraine’s economy that will be 
achieved by 2030. 
An increase in the openness of the national economy and 
its integration in the international system of the division of labor 
are obvious. Certain difficulties faced by Ukraine while entering 
the World trade Organizations appear to be somewhat 
ungrounded. Same may be fair to say for the RF. Economic 
stability and market reforms in Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation are obvious while the membership in the WTO is 
granted to numerous developing nations with unstable 
economies, unclear paths in socio-economic development, and 
unstable political regimes. The list of the WTO member-
countries is presented in the Appendix XIII (see Tables 1 and 2). 
While making forecasts for economic growth in Ukraine, 
one should not be overly optimistic. It might not be a good idea 
to compare growth rates in China and in Ukraine. Chinese 
economic miracle becomes a charismatic example of successful 
rapid economic growth in modern times, as it was earlier with 
Japan. High rate of growth in Ukraine in the first half of 2000s 
was at par with the rate of growth in China. However, the 
essence of growth and its grounds were different in the two 
cases. 
The stable and high annual rate of growth of the average 
of 9.7 percent in China over the last fifteen years is nothing but 
an indication of a fundamental process of industrialization, the 
transition from pre-industrial to industrial mode of production. 
Also, in China population growth continues, while in Ukraine 
there is a stable and continuous population decline. Accordingly, 
while calculating GDP per capita, this indicator for China 
decreases, and for Ukraine it increases in time. 
The continuing boom in the Chinese economy is 
somewhat analogous to the US roaring twenties at the beginning 
of the 20th century, or the period of industrialization and the 
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post-war reconstruction in the USSR. At the same time there 
are such rudiments of pre-industrial mode of production, as high 
but declining illiteracy rate, especially in the rural areas, 
undeveloped social sphere, lagging behind agriculture that often 
has a form of primitive production, and state property in the 
heavy industry, especially mining and machine building. All of 
these are characteristics of the Chinese economy. 
Until recently, over 70 percent of population in China 
resided in rural areas, while for the developed countries this 
indicator rarely goes higher than 30 percent. Statistics on the 
share of urban population in Ukraine, Russia, China, Poland, 
Hungary, France, Germany, and the US are presented in Table 
2.5. 
 
TABLE 2.10 
 
Share of urban population in selected countries, percent, 2004 
 
Country Urban 
population, 
percent 
Country Urban 
population, 
percent 
Ukraine 
Russia 
Poland 
Hungary 
68.0 
72.9 
62.5 
64.8 
China 
France 
Germany 
USA 
36.7 
75.5 
87.7 
77.4 
Source: World in Figures, Washington, DC: The 
Economist, 2005 
 
Social and economic transformation of the Chinese 
society occurs along with the process of industrialization and 
growing inequality in the development of different regions and 
industries. Economic transition in the post-socialist world 
occurred on the basis of already formed and sustainable 
industrialized economy. Therefore, in Ukraine, Russia, and other 
Newly Independent States capital accumulation was replaced 
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with the processes of concentration and centralization of 
capital. Such processes found their expression in the active 
redistribution of property rights, changes of the system of 
property rights itself, and specifically alienation of workers from 
the means of production and de facto and de jure concentration 
of the property rights on principal capital in the hands of few. 
This served as a ground for the famous postulate that on the 
post-soviet territories economic transformation turned into the 
redistribution of already accumulated wealth and property 
through the process of privatization, while in China the 
economic reform has a creative character and takes place under 
the guidance and oversight of the existing political regime. 
In China, processes of industrialization and initial capital 
accumulation meant an increase in production capacities and 
gradual changes in economic relations, including introduction of 
market mechanisms, typical for mixed economies. The 
economic transition in the post-soviet states took place without 
an increase in production capacities. It included major changes 
in the system of economic relations and preservation of 
production capacities, some of which were even abandoned and 
did not find new owners. 
Realization of the large economic projects, such as 
construction of hydroelectric power stations as well as the fact 
that China is now the largest consumer of raw materials in the 
world confirm the suggestion that China’s rapid growth is 
extensive in its nature. The initial capital accumulation in the 
Chinese model was based on the export increase. The massive 
increase in production and export of consumer goods was 
possible thanks to the significant amount of readily available 
and cheap labor in the country. The high rate of capital turnover 
and high rates of profit made it possible to invest in other 
industries. 
By the end of the transition to the industrialized 
economy the rate of growth in China will decrease significantly. 
There are already estimates that the Chinese economy is 
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overheated. The official forecasts place the growth rate in 
2008 at 8 percent as compared to 10.7 percent for the previous 
year. 
It is obvious that the Ukrainian society and the national 
economy are at the level of development different from that of 
China. The processes that take place in China now occurred in 
Ukraine several decades ago. One would not expect significant 
construction projects and more so massive import of raw 
materials in Ukraine. This is a fundamental distinction between 
the Ukraine’s economy and economies of China and Russia.  
Ukraine can afford neither the luxury of economic 
development at the expense of exporting raw materials, as does 
Russia, nor the significant import of raw materials, as in China. 
The ground for sustainable growth in Ukraine is seen in the 
development of high-tech industries and, more importantly, in 
an increasing organizational and economic effectiveness of 
already existing and well established industries. These industries 
include first of all metallurgy and heavy machine building. 
Development of the knowledge based or high-tech industries 
does not necessarily mean hypothetical attempts to transfer to 
production of computers, software, and biotechnologies. Rather, 
as applied to Ukraine, it means introduction of new technologies 
in already existing industries with the goal of increasing their 
effectiveness and efficiency. These technologies should 
guarantee resource-saving and be environmentally friendly. 
Technological innovations are much needed in the agricultural 
complex as well. It seems irrational to import agricultural 
products to the country with the largest stock of rich and fertile 
soil in the world. 
Ukraine, Russia, and China share common problems as 
well, including those created by the rapid economic growth. 
China already faces ecological problems, including 
environmental pollution due to the loosely controlled economic 
activities and old ecologically unfriendly technologies. The 
similar problems exist in the Russian Federation and Ukraine for 
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decades. The economic decline during 1990s led to the slow 
down in environmental pollution and even improvements in 
ecological situation. 
Slow down in economic growth in Ukraine starting 2006 
appears to be logical. Certain role here is played by non-
economic factors, including political instability, public distrust 
in the government, absence of market mentality, pessimism, 
disbelief in the future success, and corruption. 
Economic forecasts for Ukraine are quite optimistic. The 
population decline leads to the real DGP per capita growth rate 
being higher than GDP growth. At the same time the predicted 
annual growth rate equals to 5 to 6 percent for the period of 
2006-2014 and then continuous real GDP per capita growth of 
around 4 percent per year. These are very optimistic predictions. 
Ukraine will not be able to keep the pace of Chinese growth due 
to the reasons, presented earlier. Even real GDP per capita 
annual growth of 2-3 percent is a good indicator. In the 
countries of the European Union annual growth rate of 1.2 to 2 
percent is considered as a good indicator. 
 
2.3. Transition from Exogenous to Endogenous 
Economic Growth 
 
As we pointed out earlier, there was a reproduction of 
human capital on an increased scale along with the exogenous 
forms of growth and the extensive model of development of the 
national economy in the USSR. Human capital accumulation 
was done through the development of education, science, and 
healthcare. The extensive growth was based on utilization of 
additional resources, including labor, capital, and natural 
resources. The richness in natural resources allowed for 
economic expansion, relatively high standards of living, and the 
large military complex. Finally, the demographic situation was 
also favorable for extensive growth. 
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The disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
fundamental economic transition make extensive forms of 
growth less viable while urging to turn to intensification of 
economic development. While in the Russian Federation the 
unfavorable demographic situation may be partially 
compensated by the huge natural resources, in Ukraine declining 
population and limited natural resources necessitate 
technological changes and an increased reproduction of human 
capital. 
The transition from exogenous to endogenous growth 
will occur while there still is a potential for exogenous growth, 
mainly thanks to the economic decline of 1990s. When the 
resources for exogenous growth will be depleted, endogenous 
growth will become dominant and reproduction of human 
capital on an increased scale will become of primary importance, 
especially due to the continuing decline in population. The 
process is not expected to be linear. It will depend on external 
impacts as well, including political reforms, formation of civil 
society, changes in the world economy, globalization, local 
crises, and such. 
The economic transition has been completed by 2006. It 
will be fair to say that the presence of the mixed and 
predominantly market-based economy in Ukraine is a fact. 
Major features of the newly formed market economy in the 
country include: 
supply and demand based on the market mechanisms; 
free pricing. Prices are defined as a result of achieving an 
equilibrium of supply and demand; 
the economy of deficit had disappeared. The market has 
enough goods and services to satisfy consumer demand both in 
terms of quantity and in terms of quality; 
the state monopoly in production is gone. The major part 
of goods and services is produced by the independent producers; 
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the competition is growing. Improvements in the 
competitive environment make products more competitive on 
domestic and foreign markets; 
the process of creation of market institutions is 
completed; 
the national economy is characterized with the high 
degree of openness. This is confirmed by the growing volume of 
foreign trade. The structure of the national economy is to a 
certain extent determined by the volume of potential import and 
export, with the growing demand on the national goods from 
abroad; 
hyperinflation of the mid-90s is tackled and replaced 
with the regulated inflation with the annual rate of around 10-12 
percent; 
well-functioning monetary system is characterized by the 
stabilized national currency and stable exchange rate. The value 
of the national currency grew from 6UAH per $1 to 5UAH per 
$1. 
There is a new balance of different forms of property in 
the transition economies. Heyets points out that in 1999 there 
were only 54 percent of all the production facilities left in the 
state property in Ukraine, while at the beginning of the reform in 
1991 almost all of the principal capital belonged to the state. 
The share of private businesses in principal capital in 1999 was 
around 2.2 percent, the share of collective property was equal to 
44 percent. Foreign entities owned only 0.1 percent of the 
production facilities in Ukraine (Heyets, 2001, p. 9). 
Categories of economic growth and economic 
development are not identical. Economic growth can take place 
along with the temporary decline in the living standards and 
weakening of social ties. For instance, the significant temporary 
and seasonal labor migration from Ukraine abroad, especially 
intensive in 1990s, can be interpreted as a phenomenon that has 
negative impact on the social welfare, social capital, and social 
ties. It includes breaking or weakening of family ties, social 
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connections, absence of the adequate legislative base, 
insufficiency of the state regulation and oversight for the 
processes of labor migration that already take place, hard 
working conditions, lack of access to medical services, visa 
problems, and such. At the same time from the purely economic 
standpoint, the process of labor migration abroad clearly had a 
positive impact on the national economy. First, it eased the 
problem of unemployment. Second, it helped to avoid much of 
the social payments and dole to unemployed individuals from 
the state. Third, a significant part of the earnings of the labor 
migrants came to the national economy through the money 
remittances, mostly made in hard currencies. 
An alternative to the labor migration abroad would be 
high level of unemployment, large social payments and 
subsidies, high taxes, expensive labor, and low efficiency of the 
national economy. The arguments against the extensive labor 
migration abroad include rebuilding “other” economy. As a 
result, there are such stereotypes as “Ukrainian construction 
worker,” “Polish plumber,” etc. Another argument against the 
migration is the rapidly rising real estate prices. It is assumed 
that labor migrants return home and buy housing for themselves 
and their families. However, since not much was built in the 
country, prices go up. By estimates, share of labor migrants 
abroad in Ukraine was higher than in Russia, but much lower 
than in Moldova. The major destinations were member countries 
of the European Union and Israel. 
In East Germany, labor migration did not grow to a large 
scale. As a result, the level of unemployment was equal to 18 
percent during the entire period of transition. Of course such 
situation could be interpreted as socially positive, but it had 
negative impact on the economy and economic growth. 
The examples above are presented in order to delineate 
terms of economic growth and socio-economic development. 
Economic development includes access of population to 
education, healthcare, ecological and environmental programs, 
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stable energy supply, well-functioning governmental 
institutions, and such. All of these may lead to an increase in 
labor productivity. Success of the economic transition should be 
measured in terms of all of these factors and indicators, based on 
the complex strategy of development. 
Ukraine needs to redefine its balance between the 
manufacturing and the services industry. In our view, a hyper-
inflated service industry will not do well in the country. 
Employment in the service industry of around 50 percent of the 
total employment in the national economy may be a good 
indicator for Ukraine. This is accounting for the low level of 
automation in the service industry and the large amount of 
manual labor needed. As compared to the other developed 
nations, manufacturing’s share in the total GDP in Ukraine is the 
highest. 
Statistics on the structure of GDP based on the sources 
and structure of employment in the industry in Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, Poland, Hungary, China, France, Germany, 
and the US for 2004 are presented in Table 2.6. 
As shown in Table 2.6, service industry in Ukraine is 
characterized by the low level of productivity, possibly because 
of the low labor productivity and traditionally large amount of 
the manual labor utilized. The share of employed in the service 
industry constitutes 48 percent of all the employed in the 
national economy, while the share of the industry in GDP equals 
only 35 percent. 
Intensive use of manual and often low skill labor is 
common for service industry in every country. Millions of 
seasonal labor migrants and illegal aliens are employed in 
agriculture and service industries in all developed countries in 
Europe. Official statistics does not count this type of workers. 
Migrant labor helps cover a substantial part of the demand for 
low skilled labor in such industries as agriculture, hospitality 
industry, and retail. This means that that the actual share of 
employees occupied in these industries is higher than is 
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normally indicated in statistical reports. The share of 
workforce employed in agriculture and service industry in the 
US, France, and Germany is higher than is presented in Table 
2.11. The same situation is true for Hungary and Poland. 
 
TABLE 2.11 
 
Origins of GDP and structure of employment in selected 
countries, percent, 2004 
 
Country Origins of GDP, percent 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Ukraine 
Russia 
Poland 
Hungary 
China 
France 
Germany 
USA 
23.4 
7.2 
3.8 
4.1 
16.4 
3.3 
1.2 
1.4 
41.5 
39.4 
31.4 
33.8 
51.1 
25.7 
30.2 
20.3 
35.1 
53.4 
64.8 
62.1 
32.5 
71.0 
68.6 
78.3 
Country Structure of employment, percent 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Ukraine 
Russia 
Poland 
Hungary 
China 
France 
Germany 
USA 
26 
12 
19 
6 
50 
1 
3 
2 
26 
29 
31 
35 
23 
25 
33 
23 
48 
59 
50 
59 
27 
74 
65 
75 
Source: World in Figures, Washington, DC: The 
Economist, 2005 
 
Using the cheap unskilled labor of migrants that come 
from the outside of the system slows down the process of 
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implementation of latest technological achievements and 
innovations. It is cheaper for the businesses to hire unskilled 
laborers, including illegal aliens, than to modernize production 
process in agriculture, services, and other labor intensive or 
seasonal industries. The demand on high-tech solutions remains 
low. This, in turn, slows down technological progress. As a 
result, labor intensive industries do not transform into capital 
intensive industries. 
Mechanization and automation of manufacturing and 
agriculture should be followed by the mechanization and 
introduction of new technologies in the service industry. The 
structure of the service industry is even more important than its 
mechanization. The future development of the service industry 
in Ukraine, Russia, and other NIS is seen in further development 
of education industry and healthcare industry rather than retail 
sales. If service industry takes up two-thirds of the entire 
workforce in the country, this can only be justified by the highly 
developed high-tech industries that provide educational services 
and medical services. In distinction from the traditional service 
industries, such as tourism and hospitality industry, education 
and healthcare industries utilize high-skilled labor and advanced 
technologies. 
In the foreseen future Ukraine will have to learn 
balancing export promotion with import substitution, structural 
reforms and development of the domestic market. The initial 
stages of the reform in China were focused on export increase 
while now this country’s major goal is a development of its 
domestic market. Foreign investment alone cannot move the 
system far enough to achieve a new higher level equilibrium. 
The reliance on the public spending and foreign capital inflow 
gives way to the emphasis of domestic investment and 
reinvestment. 
Heyets points out that firms owned by foreign investors 
in Ukraine have the share of around 0.6-0.8 percent of all the 
capital investment, while their revenues from owning properties 
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constitute around 2.6 percent. The share of profit of the 
foreign-owned businesses amounts to 2.1 percent of all the 
nation’s profits. This indicates that the foreign investors are 
interested first of all not in the principal capital accumulation, 
but in the exploitation of already exiting production facilities 
and properties they own. According to the data for the end of 
1998 the revenues from property were exceeding volumes of 
capital investments several times (Heyets, 2001, p. 11). 
One of Ukraine’s major concerns is the complicated 
demographics. Despite the slow down in the population decline, 
the process of decline in absolute terms continues and appears to 
be irreversible at least in the near future. It is expected that the 
total population will decline with the annual rate of 0.5 percent 
during the period of 2007-2011, and then with the rate of 0.4 
percent starting 2012. The low level of birth rate does not make 
Ukraine an exception. Such trend is common for all developed 
nations, including the Russian Federation and European 
countries. The only exception is the US. However, even in the 
US population growth occurs thanks to two major factors: 
continuing immigration and high birth rate among the immigrant 
families. In 2006, when the population of the US reached the 
benchmark of 300 million, half of all the population growth was 
based on the immigration from Mexico and children born in the 
families of immigrants from Mexico. 
Population in the countries of Western Europe increases 
very modestly thanks only to the intensive immigration from the 
developing countries. Birth rates in such traditionally catholic 
societies known for the strong family values, as Italy and Spain, 
barely reach 1.2 children per family. In France and Germany the 
situation is not much better, with the birth rate of around 1.58. 
Even simple scale reproduction with zero increase in population 
requires the birth rate of 2.1. Demographic situation in the 
Russian Federation is even more complex than in Ukraine. 
While the birth rates in both countries are about the same, 
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around 1.14, and are the lowest in Europe, the life 
expectancy at birth in Russia is lower than in Ukraine. 
In distinction from Russia, Ukraine does not have a 
substantial migration into the country. Instead, it has labor 
migration abroad. In the future, repatriation of the labor 
migrants back to the country will become one of the priorities in 
the state’s economic policy. Declining population allows 
preservation and conservation of natural resources. This might 
be the only positive characteristic of the process of population 
decline. 
The unemployment level of 5 percent per annum offered 
in the forecasts appears to be quite moderate. Such a low level 
of unemployment can be found only in such developed countries 
as the US and Japan. In the US it is explained in part by the 
relatively liberal market model and the low minimum wage 
while in Japan unemployment traditionally is taken very 
seriously by the government planning agencies. In the Western 
European countries the level of unemployment varies within the 
limits of 8 to 18 percent depending on the country and the 
business cycle. 
Unemployment forecasts for Ukraine do not account for 
the business cycle and the possibility of cyclic development. 
There is no doubt that the level of unemployment in Ukraine 
will not remain stable at 5 percent. Rather, it will change 
depending on the stage of the business cycle. Fluctuations in the 
level of business activities will influence the emerging labor 
market and lead to fluctuations in the level of unemployment. 
Types of unemployment are also of great concern. It is 
preferable to have frictional and cyclical unemployment rather 
than stable and institutional unemployment. With an increase in 
labor productivity and the complexity of work in the future, the 
periods of high unemployment can be used for retraining. 
Labor productivity forecasts for Ukraine are also quite 
optimistic. A stable increase in labor productivity was present 
starting in 1999 and reached 14.4 percent in 2000. Remarkably, 
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a high increase in the rate of level of labor productivity 
continued till 2006. According to the forecasts this indicator will 
be at the level of 6 percent per annum till 2017 and then decline 
to 5 percent per year. 
As was pointed out earlier, the resources for exogenous 
transition are near their depletion, while the resources for 
exogenous growth are still significant. Ukraine still has reserves 
of labor and capital that can move the economy forward if 
involved in production. 
The labor reserves exist in the following forms: presence 
of unemployment, labor migration abroad, and limited working 
time. Accordingly, the measures that can lead to an increase in 
the total amount of labor used in production and to the 
exogenous growth will be reduction of unemployment, return of 
the labor migrants from abroad back to the national economy, 
and an increase in the working time. 
The reduction in unemployment is achieved with the 
help of standard measures, including: stimulating demand based 
on an increase in the final consumption; reduction in the 
frictional unemployment through the development of 
information networks and an improved access to this 
information for employees and employers; reduction in 
institutional and structural unemployment through the 
reorganization of social and welfare programs and professional 
retraining. 
Return of the labor migrants back to the national 
economy can be done through the development of domestic 
labor market and an increase in wages and salaries, balancing 
the level of wages with the level of prices. 
The increase of the working time can be done by an 
increase in the working day and/or working week. The economy 
will have to present stimuli for additional employment and 
working overtime while preserving the same level of labor 
intensity. 
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The algorithm of an increase in labor as the factor of 
exogenous growth is fairly simple and may be presented as 
follows: 
reduction in domestic unemployment and achievement 
of the level of full employment; 
attracting labor migrants back to the national economy; 
attracting labor migrants non-citizens from abroad; 
increasing the working time; 
increasing the labor intensity. 
All the measures listed above are parts of the process of 
increase of production and exogenous growth. 
The capital reserves exist in the following forms: 
undeveloped stock market, shadow economy, national capital 
outflow, unused production capacities, and unfinished 
construction projects. Accordingly, the measures to increase the 
volume of capital involved in production and to support 
exogenous growth will include creation and development of the 
stock market, reversing the capital flight from the country and 
repatriation of capital, legalization of capital, full production 
capacity utilization, and completion of the construction projects. 
The algorithm of an increase in capital as the factor of 
exogenous growth may be presented as follows: 
creation of the stock market in order to attract capital and 
channel it to production; 
repatriation of national capital back to the national 
economy; 
legalization of capital used in the shadow economy, 
amnesty of capital; 
full capacity utilization of earlier unused production 
capacities; 
completion and exploitation of the production facilities 
that are currently under construction. 
The possible ways of an increase in the rate of 
exogenous growth with both labor and capital are presented in 
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Table 2.12. Potential for exogenous growth in Ukraine and 
other post-transition economies is presented in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2. 
Creation of the open labor market will facilitate more 
effective distribution of the workforce within the national 
economy and create an opportunity for attracting foreign work 
force to the country if necessary. Creation of the stock market 
will facilitate development of the capital market, possible 
attraction of capital from abroad, more investments in 
manufacturing and service industries and an increase in the 
effectiveness of capital investments. 
Heyets points out that “As far as the state securities 
market is concerned, it had in fact been frozen for a while after a 
failed start. The stock market situation is causing a lot of 
concern, since this extremely important sphere of the market 
economy does not meet the needs of today, let alone the future. 
Everywhere in the world, the stock market is a financial 
instrument which helps to allocate, distribute, and direct 
investment capital into various spheres of the economy, 
primarily into the real sector. The Ukrainian stock market has 
not compensated for the lack of governmental planning and 
administrative levers. The underdeveloped stock market is 
impeding the investment process, thus hampering economic 
restructuring without which it is impossible to increase 
competitiveness. There is a lack of transparency and of stock 
market liquidity; there are high systematic risks. The current 
system regarding taxation of investment funds and security 
profits discourages investment. The rights of investors and 
shareholders (founders, partners) of joint-stock companies and 
other businesses remain unprotected” (Heyets, 2002, p. 87). 
 
TABLE 2.12 
Potential for exogenous growth by factor of production 
 Resource Phenomenon Measure Task 
L 
A 
B 
O 
R 
Labor force Unemployment 
 
 
Labor migration 
 
Working time 
 
Decrease in 
unemployment 
 
Repatriation 
 
Working time increase 
 
Full employment 
 
 
Labor force increase 
 
Working time max 
 
C 
A 
P 
I 
T 
A 
L 
 
Stock 
market 
 
Capital flow 
 
Shadow 
economy 
 
Production 
capacities 
 
Facilities 
Undeveloped stock 
market 
 
Capital flight 
 
Shadow capital 
 
 
Unused production 
capacities 
 
Incomplete construction 
Creation of the stock 
market 
 
Capital repatriation 
 
Capital legalization 
 
 
Increase in capacity 
utilization 
 
Construction completion 
Development of the stock 
market 
 
Complete capital return 
 
Complete capital 
legalization 
 
Full capacity utilization 
 
 
Full capacity utilization 
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Labor force 
Working time Unemployment Labor migration abroad 
Reduction of 
unemployment 
Working time 
increase 
Repatriation 
Full employment Maximization of 
working time 
Increase in labor force 
Total employment Optimization of 
working time 
Labor migration inflow 
Labor 
Figure 1. Potential for exogenous growth in factors of production: labor 
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Capital market Capital flows Shadow economy Production capacity 
Undeveloped stock 
market 
Creation of the 
stock market 
Development of 
the stock market 
Construction of 
production 
capacities
Capital flight Shadow capital Unused production 
capacities 
Incomplete 
construction 
Repatriation of 
capital 
Driving capital out 
of shade 
Capacity utilization Completion of 
construction 
Complete 
repatriation of 
capital 
Legalization of 
capital 
Full production 
capacity utilization 
Full capacity 
utilization of 
facilities 
Capital 
Figure 2. Potential for exogenous growth in factors of production: capital 
 
Ukraine faces continuing capital flight and labor 
migration, while further capital accumulation is needed. The 
process of continuing exogenous growth may be supported by 
the following steps: 
using the present internal resources in the process of 
production at full capacity; 
repatriation of labor and capital from abroad back to the 
national economy; 
attracting additional resources from abroad. 
In the future exogenous resources of growth will be 
depleted. The limited quantity of labor, working time, and 
capital along with the continuing population decline 
predetermine the necessity of moving to the endogenous model 
of growth. This may be done based on the development of labor 
market and stock market on one hand and further development 
of education and healthcare industries on the other hand. 
Labor market, normally underdeveloped even in the 
well-established market economies with strong traditions of 
competitiveness, is very weak in Ukraine and other post-
transition economies. Personal connections and corruption are 
still major means of gaining a job placement. In this sense the 
pseudo-labor market that exists now has even less market 
features than it had during the soviet times. As a result, bankers 
do not know how to do banking, managers do not know how to 
lead the businesses, and economists have a very vague idea of 
how to optimize production and maximize profit. This situation 
becomes even worse when it comes to the state bureaucrats who 
are still influential in the economy. At the same time highly 
skilled professionals cannot occupy the work places they are 
qualified for. 
Heyets notes in this respect the following: “First of all, 
we do not have a real labor market since this most important 
resource has not been truly valued so far. This substantially 
restricts the effective use of labor, because other resource prices 
have reached world levels long ago. This fact is a serious 
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obstacle on the way to economic growth, especially taking 
into account the present skill level of labor. As a result, the 
motivation to work efficiently diminishes. Moreover, taxation 
does not provide incentives; on the contrary, it hinders the 
economic activity of people, thus limiting long-term economic 
growth.” (Heyets, 2002, p. 87) 
One of the major misleading assumptions often made 
about the pace of the reforms, and privatization in particular, is 
that the soon the reforms are done, the mo successful the process 
of transition will be. Privatization from this position is seen as a 
move from one static condition to the other and from one 
stationary equilibrium to the other. The stationary position is 
then considered as an absolution, a necessary precondition for a 
smooth and sustainable development, a goal by itself. The 
system dynamics in this logic is missing. Transition systems are 
inherently unstable and characterized by non-linear dynamics. 
Shleifer points out that “The need to gain support for 
reform is the political argument for privatizing rapidly. If 
privatization is slow, the benefits to the population are by 
definition small, and hence the political capital they buy the 
reformers is small as well. Fast privatization is privatization that 
offers large political benefits from the start, which is exactly 
what a reformist government needs. Critics of fast privatization 
have argued that it creates fast unemployment and thus drains 
the government budget (Aghion and Blanchard, 1993). This can 
produce both political opposition and economic problems for 
further privatization. This argument overlooks two essential 
points. First, privatization in Eastern Europe is inherently very 
slow. Slowing it down further beyond what internal political 
forces accomplish will stop it altogether. Second, and more 
important, rapid privatization buys political benefits and thus 
allows reforms to deepen.” (Shleifer, 2005, p. 36) 
In our view, privatization should be relatively slow. In 
Ukraine process of privatization took longer than it did in Russia. 
Privatization should be considered not only as a process of 
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property distribution, including the change of ownership of 
the production facilities, but as a process of investment. Ukraine 
still has a significant potential for privatization. The state 
property should no longer be distributed for free or through the 
fictitious voucher privatization, notorious for its corruption and 
pointlessness. Instead, it should be sold at the market prices to 
those who are able and willing to pay. This will guarantee at 
least the effective exploitation of the privatized production 
facilities in the future. 
One of the fundamental problems of the economic 
mechanisms, incentives for productive labor, and the national 
economies in general is a rent-seeking behavior. The rent-
seeking behavior is best seen in Russia, especially with the ever 
high energy prices. Other post-soviet economies can also be 
characterized as infected with the rent-seeking behavior. Since 
the resources are controlled territorially and the territories are 
confined within the national borders, the state is always a major 
player in the distribution of access to the resources and 
allocation of the benefits, derived from the resources, if not the 
major one. In the Russian Federation, one can see the 
growing involvement of the state in the oil and gas industry. The 
earlier total privatization of the industry is now reversed with 
the processes of de facto partial deprivatization, nationalization, 
and centralization of control over the access to the resources and 
revenue flows, strengthening the vertical axis of power and 
increasing participation of the state in the economy. 
Ukraine cannot repeat the path of the Russian 
Federation simply because Russia has the richest natural 
resources in the world. The Russian economy will always be 
distinct by the inefficient use of the natural resources and the 
society will remain under the influence of rent-seeking behavior 
for quite sometime. In addition, Russia, and Moscow in 
particular, remains a regional center. In distinction of Ukraine, it 
did not suffer a significant labor migration abroad that lasted for 
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at least 15 years. Instead, the Russian Federation 
experiences a significant influx of labor migrants into the 
country, some of whom come from Ukraine. 
The exogenous transition was not very successful not 
only in Ukraine, but in the Eastern European countries as well, 
despite the inflow of foreign capital in these economies was 
much more significant. Examples of Poland, Hungary, and other 
countries of the region make it possible to believe that the 
“honey moon” of the Eastern European reforms is over. 
In Hungary, $40 billion in foreign direct investment 
coexist with the $40 billion foreign debt with the state budget 
deficit of $10 billion. This in part is a result of the over-reliance 
on the foreign help during transition. The external help was 
intended to prevent the significant economic decline, facilitate 
economic stabilization, and initiate growth. What happened in 
the reality can be characterized as Leontieff’s “living above the 
means.” 
Political instability, trade union protests in Poland, 
violent demonstrations in autumn of 2006 in Hungary, 
dissatisfaction with the results of the reforms in East Germany 
prove the insufficiency of the exogenous model of transition, 
growth, and socio-economic development. 
The rapid economic growth that can be observed in 
Ukraine in the short run may be explained in part by such 
factors as statistical errors, legalization of a part of the shadow 
economy, utilization of already existing production capacities 
that were not in use during the transition, and reduction in 
unemployment. However, these factors alone cannot explain the 
rapid growth in the country that started in 1999 and continues 
for the last eight years. The presence of the sustainable real per 
capita GDP growth is unquestionable. 
Utilization of unused production capacities and 
workforce is not enough to achieve sustainable economic 
growth. Sustainable economic growth can only be based on the 
continuous technological improvements and innovations, 
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including management and organization of production, as 
well as accumulation of human capital and an increase in the 
effectiveness of its utilization in production. Therefore, major 
tasks for Ukraine become the renovation of principal capital, 
maintaining a high rate of technical progress, utilization of new 
technologies in the process of production, human capital 
accumulation, and organizational innovations. 
Human capital exists indivisibly from each individual 
and from the societal production. Human capital is personified, 
as it is embedded in an individual, and is accumulated, as any 
other form of capital. Human capital has value only in the 
process of production. Human capital is created, accumulated, 
and realized only within the process of societal production. The 
components of human capital, such as knowledge, special skills, 
experiences, are utilized in production. Endogeneity of human 
capital is explained by the fact that human capital is produced 
within the system, by the system, and for the system. 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The ideas of public spending and foreign investment as 
the major engines for potential growth, especially in developing 
nations, are replaced with the ideas about the importance of 
reinvestment and domestic market development. The theories of 
growth based on the fundamental assumption that a significant 
influx of the resources is necessary to initiate sustainable growth 
do not hold. They might work to a certain degree in the 
developing world, but appear to be insufficient to explain rapid 
economic growth in Ukraine and other countries of the former 
Soviet Bloc. 
Despite the difficulties and local crises, the socio-
economic transition in Ukraine may be considered as successful. 
Political and economic reforms lead to the creation of 
predominantly market economy. By 2004 Ukraine achieved pre-
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transition level of GDP per capita. The positive economic 
growth takes place since 1999. 
Based on the data available and long run forecasts, the 
stages of GDP growth can be presented as follows: the decline 
in the rate of growth (till 1989); the negative economic growth 
(from 1990 to 1999); the significant economic growth along 
with a significant increase in business activities in the country 
(from 2000 to 2004); the slow down in the rate of growth (from 
2005 to 2010); further decline in the rate of growth (from 2011 
to 2015); and stabilization of the rate of growth at the moderate 
level. 
While the exogenous resource of economic transition is 
depleted and the exogenous-type forms of transition are no 
longer effective, the exogenous growth still has a certain 
potential in Ukraine. This is explained by the fact that there are 
still unused labor resources as well as labor migration abroad 
and capital flight. Repatriation and legalization of capital, return 
of the labor migrants, and full employment will support 
economic growth in the short run. However, the sustainable 
growth will only be possible thanks to technological 
advancements and innovations. This anticipates endogenous 
growth. 
Among the major tasks of post-transition development in 
Ukraine are strengthening of the labor market and creation of 
the stock market. Such developments will facilitate better 
distribution of property and lead to an increase in labor 
productivity. This will eventually bring higher rate of GDP per 
capita growth and higher living standards of the population. 
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PART III 
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE NIS 
 
3.1. Recession: Myth and Reality 
 
The logic of this chapter can be presented as follows. 
First, statistical data is introduced for the transition economies. 
The data was previously used to substantiate claims about 
significant economic decline and the existence of a crisis 
situation in the national economies of the countries of the former 
Soviet Bloc during the period of 1990-2000. We consider the 
scale and the continuity of economic decline in transition 
economies, the level of corruption, the influence of corruption 
on GDP growth, the shadow sector or unofficial economy and 
its size in transition economies, energy consumption as a 
measurement of real volume of production, and the structure of 
energy production as a measurement of the level of economic 
development. An attempt is made to determine the extent to 
which the alleged existence of significant economic decline or 
an economic crisis was a real or mythical. 
Second, we present and analyze macroeconomic 
indicators of the national economies of the former Soviet Bloc, 
including member countries of the CIS. GDP growth rates in the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR are 
considered here along with the structure of GDP growth by 
expenditures in Ukraine. The fact of sustainable economic 
growth in Ukraine is supported by the statistical findings. 
Third, we further analyze statistical data used to 
determine whether economic growth in Ukraine was initiated by 
external forces or an external shock. For this we consider in 
detail such processes and indicators as volume of foreign direct 
investments and portfolio investments as well as capital flight 
from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland, and Hungary. We 
also consider indicators of foreign debt and debt service in 
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Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In this chapter such 
characteristics as unemployment and the labor market in 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and other CIS countries are 
considered not as social indicators, but as factors that could 
possibly influence the initiation of economic growth. 
Macroeconomic indicators that confirm growth and indicators of 
external influence on the national economies are followed by 
selected macroeconomic and social indicators of the countries of 
the former Soviet Bloc. This is done for the purpose of 
substantiating the argument about the presence of sustainable 
economic growth in these countries. In this part of the chapter 
we analyze such indicators as income and the dynamics of 
private consumption and prices in Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary, and productivity and wages in 
Ukraine. Examination of the indicators of labor productivity and 
the average wage will serve as a transition to the analysis of the 
factors that made possible initiation of sustainable economic 
growth. Specifically, we consider such internal systemic factors 
as human capital and conditions for its accumulation and use. 
We analyze data on the population’s access to higher education 
and medical services, living conditions, life expectancy at birth 
in the CIS countries, as well as numerous indicators of socio-
economic progress of the Ukrainian society, including its 
openness and well-being. R&D is considered as one of the 
moving forces of growth in the future. Finally, we consider 
long-run forecasts of economic growth in Ukraine and interpret 
them. Concluding remarks are focused on generalization of the 
results of the statistical analysis and confirmation of theoretical 
statements and hypotheses presented in Part II. 
 
3.1.1. Cumulative Output Decline and Period of 
Recovery 
Data about the cumulative output decline and time to 
recovery in individual transition countries for the period of 
1990-1999 is presented in Table 3.1. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Cumulative output decline and recovery in individual transition 
countries, 1990-1999 
Country Consecutive 
years of 
output 
decline 
Cumulative 
output 
decline 
Index of 
1999 
Real GDP 
(1990=100) 
Central and Eastern 
Europe and Baltics 
3.8 22.6 103.1 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
5 
2 
3 
4 
3 
33 
16 
36 
12 
35 
15 
51 
44 
6 
21 
23 
14 
102 
78 
84 
97 
80 
105 
58 
66 
141 
80 
104 
113 
NIS 6.5 50.5 57.7 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Moldova 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
4 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
8 
10 
6 
63 
60 
35 
78 
41 
50 
63 
40 
50 
48 
59 
18 
50 
53 
82 
29 
60 
62 
34 
59 
56 
63 
41 
93 
Source: Dabrowski, M. (2002). Is the Economic Growth in 
Ukraine Sustainable? In S. Cramon-Taubaden and I. Akimova (Eds.). 
Fostering Sustainable Growth in Ukraine. Berlin: Physica-Verlag, p. 
73. 
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According to the data presented in Table 3.1, the average 
period of continuous output decline in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Baltic states, including Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, is equal to 
3.8 years. The average period of continuous output decline in 
the CIS countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, 
is equal to 6.5 years, and hence lasted much longer than in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic states. 
The total volume of output decline in the CIS countries 
is also significantly larger than in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and Baltic states—50.5 percent and 22.6 percent, 
respectively. Moreover, total volume of output decline in the 
Baltic states was highest in the group, with 51 percent in Latvia, 
44 percent in Lithuania, and 35 percent in Estonia. Unlike other 
countries in the group, Baltic states were part of the USSR. 
According to the data, the longest period of continuous 
output decline occurred in Ukraine, where it lasted 10 years. 
Nevertheless, the output decline was not the most significant 
among the countries examined. The official output decline in 
Ukraine was equal to 59 percent, but in Azerbaijan it was 60 
percent, in Armenia and in Moldova it was 63 percent, and in 
Georgia it was 59 percent. Based on its continuous output 
decline and the slow pace of the reforms, Ukraine has been often 
referred to in the economic literature as a “national park” of 
transition, by which is meant a site of preservation, a place 
where transition takes place very slowly. 
Cumulative output decline does not correlate with the 
period of decline. In Georgia, total output decline was equal to 
78 percent during a period of decline that lasted for 5 years, 
whereas in the Russian Federation output decline was equal to 
40 percent with the period of decline being 7 years. The 
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correlation of cumulative output decline and the total number 
of consecutive years of output decline in the NIS in 1990-1999 
is presented in Figure 3.1. 
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                             Consecutive years of output decline 
 
Figure 3.1. Correlation of cumulative output decline and 
total number of consecutive years of output decline in the NIS, 
1990-1999 
 
The above diagram points to the absence of a positive 
correlation between cumulative output decline and the number 
of consecutive years of output decline in the NIS. 
Official data about cumulative output decline and its 
continuity should be approached critically. In our view, 
consecutive output decline in Ukraine continued for no more 
than 6 years and the decline itself was significantly smaller than 
59 percent of GDP. This statement will be proven statistically 
further in the chapter. 
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The output decline of 59 percent during the period of 
1990 to 1999 can be combined with the reported share of the 
unofficial economy, which constituted 48.9 percent in 1995. 
Accordingly, the claimed output decline of 59 percent is the 
product of narrowly considering only the dynamics of official 
GDP. The decline started in 1992 and continued to 1998, 
making the whole period of continuous decline equal to 7 years 
or so. 
Economic transition in the Russian Federation has 
similar characteristics. The output decline of 40 percent during 
the period of 1990 to 1999 can be combined with the reported 
share of the unofficial economy, which constituted 41.6 percent 
in 1995. Accordingly, the claimed output decline of 59 percent 
is again the product of narrowly focusing only on the dynamics 
of official GDP. The decline started in 1992 and continued till 
1998, being significantly less than the officially registered 40 
percent. 
Correlation of cumulative output decline and total 
number of consecutive years of output decline in the Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states in 1990-1999 is depicted in 
Figure 3.2. 
As follows from the correlation diagram presented in 
Figure 3.2, there was a certain correlation between the 
cumulative output decline and the total number of consecutive 
years of output decline in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
Baltic states during the period of 1990-1999. The presence of a 
positive correlation in this group of countries makes it distinct 
from the NIS. However, even here deviations from the 
correlation line are quite significant. The value of output decline 
for the countries with the three-year period of decline varies 
within the limits of 12 to 33 percent, while for the countries with 
the four-year period of decline it varies within the limits of 15 to 
36 percent. 
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Figure 3.2. Correlation of cumulative output decline and 
total number of consecutive years of output decline in the 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, 1990-1999 
 
3.1.2. Corruption and Its Impact on Economic Growth 
One of the arguments used to support the idea of sharp 
and significant output decline in the countries of the former 
Soviet Bloc is that the high level of corruption in transition 
economies has a negative impact on production. We will turn to 
statistical data to test such a statement. The level of business-
related corruption in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
and Central and Eastern Europe in 2002 is presented in Table 
3.2. The percent of managers who consider corruption the major 
obstacle for the business and entrepreneurial activities is 
considered an indicator of the negative impact of corruption on 
 143 
production. The data is obtained during the survey conducted 
in the NIS and CEE in 2003. 
 
TABLE 3.2 
 
An indicator of business-related corruption (percent of managers 
surveyed ranking this as a major business constraint) in NIS and 
CEE, 2002* 
 
Country Indicator Country Indicator
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
13.5 
19.5 
17.9 
25.4 
22.5 
12.5 
 5.4 
35.1 
 8.8 
14.2 
31.4 
11.7 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
15.6 
40.2 
27.6 
34.9 
13.7 
16.3 
27.5 
 6.1 
21.0 
27.8 
 8.7 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from 
the database in August 10, 2006. 
* Data for Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are for 2003. 
 
According to the data presented in Table 3.2, the level of 
corruption in business and the relationship between business and 
state in Ukraine is average for the region overall, while in the 
Russian Federation the level of corruption is at the lower end of 
the scale. Moldova is a leader in corruption, while in Estonia, 
Slovenia, and Hungary the level of corruption is relatively low 
as compared to the region’s average. Needless to say, data on 
corruption are always to a large extent subjective, partial, and 
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biased. Nevertheless, they should be taken into consideration 
when there is a lack of better sources of information. 
The issue of slowing down economic growth due to an 
increase in corruption is still open. While a positive correlation 
between the high level of corruption and output decline has been 
proven theoretically, strong systematic empirical evidence has 
yet to be shown. Correlation of the GDP per capita growth and 
estimates of corruption made by the businessmen in the NIS and 
CEE countries of the former socialist bloc in 2002 is presented 
as a diagram in Figure 3.3. 
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                                                                Corruption 
Figure 3.3. Correlation of the GDP per capita growth and 
estimates of corruption made by the businessmen in the NIS and 
CEE countries of the former socialist bloc, 2002. 
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The diagram shows that there is no clear evidence of a 
positive correlation between the level of corruption and output 
decline or GDP growth slowdown. In Moldova GDP per capita 
growth of 8 percent in 2002 was possible, with the level of 
corruption marked at 40.2. In Slovenia during the same year 
GDP per capita growth was only 3 percent, with the level of 
corruption at 6.1. In Ukraine GDP per capita growth of around 5 
percent in 2002 coexisted, with the level of corruption of 27.5 
on the offered scale. The diagram is but a one year snapshot of 
the correlation between corruption and GDP growth. We could 
expect that this correlation would change over time and for that 
reason we should consider possible links between corruption 
and growth should be considered in dynamics over time. Further 
consideration of a possible negative correlation between the 
level of corruption and GDP growth should be based on the time 
series data. 
 
3.1.3. Shadow Sector, Unofficial Economy and its Size 
Data for unofficial GDP in Eastern Europe and former 
USSR for the period of 1989 -1995 are presented in Table 3.3. 
More detailed data are presented in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 
I. A sharp increase in growth of the shadow economy in the 
early 1990s was observed in all the countries of the former 
USSR, except Estonia and Uzbekistan. A critical approach to 
such data should acknowledge that the controlling, estimating, 
and reporting bases in these countries are insufficient for 
reflecting the size of the shadow economy. The accuracy of 
reports on national levels of corruption is always a matter of 
some concern. 
 
 
 146 
ТABLE 3.3. 
 
Unofficial GDP in Eastern Europe and former USSR, 
1989 -1995 
 
Country Share of unofficial DGP in the total GDP 
(percent) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Eastern 
Europe 
Bulgaria 
Czech Rep 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak Rep 
 
 
 
22.8
6.0
27.0
15.7
22.3
6.0
 
 
25.1
6.7
28.0
19.6
13.7
7.7
 
 
23.9 
12.9 
32.9 
23.5 
15.7 
15.1 
 
 
 
25.0
16.9
30.6
19.7
18.0
17.6
 
 
29.9
16.9
28.5
18.5
16.4
16.2
 
 
29.1
17.6
27.7
15.2
17.4
14.6
 
 
36.2 
11.3 
29.0 
12.6 
19.1 
5.8 
 
USSR 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
16.1
21.9
15.4
19.9
24.9
17.0
12.8
11.3
18.1
14.7
16.3
11.4
 
20.2 
22.7 
16.6 
26.2 
36.0 
19.7 
19.0 
21.8 
27.1 
23.5 
25.6 
7.8 
 
22.0
39.2
13.2
25.4
52.3
24.9
34.3
39.2
37.3
32.8
33.6
11.7
23.0
51.2
11.0
24.1
61.0
27.2
31.0
31.7
34.0
36.7
38.0
10.1
27.0
58.0
18.9
25.1
63.5
34.1
34.2
28.7
39.7
40.3
45.7
9.5
 
31.6 
60.6 
19.3 
11.8 
62.6 
34.3 
35.3 
21.6 
35.7 
41.6 
48.9 
6.5 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Gjourgyan and 
Mirzoyan (2000), Shleifer (2005). 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia were leaders in the share of 
shadow economy in the national economies, and, accordingly, in 
the share of unofficial GDP in the total GDP. The share of 
unofficial GDP in Azerbaijan in 1995 constituted 60.6 percent 
of the total GDP, while in Georgia it was equal to 62.6 percent. 
The share of unofficial GDP in Ukraine in 1995 was reported at 
48.9 percent of the total GDP, while in the Russian Federation it 
was estimated at 41.6 percent. 
Data for the former USSR in 1989 are presented as an 
average for all of the former republics, indicating the same level 
of unofficial GDP of 12 percent. In the former socialist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, economic transitions have started 
earlier than in the USSR, and by 1989 the share of unofficial 
GDP had reached significant value. The share of unofficial GDP 
in Bulgaria was equal to 22.8 percent, in Romania it was 22.3 
percent, and in Hungary 27 percent. 
By the end of 1995 Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania 
remained the leaders in terms of share of unofficial GDP among 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The share of 
unofficial GDP in 1995 in Bulgaria was equal to 36.2 percent. 
Dynamics of the share of unofficial GDP in the Eastern 
European countries in 1989-1995 are presented in Figure3.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Unofficial GDP in the Eastern European 
countries, 1989-1995 
 
Graphs of the share of unofficial GDP in the Eastern 
European countries in 1989-1995 demonstrate relatively smooth 
distribution in time almost without sharp increases. 
Dynamics of the share of unofficial GDP in the countries 
of the former USSR in 1989-1995 are presented in Figure3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Unofficial GDP in the former USSR, 1989-
1995 
 
Graphs of the share of unofficial GDP in the countries of 
the former USSR in 1989-1995 demonstrate very sporadic 
distribution in time, with a significant increase in some countries. 
Dynamics of the share of unofficial GDP in Ukraine in 
1989-1995 are presented in Figure3.6. 
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Figure 3.6. Unofficial GDP in Ukraine, 1989-1995 
 
According to the graph, the share of unofficial GDP in 
Ukraine continuously and steadily increased during the period of 
1989-1995. However, such an increase was not linear, and it 
accelerated in 1990-1992 and again in 1993-1994. Moreover, an 
increase in the share of unofficial GDP in Ukraine was taking 
place when the total GDP was steadily declining. Therefore, an 
increase in the share of unofficial GDP in Ukraine was not as 
dramatic, as the graphic presentation might make it seem. 
The share of unofficial GDP in total GDP in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 2000s is not 
much higher than the analogous indicator in the countries of 
Western Europe, USA, Canada, and Australia. 
Data of the share of the unofficial GDP in the total GDP 
in the countries of Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia in 1990 are presented in Table 3.4. 
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ТABLE 3.4 
 
Share of the unofficial DGP in the total GDP (percent), in 
Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and Australia, 1990 
 
Country 
 
Percent 
 
Country 
 
Percent 
 
Spain 
Greece 
Ireland 
Belgium 
Italy 
Denmark 
Austria 
Australia 
Germany 
Portugal 
22.9 
21.8 
20.6 
19.8 
19.6 
16.9 
15.5 
15.1 
14.6 
13.8 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Japan 
UK 
France 
Canada 
Sweden 
USA 
Switzerland 
Norway 
13.4 
13.3 
13.2 
13.1 
12.3 
11.7 
11.0 
10.5 
10.2 
 9.3 
Source: Lackó, M. (1998). The Hidden Economies of 
Visegrád Countries in International Comparison: A Household 
Electricity Approach. In L. Halpern and C. Wyplosz (Eds.): 
Hungary: Towards a Market Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
As is clear from the data, the share of unofficial GDP in 
Spain and Greece is highest among the developed capitalist 
countries, comprising 22.9 percent and 21.8 percent, 
respectively. The relatively stable economic situation in the 
countries of Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia points toward an unchanged share of unofficial GDP. 
Of the member countries of the European Union Spain and 
Greece have the lowest levels of per capita income. It is not 
surprising that rapid economic reforms and relatively low levels 
of per capita income lead to an increase in the size of the 
shadow economy in transition societies. 
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In the USSR in 1989 the share of unofficial GDP in 
total GDP was more or less the same as it was in the US, France, 
and Canada. In 1990 it had achieved the level of Germany and 
Austria. Within the next few years, the share of unofficial GDP 
in total GDP in the former soviet republics went above those of 
the developed capitalist economies. In considering the share of 
unofficial GDP in total GDP, we ought to give preference to the 
weighted average values and focus predominantly on the 
indicators of the Russian Federation and Ukraine where total 
GDP was much higher than in the other former soviet republics. 
It is possible that the size of the shadow economy in 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation will be reduced thanks to 
diligent fiscal policy, with the result that the share of unofficial 
GDP in total GDP will decrease to the level of the EU countries. 
 
3.1.4. Energy Production and Consumption 
One can find quite surprising the fact that the leading 
international organizations and programs, including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (IBRD), 
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) not only 
designated Ukraine as a country with a transition economy, but 
also placed it, all along with the transition economies, on the list 
of developing countries. This was done with a certain degree of 
enthusiasm. 
We ought to consider such categorizations as incorrect. 
For instance, in his works in 1970s and 1980s, Leontieff rightly 
groups the USSR and socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe along with capitalist economies of Western Europe and 
North America, categorizing all of them as developed 
industrialized nations. In our view, the fact that such a large 
share of Ukraine’s electric energy is produced by nuclear power 
stations is itself an indication that Ukraine should be listed as an 
industrialized rather than a developing nation. The country 
should not be regarded as a developing nation just because of 
the temporary negative aspects of the transition. 
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When energy import and decline in energy production 
are accounted for, the electric energy produced by the nuclear 
power stations as a share of the total electric energy produced in 
the country increases as does the weight of nuclear power in 
general, even if the volume of its production is constant. 
On the other hand, the presence of a well-developed 
technologically complex system of energy production by nuclear 
power plants on an industrial scale indicates that the country 
cannot be a developing one by definition. Moreover, as shown 
in Table 3.5, the electric energy produced by the nuclear power 
stations as a share of the total electric energy produced in the 
country, has reached 43 percent in 2003 and is at par with the 
level of developed capitalist countries. 
In France, the share of electric energy produced by 
nuclear power stations in the total electric energy produced is 
approximately 80 percent, but France is something of an 
exception. According to the data, presented in Table 3.5 and in 
Figure 3.7, the share of electric energy produced by nuclear 
power stations in the total electric energy produced in Ukraine 
increased consistently during the entire period of 1992 to 2003. 
Selected indicators for electricity and energy production 
and consumption in Ukraine in 1992-2003 are presented in 
Table 3.5. More detailed data of energy production and energy 
consumption in Ukraine in 1992-2003, including electric energy 
indicators, are presented in Tables 3 and 4 of Appendix I. 
The data for energy production and energy consumption 
in Ukraine in 1992-2003, including electric energy production 
and consumption, support our statement that economic decline 
in Ukraine during the period of 1991 to 1999 was not as 
significant as it is presented in numerous sources and should not 
be considered a deep economic crisis. 
Electric energy does not dominate the national economy 
and does not dictate trends in future economic development of 
the country. In Ukraine in 2002, 5.9 percent of managers 
surveyed ranked the price of electric energy as a major business 
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constraint. In 2005 this figure declined to 4.9 percent, 
contrary to expectations. 
 
TABLE 3.5 
 
Selected indicators for electricity and energy production and 
consumption in Ukraine, 1992-2003 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
Electric 
power 
consump
tion 
(kWh 
per 
capita) 
Electric 
power 
transmis
sion 
losses, % 
 
Electricit
y 
producti
on from 
nuclear 
sources, 
% 
Energy 
imports, 
net (% of 
energy 
use) 
 
Energy 
use (kg 
of oil 
equivale
nt per 
capita) 
 
1992 4307.974 9.01973 29.19802 49.55032 4187.438 
1993 3947.971 9.73453 32.75594 48.57830 3735.357 
1994 3469.518 10.72403 33.96329 47.42668 3182.409 
1995 3343.571 9.71566 36.38564 49.84413 3213.291 
1996 3163.629 13.67508 43.53585 52.00154 2894.519 
1997 2960.385 15.97460 44.66895 49.19622 2779.948 
1998 2772.917 17.36642 43.53554 46.33653 2642.613 
1999 2787.189 17.56333 41.86905 45.47789 2649.489 
2000 2773.435 18.20409 45.08735 44.36479 2643.656 
2001 2790.534 19.70996 44.07903 44.67668 2673.062 
2002 2843.537 19.29596 44.93288 44.86455 2737.304 
2003 2997.873 17.80189 45.17536 43.01460 2772.388 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from 
the database in August 10, 2006. 
 
Dynamics of electricity production from nuclear sources 
as percent of total electricity production in Ukraine in 1998-
2003 is presented in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7. Electricity production from nuclear sources 
(percent of total) in Ukraine, 1998-2003 
 
Energy-efficient technologies in energy-intensive 
production in metallurgy and machine building are necessary to 
reduce the national economy’s energy dependency. This 
supports our statement that future development should focus on 
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of already existing 
well-established branches of the national economy. 
Technological innovations and energy efficiency will protect the 
national economy from potential shocks caused by energy price 
fluctuations and energy market volatilities. This, in turn, 
necessitates a further increase in investment in principal capital, 
including machines and equipment. Modernization of the 
nation’s basic industries is linked to the creation and 
development of the stock market, which would facilitate 
channeling resources into the branches. Human capital 
accumulation will also be necessary to serve new production 
technologies. 
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3.2. Macroeconomic Indicators of the Former Soviet Bloc 
 
Selected macroeconomic and demographic indicators in 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland, and Hungary for the 
period of 2000-2004 are presented in Tables 3.6 – 3.9. 
 
ТABLE 3.6 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine, 2000-2004 
 
Indicator 2000 2003 2004 
National income, billion USD 34.4 46.9 60.3
National income per capita, 
billion USD 
690.0 970.0 1260.0
GDP, billion USD 31.3 50.1 65.1
Annual GDP growth, percent 5.9 9.4 12.1
Population, million 49.5 48.4 48.0
Population growth, percent -0.8 -0.7 -0.7
Source: World Development Indicators Database, 
Retrieved in November 12, 2005. 
 
ТABLE 3.7 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in the Russian Federation, 
2000-2004 
Indicator 2000 2003 2004 
National income, billion USD 250.3 373.9 487.3
National income per capita, 
billion USD 
1720.0 2610.0 3410.0
GDP, billion USD 259.7 430.1 582.4
Annual GDP growth, percent 10.0 7.3 7.2
Population, million 145.6 143.4 142.8
Population growth, percent -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Source: World Development Indicators Database, 
Retrieved in November 12, 2005. 
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ТABLE 3.8 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Poland, 2000-2004 
 
Indicator 2000 2003 2004 
National income, billion USD 171.0 201.7 232.4
National income per capita, 
billion USD 
4430.0 5280.0 6090.0
GDP, billion USD 166.5 209.6 241.8
Annual GDP growth, percent 4.0 3.7 5.3
Population, million 38.6 38.2 38.2
Population growth, percent -0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Source: World Development Indicators Database, 
Retrieved in November 12, 2005. 
 
ТABLE 3.9 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Hungary, 2000-2004 
 
Indicator 2000 2003 2004
National income, billion USD 46.6 64.4 83.3
National income per capita, 
billion USD 
4650.0 6360.0 8270.0
GDP, billion USD 46.7 82.8 99.7
Annual GDP growth, percent 5.2 3.0 4.0
Population, million 10.0 10.1 10.1
Population growth, percent -0.4 -0.3 -0.4
Source: World Development Indicators Database, 
Retrieved in November 12, 2005. 
 
Major macroeconomic and demographic indicators in 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland, and Hungary for the 
period of 2000-2004, presented in Tables 3.6 – 3.9, are useful as 
a basic informative resource. 
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3.2.1. GDP Growth in Eastern Europe and the FSU 
Data for GDP per capita growth in the CEE and the 
former USSR for the period of 1991 to 2004 according to the 
World Development Indicators database are presented in Table 
3.10. Data for GDP per capita growth in the former USSR for 
the period of 1995 to 2000 calculated according to the Penn 
World Tables methodology are presented in Table 3.11. Data for 
GDP per capita growth in the CEE and the former USSR for 
selected years are presented in Table 3.10. 
 
TABLE 3.10 
 
GDP per capita growth in the CEE and the former USSR, 1991, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 
 
Country 1991 1994 1997 2000 2004 
Armenia -10.8891 7.9238 4.4708 6.6208 7.3926 
Azerbaijan -2.2295 -20.7781 4.7876 10.1953 9.2241 
Belarus -1.2484 -11.5964 11.8734 6.1172 11.5991 
Georgia -20.4077 -8.5790 12.0380 2.9995 7.2972 
Hungary -11.7302 3.2782 4.9591 6.4682 4.8808 
Kazakhstan -11.5545 -11.3227 3.3195 10.1307 8.7831 
Kyrgyzstan -9.3270 -20.0324 8.3333 4.3556 5.9374 
Latvia -12.3096 3.7139 10.0948 7.7027 8.9068 
Lithuania -5.8284 -9.1493 7.7551 4.8524 7.2476 
Moldova -16.1394 -30.7228 1.8901 2.4333 7.6402 
Poland -7.3054 4.9691 6.7115 3.9779 5.4800 
Russia -5.2591 -12.4613 1.6994 10.0045 7.7022 
Tajikistan -9.0744 -22.4399 0.3185 7.0313 9.3894 
Turkmenistan -7.3638 -19.4063 -12.6153 17.0833 ... 
Ukraine -8.6016 -22.5508 -2.1121 6.9713 12.9534 
Uzbekistan -2.8285 -7.1970 3.5656 2.3365 6.1338 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from 
the database in August 10, 2006. 
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Data for GDP per capita growth in the former USSR 
in 1995-2000 are presented in Table 3.11. 
 
TABLE 3.11 
 
GDP per capita growth in the former USSR, 1995-2000* 
 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Armenia 9.19 4.58 -1.7 7.34 4.73 5.57 
Azerbaijan -14.46 -5.80 2.14 14.39 5.96 10.40 
Belarus -8.12 2.59 15.55 7.18 7.87 11.19 
Georgia 6.42 0.08 9.60 4.88 4.63 6.16 
Kazakhstan … … 11.64 -3.71 17.43 -13.22 
Kyrgyzstan -1.85 2.31 1.23 -4.15 20.05 7.87 
Latvia -10.72 2.27 7.43 2.24 0.88 4.80 
Lithuania -2.17 4.21 5.09 6.72 -5.29 5.13 
Moldova 1.91 3.61 8.14 2.34 3.69 7.67 
Russia … -4.82 3.56 -8.49 -4.52 1.81 
Tajikistan -6.75 -0.96 0.60 -2.82 3.48 11.40 
Turkmenistan … … 25.35 -2.25 2.60 6.56 
Ukraine -10.95 -9.19 -1.02 1.17 1.45 3.35 
Uzbekistan -2.54 10.24 … … … … 
Source: Heston, A., Summers, R., and B. Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons 
at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
Retrieved 
from: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php 
Accessed in August 12, 2006. 
* In Penn World Table data Real GDP means GDP 
measured in PPP (purchasing power parity), not in constant 
prices (adjusted for inflation) as it is normally the case for term 
“real” in economic literature. 
 
Real GDP per capita growth in Ukraine according to the 
calculations of Penn World Table Version 6.1 for the period of 
1991-2000 is presented in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. Real GDP per capita growth in Ukraine 
according to the calculations of Penn World Table Version 6.1, 
1991-2000 (annual percent change) 
 
More detailed annual indicators of GDP per capita 
growth in the CEE and the former USSR for the period of 1991 
to 2004, according to the World Development Indicators 
database as well as GDP per capita growth in the former USSR 
for the period of 1991 to 2000 calculated according to the Penn 
World Tables methodology, are presented in Tables 1-3 of 
Appendix II. 
Major macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary including nominal GDP (USD 
PPP), real GDP in national currencies, real GDP (USD PPP) in 
constant prices of 1996, real GDP in USD in constant prices of 
1996, nominal GDP in national currencies, nominal GDP in 
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USD, and real GDP in factor costs in national currencies for 
the period of 1989 to 2010 are presented in Tables 1-4 of 
Appendix III. These data clearly support our suggestion that the 
output decline have started before the Soviet Union 
disintegration and indicate stable growth that takes place in the 
national economies of the former soviet republics now and in 
perspective to 2010. 
 
3.2.2. Structure of GDP Growth by Expenditures in 
Ukraine 
Statistical data on the contribution of stock building, 
private consumption, government consumption, gross fixed 
investment, and external balance to real GDP growth in Ukraine 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Table 3.12. 
The data shows that the major emphasis is made on 
private consumption. The literature on growth in Ukraine also 
points toward increasing private consumption. At the same time 
role of government consumption declines. External balance has 
negative effect on growth. This trend will likely continue in the 
future. Role of investment will continue to grow while 
investment share will become significantly higher than 
government consumption. Investment had positive effect on 
growth starting 1997. It is expected that in the future role of the 
stock building will be minimal. 
Dynamics of the real GDP growth by expenditure 
components in Ukraine for the period of 1991 to 2010 is 
presented in detail in Appendix IV. 
Dynamics of the real GDP growth by expenditure 
components in Ukraine for the period of 1991 to 2010 is 
presented in Figures 3.9-3.13. 
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TABLE 3.12 
 
Contribution to real GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 
1991-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Stock 
Building 
 
 
Private 
consum 
ption 
 
Govern
ment 
consum 
ption 
Gross 
fixed 
investm
ent 
External 
balance 
 
 
1991 0.994 -4.537 0.833 … …
1992 0.809 -4.447 0.510 -6.235 …
1993 7.601 -12.559 0.017 -15.993 …
1994 19.016 -3.699 -2.164 -17.688 -18.395
1995 -17.115 -0.941 -1.612 -2.261 9.786
1996 1.484 -5.239 -1.157 -4.665 -0.466
1997 -2.089 -0.907 -0.507 0.752 -0.236
1998 -3.772 0.750 -0.786 0.954 0.908
1999 -3.056 -1.253 -1.750 0.169 5.691
2000 1.393 2.936 -0.388 3.000 -1.142
2001 2.112 3.105 0.397 2.359 1.212
2002 0 5.200 -1.200 0.900 3.200
2003 0 7.000 2.300 3.900 -3.200
2004 0.200 7.900 0.300 5.400 1.400
2005 -0.200 9.800 0.400 -0.100 -8.300
2006 0 6.100 0.300 1.400 -6.200
2007 0 5.900 0.600 2.500 -3.200
2008 0 6.400 0.900 2.800 -4.100
2009 0 7.700 1.000 2.200 -4.600
2010 0 7.200 1.000 2.500 -5.000
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP. 
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Figure 3.9. Contribution of private consumption to real 
GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
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Figure 3.10. Contribution of government consumption to 
real GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
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Figure 3.11. Contribution of gross fixed investment to 
real GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
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Figure 3.12. Contribution of stockbuilding to real GDP 
growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
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Figure 3.13. Contribution of external balance to real 
GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
 
Statistical data on the contribution of stock building, 
private consumption, government consumption, gross fixed 
investment, and external balance to real GDP in Ukraine for the 
period of 1993-2010 are presented in Table 3.13. 
Statistical data on the structure of contribution of stock 
building, private consumption, government consumption, gross 
fixed investment, and external balance to real GDP in Ukraine 
for the period of 1993-2010 shows that the share of private 
consumption in GDP was continuously increasing, beginning in 
1993. It increased from 46.667 percent in 1993 to 72.9 percent 
in 1998. Such an increase was followed by an insignificant 
decrease to the level of 64.4 percent in 2004. In 2005 the share 
of private consumption in GDP was equal to 69.336 percent. 
Increase in private consumption is considered a major 
engine for sustaining present economic growth. It is expected 
that the share of private consumption in total GDP will fluctuate 
within a range of 80 to 88 percent during the period of 2006-
2010. This prediction is in line with the predictions made earlier 
in the literature on economic growth forecasts in Ukraine. 
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TABLE 3.13 
 
Contribution to real GDP in Ukraine, percent, 1993-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
Private 
consumption 
 
Government 
consumption 
 
Gross fixed 
investment 
 
Stock 
building 
 
1993 46.667 13.333 26.667 13.333 
1994 48.333 19.167 24.167 11.667 
1995 55.229 21.284 23.486 3.303 
1996 71.149 8.710 20.854 1.840 
1997 71.868 9.747 20.029 1.392 
1998 72.909 8.578 19.689 1.072 
1999 69.839 7.206 19.396 -1.917 
2000 68.148 7.115 19.757 0.000 
2001 68.564 8.032 19.737 2.057 
2002 68.022 7.396 19.220 0.974 
2003 67.591 7.818 20.648 1.384 
2004 64.414 6.896 22.601 -1.420 
2005 69.336 7.628 22.013 0.141 
2006 79.400 7.700 20.500 0.500 
2007 87.100 8.200 22.600 0.700 
2008 87.600 8.000 22.800 0.800 
2009 87.600 8.000 22.800 -0.500 
2010 85.900 7.900 22.600 -0.400 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP. 
 
The share of government consumption is expected to 
remain unchanged during the period of 2005-2010, fluctuating 
around 8 percent of GDP. The share of government 
consumption in total GDP increased from 13.3 percent in 1993 
to 21.28 percent in 1995. It has since declined. One factor in 
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such a decline is the shrinking of the public sector due to 
massive privatization as well as to legalization of a significant 
part of the shadow economy after 2000. The share of the 
external trade balance in GDP has declined steadily since 1993. 
The share of investments is expected to grow further. 
The contribution of private consumption, government 
consumption, gross fixed investment and stockbuilding to real 
GDP in Ukraine for the period of 1993 to 2010 is presented in 
Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.14. Contribution of private consumption, 
government consumption, gross fixed investment and 
stockbuilding to real GDP in Ukraine, percent, 1993-2010 
 
3.2.3. Volume of Direct and Portfolio Investments in 
Ukraine 
Selected indicators for the foreign direct investment and 
portfolio investment flows in Ukraine for the period of 1994 to 
2009 are presented in Table 3.14. 
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TABLE 3.14 
 
Selected indicators for the Foreign Direct Investment and 
Portfolio Investments flows in Ukraine, 1994-2009* 
 
Year Net flow of 
FDI, 
million USD 
Inward 
portfolio 
investments, 
million USD 
Inward FDI 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Inward FDI 
as a 
percentage 
of 
gross fixed 
investment 
1994 159 0 0.434 1.796 
1995 267 16 0.722 3.073 
1996 521 199 1.169 5.607 
1997 623 1605 1.242 6.202 
1998 743 -2801 1.774 9.010 
1999 496 -75 1.571 8.098 
2000 595 -197 1.903 9.634 
2001 792 -867 2.084 10.558 
2002 693 -2117 1.635 8.505 
2003 1424 -1923 2.840 13.757 
2004 1715 615 2.643 11.695 
2005 7808 484 9.421 42.795 
2006 4200 600 4.600 22.300 
2007 4500 650 4.600 20.500 
2008 4200 750 3.800 16.500 
2009 4000 650 3.200 13.900 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved in 
August 12, 2006. 
* Data for 2006-2009 are based on prognosis made by 
the IMF in cooperation with the State Committee of Statistics of 
Ukraine. 
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Selected indicators for the foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment stock in Ukraine for the period of 1994 
to 2009 are presented in Table 3.15. 
 
TABLE 3.15 
 
Selected indicators for the Foreign Direct Investment and 
Portfolio Investment stock in Ukraine, 1994-2009* 
 
Year Stock of 
inward 
FDI, 
million 
USD 
Stock of 
inward FDI 
per capita, 
USD 
Stock of 
inward FDI 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Stock of 
outward 
FDI as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
1994 483.5 9.393 1.320 0.055 
1995 896.9 17.559 2.424 0.227 
1996 2063.6 40.751 4.631 0.219 
1997 2810.7 55.940 5.604 0.254 
1998 3553.7 71.287 8.485 0.233 
1999 3281.8 66.358 10.392 0.312 
2000 3875.0 79.023 12.395 0.545 
2001 4555.3 94.428 11.985 0.410 
2002 5339.0 111.720 12.594 0.339 
2003 6657.0 140.330 13.280 0.326 
2004 8353.0 177.360 12.876 0.271 
2005 16375.0 350.270 19.757 0.263 
2006 20575.0 442.700 22.400 0.400 
2007 25075.0 542.300 25.900 0.500 
2008 29275.0 636.100 26.200 0.600 
2009 33275.0 726.400 26.300 0.700 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved in 
August 12, 2006. 
* Data for 2006-2009 are based on prognosis made by 
the IMF in cooperation with the State Committee of Statistics of 
Ukraine. 
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Dynamics of the selected indicators for the foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment stock and flows in Ukraine 
for the period of 1994 to 2009 are presented in Figure 3.15. 
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Figure 3.15. Selected indicators for the foreign direct 
investments and portfolio investments stock and flows in 
Ukraine, 1994-2009 
 
Statistics presented in Tables 3.14 and 3.15 and Figure 
3.15 show that FDI flow in Ukraine increased from 159 million 
USD in 1994 to 496 million USD in 1999. The high rate of 
investment flow in Ukraine continued through 2004. Investment 
flow increased from 595 million USD in 2000 to 1715 million 
USD in 2004. The phenomenal growth of FDI flow in Ukraine 
took place in 2005, when it reached 7808 million USD, 
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indicating a four-and-a-half-fold increase in one year. Annual 
FDI flow in Ukraine during the period of 2006 to 2009 is 
expected to be within the limits of 400 to 450 million USD a 
year. 
Portfolio investment flow in Ukraine was positive from 
1994 to 1997, reaching 1605 million USD. During the period of 
1998 to 2003 it was negative. Portfolio investment outflow was 
most significant in 2002, reaching 2177 million USD. Starting in 
2004 Ukraine experienced an inflow of portfolio investment, 
which is expected to last through 2009. Annual portfolio 
investment is expected to be within the limits of 500 to 750 
million USD a year. 
FDI stock in Ukraine increased tenfold from 1994 to 
2001, starting from 483.5 million USD and reaching 455.3 
million USD. Total volume of FDI in 2006 was equal to 20775 
million USD. According to the forecasts, FDI stock in Ukraine 
is to reach 33275 million USD by 2009. 
Despite the increase in FDI, its share in GDP was 
insignificant over the entire period. The share of FDI in GDP 
grew from 0.434 percent in 1994 to 1.903 percent in 2000 and 
then to 2.084 percent in 2001 and 2.643 percent in 2004. FDI 
flow as a share of GDP reached 9.421 percent in 2005 and is 
expected to fluctuate within the limits of 3.2 to 4.6 percent per 
annum. 
The data presented in Table 3.14 and in Figure 3.15 
indicate that FDI flow as a share of total investment in Ukraine 
increased from 1.796 percent in 1994 to 9.634 in 2000, i.e. more 
than five times, and reached 42.795 percent in 2005. It is 
expected that FDI flow as a share of total investment will 
decline to 13.9 percent in 2009. 
FDI stock as a share of GDP in Ukraine grew 
continuously from 1.32 percent in 1994 to 12.395 percent in 
2000 and 19.757 percent in 2005 and is expected to reach 26.3 
percent in 2009. 
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External capital flows in Ukraine were not limited to 
FDI and portfolio investment inflow. Capital outflow was taking 
place as well. FDI flow as a share of GDP invested abroad 
increased from 0.055 percent in 1994 to 0.263 percent in 2005 
and could reach 0.7 percent in 2009. FDI outflow is insignificant 
compared to FDI inflow. The proportion was 1 to 7 in 1994, 1 to 
3.5 in 2000, and 1 to 36.2 in 2005, and it is expected to be 1 to 
4.57 in 2009. The relation of FDI stock in Ukraine to FDI stock 
abroad as a share of GDP was equal to 37 to 1 in 1994, 23 to 1 
in 2000, and 76 to 1 in 2005. According to Economist 
Intelligence Unit forecasts, the share of FDI stock to GDP in 
Ukraine will be 38 times higher than FDI stock as a share of 
GDP outside Ukraine by 2009. 
Despite the optimistic trends in FDI investment and its 
balance in Ukraine, one should admit that there is no good 
reason to accept Leontieff’s external shock scenario in Ukraine. 
Theories of exogenous growth based on external shock that 
comes in the form of massive capital influx in a short period of 
time are not valid. Total FDI stock and portfolio investment 
placed in the country constituted only 10 percent of GDP in 
1999. Such volume of external investment was unlikely to 
initiate sustainable and significant economic growth in Ukraine. 
To demonstrate insignificant volume of the total external 
investment inflow and stock we will present some statistics on 
per capita investment. FDI per capita in Ukraine was equal to 
1.32 USD in 1994. This indicator grew to 66.36 USD by 1999. 
Despite the rapid increase in FDI, the total volume of it 
remained absolutely insignificant. In 2005 FDI per capita in 
Ukraine reached 350.27 USD and is expected to grow to 726.4 
USD in 2009. Total FDI stock of over 700 USD would possibly 
be considered significant in early 1990s, but certainly not in 
2009. We will continue considering the issue of possible 
external shock as an initiator of substantial economic growth in 
Ukraine by addressing trends in statistical data on capital flight 
and external debt. 
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3.2.4. Capital Flight from Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary 
Statistics on capital flight from Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary for the period of 1991 to 2010 
are presented in Table 3.16. 
 
TABLE 3.16 
 
Capital flight in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland and 
Hungary (million USD), 1991-2010* 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1991 ... 1,978.40 ... ... 
1992 ... 5,207.50 ... ... 
1993 1,958.10 4,661.20 ... ... 
1994 1,387.00 2,887.40 -14,001.50 551.40 
1995 -640.90 4,128.40 -3,434.60 132.30 
1996 -1,789.70 1,043.10 -23,186.70 279.20 
1997 -1,579.40 -262.30 -2,044.50 -591.60 
1998 -1,479.90 3,343.80 -35,205.10 -2,592.50 
1999 344.90 -594.50 -23,324.50 -1,631.70 
2000 1,605.60 -56.00 -25,939.00 -510.20 
2001 -2,486.60 -3,726.30 -22,305.80 -1,356.10 
2002 1,048.80 785.00 -14,247.30 -2,625.10 
2003 1,988.30 -3,238.40 -21,781.00 -3,779.00 
2004 -6,305.30 3,462.90 -27,872.80 -11,378.80 
2005 -8,575.00 -2,966.00 -44,816.00 -1,938.00 
2006 -2,904.71 -2,293.97 -24,452.41 -4,686.40 
2007 4,087.46 -5,872.74 -64,619.74 -1,307.43 
2008 4,058.88 -3,203.13 -23,644.70 734.17 
2009 7,240.88 -1,701.62 5,475.94 -795.79 
2010 6,028.46 -310.44 2,136.88 -3,125.72 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
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calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP (as derived from IMF, International Financial Statistics; 
World Bank, Global Development Finance) 
* Current-account balance with the sign reversed plus 
the change in international reserves, minus the change in total 
external debt stock (not adjusted for the effects of cross-
currency valuation changes), minus net direct investment. It 
represents the degree of over/under funding of the current 
account deficit. A negative number represents capital leaving the 
country. 
 
Dynamics of capital flight from Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland and Hungary for the period of 1991 to 2010 
are presented in Figures 3.16 – 3.19. 
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Figure 3.16. Capital flight in Ukraine (million USD), 
1991-2010 
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Figure 3.17. Capital flight in the Russian Federation 
(million USD), 1991-2010 
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Figure 3.18. Capital flight in Poland (million USD), 
1991-2010 
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Figure 3.19. Capital flight in Hungary (million USD), 
1991-2010 
 
Capital outflow from Ukraine was equal to 2592.5 
million USD in 1998 and then declined to 2625.1 million USD 
in 2002. Capital flight from Ukraine increased to a new high of 
11378.8 million USD in 2004. This indicator is expected to 
decline in the future. Similar to Ukraine, in the Russian 
Federation capital flight in 1998 peaked at 35205.1 million USD. 
The peak it reached in 2005 was 44816 million USD. 
Continuing capital flight from the Russian Federation is 
expected to reach 64619.74 million USD in 2009. It is also 
expected that starting in 2009 volumes of capital outflow will 
decline. In Poland, capital outflow started only in 1997, while 
before 1997 there was capital inflow. Capital outflow also took 
place from 1999 to 2001. There was a frequent interchange 
between net capital inflow and net capital outflow in Poland 
were changing each other quite frequently. Hence, it is difficult 
to identify any sustainable trends in the capital flight. 
Insignificant net capital outflow is expected starting in 2005. In 
Hungary, net capital outflow took place from 1995 to 1998, in 
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2001, and from 2004 to 2006. The most significant capital 
flight of 8575 million USD was observed in 2005. 
 
3.2.5. Foreign Debt and Debt Service in Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation 
Major indicators of foreign debt and debt service in 
Ukraine for the period of 1992 to 2010 are presented in Table 
3.17. 
 
TABLE 3.17 
 
Selected indicators of the foreign debt and debt service in 
Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Total 
foreign 
debt, 
mln. 
USD 
Total 
debt per 
head, 
USD 
 
Total 
debt to 
export 
of 
G&S, % 
Total 
debt to 
GDP, % 
 
 
Debt-
service 
paid to 
GDP, % 
 
1992 550.8 10.6 ... ... ...
1993 3,854.8 74.3 ... 11.648 0.611
1994 5,636.1 109.5 33.755 15.383 0.896
1995 8,429.4 165.0 48.621 22.784 3.073
1996 9,538.0 188.4 46.645 21.405 2.821
1997 11,133.3 221.6 54.274 22.199 2.704
1998 13,076.6 262.3 73.700 31.222 4.830
1999 13,950.6 282.1 81.316 44.175 8.871
2000 12,190.3 248.6 61.990 38.995 11.710
2001 12,713.1 263.5 59.818 33.448 6.032
2002 13,478.4 282.0 57.316 31.794 7.652
2003 16,206.8 341.6 55.489 32.328 7.357
2004 21,651.7 459.7 51.947 33.371 6.629
2005 23,273.0 498.0 51.600 28.100 7.200
2006 26,143.1 562.0 49.600 28.400 6.300
2007 30,019.4 649.0 51.200 30.900 6.200
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2008 32,659.2 710.0 53.300 29.200 5.400
2009 34,886.3 762.0 50.500 27.500 6.100
2010 37,714.1 827.0 46.600 25.900 5.600
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, UNDP 
 
At the moment of its independence, Ukraine had 
excellent opportunities for receiving international loans, since 
all the foreign obligations of the just disintegrated USSR were 
accepted by the Russian Federation. Foreign debt in Ukraine 
grew steadily from 550.8 million USD in 1992 to 13950.6 
million USD in 1999 and to 26143.07 million USD in 2006. It is 
expected that foreign debt in Ukraine will move beyond 30 
billion USD by the end of 2007, comprising around 30019.44 
million USD. Dynamics of the total foreign debt in Ukraine for 
the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 3.20. 
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Figure 3.20. Dynamics of total foreign debt (million 
USD) in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
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Data in diagram 3.20 indicate that foreign debt in 
Ukraine declined slightly only in 2000 and otherwise grew 
continuously. 
Dynamics of the total debt per head in Ukraine for the 
period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 3.21. 
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Figure 3.21. Dynamics of total debt per head (USD) in 
Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Foreign debt in Ukraine increases consistently, but its 
total volume is still insignificant. Indicator of per capita foreign 
debt grew from 10.6 USD in 1992 to 282.1 USD in 1999 and 
reached 498 USD only by the end of 2005. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts, foreign debt per capita in 
Ukraine will reach 827 USD in 2010 and will not rise above 
even the relatively low threshold of 1000 USD per capita. 
It seems obvious that such insignificant amounts of 
foreign capital inflows in the form of international loans 
indicated as foreign debt were unlikely to move the 
industrialized nation of fifty million population toward 
substantial economic growth. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
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utilizing of international loans is always of great concern. 
One should admit that international loans in Ukraine and in the 
Russian Federation were rarely utilized with maximum 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt to exports of 
goods and services in Ukraine for the period of 1992-2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.22. 
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Figure 3.22. Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt 
to exports of goods and services (percent) in Ukraine, 1992-
2010 
 
Size of the foreign debt in Ukraine is significant in 
respect to total export. Foreign debt was equal to 33.755 percent 
of export in 1994 and reached its peak of 81.3 percent in 1999. 
After 1999 the size of foreign debt in respect to total export 
declined and comprised 49.6 percent in 2006. It is expected that 
value of this indicator will stay within the limits of 46 to 53 
percent till 2010. 
The indicator of foreign debt to GDP grew continuously 
starting in 1993 and reached 44.2 percent in 1999. After 1999 
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one could observe a decline in this indicator to 28.1 percent 
in 2005. It is expected that the value of this indicator will be 
around 30 percent till 2010. 
Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt to GDP in 
Ukraine for the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 
3.23. 
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Figure 3.23. Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt 
to GDP (percent) in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Debt service was a growing burden for the country and 
increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1993 to 11.7 percent of 
GDP in 2000. This indicator later declined to 6.3 percent in 
2006 and is expected to stay within the limits of 6 percent of 
GDP till 2010. 
Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt-service paid 
to GDP in Ukraine for the period of 1992-2010 are presented in 
Figure 3.24. 
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Figure 3.24. Dynamics of the proportion of the total 
debt-service paid to GDP (percent) in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Selected indicators of foreign debt and debt service in 
the Russian Federation for the period of 1992 to 2010 are 
presented in Table 3.18. 
Foreign debt in the Russian Federation experienced a 
consistent increase from 78210.7 million USD in 1992 to 
177798.3 million USD in 1998. This increase was followed by a 
decline to 147426.9 million USD in 2002 and then by an 
increase to 257497.9 million USD in 2005. The Russian 
Federation adopted a course of early repayment of its foreign 
debt, which was made possible by the rapid increase in the oil 
and gas prices on the world market. Otherwise the debt could 
potentially have grown to 307281.95 million USD by the end of 
2010. 
Dynamics of the total foreign debt in the Russian 
Federation for the period of 1992 to 2010 are presented in 
Figure 3.25. 
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TABLE 3.18 
 
Selected indicators of the foreign debt and debt service in the 
Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Total 
foreign 
debt, mln. 
USD 
 
Total 
debt per 
head, 
USD 
 
Total debt 
to export 
of 
G&S, % 
 
Total 
debt to 
GDP, 
% 
 
Debt-
service 
paid to 
GDP, 
% 
1992 78,210.70 526.50 157.185 64.000 1.200 
1993 111,958.00 753.90 168.176 64.740 1.270 
1994 121,775.40 820.40 145.202 43.685 1.245 
1995 121,400.80 818.20 121.679 38.746 1.966 
1996 126,374.60 853.00 114.809 32.231 1.866 
1997 127,579.30 861.60 118.558 31.506 1.737 
1998 177,798.30 1,202.70 191.095 65.620 4.021 
1999 174,753.70 1,185.80 194.625 89.203 6.171 
2000 160,022.90 1,090.60 132.660 61.615 4.553 
2001 152,487.90 1,044.30 125.476 49.732 5.632 
2002 147,426.90 1,014.90 115.224 42.723 4.106 
2003 175,522.40 1,214.00 106.591 40.679 4.449 
2004 197,335.20 1,370.60 91.026 33.513 3.597 
2005 214,367.00 1,490.00 74.300 28.100 4.800 
2006 257,497.92 1,800.00 69.100 26.500 4.500 
2007 274,443.36 1,930.00 64.600 24.400 3.700 
2008 285,168.08 2,010.00 64.100 23.500 3.600 
2009 296,017.41 2,090.00 61.300 22.600 3.300 
2010 307,281.95 2,180.00 56.000 21.800 3.000 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP 
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Figure 3.25. Dynamics of the total foreign debt (million 
USD) in the Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
 
Figure 3.25 demonstrates that foreign debt in the Russian 
Federation experienced a decline only during 2000-2002. 
Dynamics of the total debt per head in the Russian Federation 
for the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 3.26. 
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Figure 3.26. Dynamics of the total debt per head (USD) 
in the Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
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The Russian Federation is quite distinct from Ukraine 
in terms of total debt per head. While in Ukraine total debt per 
head is insignificant, in the Russian Federation this indicator 
grew from 526.5 USD in 1992 to 1202.7 in 1998 and reached 
1490 by the end of 2005. Earlier it was expected that total debt 
per head would continue to grow and reach 2180 USD by the 
end of 2010. However, taking into consideration Russia’s 
commitment to repay its debt and the government’s strategy to 
utilize high world prices on oil and gas to repay the debt, one 
could expect that this indicator would much lower than has been 
predicted. During this substantial period of time, the indicator of 
foreign debt as a percent of export in the Russian Federation was 
much higher than in Ukraine. This indicator was equal to 
157.185 percent in 1992 and reached its peak of 194.625 in 1999. 
The value of the indicator has since declined. It declined to 74.3 
percent in 2005 and is expected to decline further. Dynamics of 
the proportion of the total debt to exports of goods and services 
in the Russian Federation for the period of 1992 to 2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.27. 
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Figure 3.27. Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt 
to exports of goods and services (percent) in the Russian 
Federation, 1992-2010 
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The proportion of total debt to exports of goods and 
services in the Russian Federation was more significant than in 
Ukraine and increased from 157.185 percent in 1992 to 194.625 
in 1999. After 1999 the value of this indicator declined to 74.3 
percent in 2005 and will likely continue to decline. 
Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt to GDP in 
the Russian Federation for the period of 1992 to 2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.28. 
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Figure 3.28. Dynamics of the proportion of the total debt 
to GDP (percent) in the Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
 
The proportion of total debt to GDP in the Russian 
Federation grew continuously since 1993 and reached 89.2 
percent in 1999. This indicator in the Russian Federation was 
two times higher than in Ukraine. After 1999 there was a decline 
in the value of the indicator to 28.1 percent in 2005. 
Dynamics of the proportion of total debt-service paid to 
GDP in the Russian Federation for the period of 1992-2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.29. 
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Figure 3.29. Dynamics of the proportion of the total 
debt-service paid to GDP (percent) in the Russian Federation, 
1992-2010 
 
Selected data on foreign debt, total stock of foreign 
direct investment, and capital flight in Ukraine for the period of 
1992-2010 are presented in Table 3.19. These data visualize 
relations of such values and allow for easy comparisons. 
As follows from the data presented in Table 3.19, the 
size of the foreign debt in any given year was higher than the 
FDI inflow in the country. Accordingly, per capita foreign debt 
was always higher than per capita FDI during the entire period. 
This means that if foreign debt is to be repaid at any given time 
during the period of transition, the positive effects of FDI would 
be nullified. 
Dynamics in the values of foreign debt, total stock of 
foreign direct investment, and capital flight in Ukraine for the 
period of 1994-2009 are presented in Figure 3.30. 
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ТABLE 3.19 
 
Selected data on foreign debt, total stock of foreign direct 
investment, and capital flight in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock of 
inward 
FDI 
per 
capita, 
USD 
Total 
debt per 
head, 
USD 
Stock of 
inward 
FDI, 
million 
USD 
Total 
foreign 
debt, 
mln. 
USD 
Capital 
flight, 
mln. 
USD 
1992 … 10.60 … 550.80 ...
1993 … 74.30 … 3854.80 ...
1994 9.39 109.50 483.5 5636.10 551.4
1995 17.56 165.00 896.9 8429.40 132.3
1996 40.75 188.40 2063.6 9538.00 279.2
1997 55.94 221.60 2810.7 11133.30 -591.6
1998 71.29 262.30 3553.7 13076.60 -2592.5
1999 66.36 282.10 3281.8 13950.60 -1631.7
2000 79.02 248.60 3875.0 12190.30 -510.2
2001 94.43 263.50 4555.3 12713.10 -1356.1
2002 111.72 282.00 5339.0 13478.40 -2625.1
2003 140.33 341.60 6657.0 16206.80 -3779.0
2004 177.36 459.70 8353.0 21651.70 -11378.8
2005 350.27 498.00 16375.0 23273.00 -1938.0
2006 442.70 562.00 20575.0 26143.07 -4686.4
2007 542.30 649.00 25075.0 30019.44 -1307.4
2008 636.10 710.00 29275.0 32659.17 734.2
2009 726.40 762.00 33275.0 34886.29 -795.8
2010 … 827.00 … 37714.10 -3125.7
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP 
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Figure 3.30. Dynamics in the values of foreign debt, total 
stock of foreign direct investment, and capital flight in Ukraine, 
1994-2009 
 
Capital flight from the country was insignificant during 
the entire period of 1994-2007. It was insignificant compared to 
foreign debt and FDI. Even in 2005, capital flight did not rise 
above FDI. Nevertheless, the values of FDI and international 
credit are not high enough to initiate significant and sustainable 
growth. The major role of internal resources is obvious. 
 
3.2.6. Unemployment and the Labor Market in Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation and other NIS 
Indicators of employment, unemployment, the labor 
market, and workforce dynamics may serve as a link between 
analyses of the external sources and dynamics of GDP, on the 
one hand, and data on personal income and income structure of 
GDP, on the other. In accordance with the logic of this chapter, 
we present the dynamics of external sources that could 
potentially be a basis and a moving force for growth and analyze 
whether they were sufficient for such a task and whether they 
had a decisive impact on initiation of positive and sustainable 
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economic growth. Indicators of per capita income, personal 
consumption, etc. are presented to prove that an increase in the 
population’s well-being was the result of economic growth. 
Indicators of employment and the labor market then serve two 
purposes. First, they are intended as a link between the two parts 
listed above. Second, dynamics in workforce development and 
the labor market may reveal not only the potential for growth in 
the national economies but also the potential sources of that 
growth. Detailed statistics of labor force, including indicators of 
productivity, labor productivity, workforce, and wages in 
Ukraine for the period of 1991 to 2010 are presented in Tables 
1-4 and Figure 1 of Appendix V. Number of officially 
unemployed individuals who received unemployment benefits in 
the CIS for the period of 1991-1999 is presented in Table 3.20. 
 
TABLE 3.20 
 
Number of unemployed persons in the CIS, received benefits at 
the end of year (thousands) 1991-1999 
 
Country 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Azerbaijan … 4.4 4.0 3.2 2.3 
Armenia … 33.1 41.6 20.6 30.5 
Belarus 1.5 34.5 68.7 49.4 35.6 
Georgia … … … 5.0 1.8 
Kazakhstan 1.0 15.4 73.5 176.7 25.7 
Kyrgyzstan 0.1 1.7 28.9 20.3 5.4 
Moldova … 4.1 8.0 7.5 11.4 
Russia 11.9 550.4 2025.9 1771.1 1090.2 
Tajikistan … 5.0 19.9 37.1 34.7 
Turkmenistan … … … … … 
Uzbekistan … 7.6 12.5 16.9 21.8 
Ukraine 5.5 40.0 74.4 361.6 620.6 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - 
Official Statistics. Retrieved from the database August 8, 2006. 
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Dynamics of the number of officially unemployed 
individuals who received unemployment benefits in the CIS for 
the period of 1991-1999 is presented in Figure 3.31. 
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Figure 3.31. Number of unemployed persons in the CIS, 
received benefits at the end of year (thousands) 1991-1999 
 
The number of officially unemployed individuals who 
received unemployment benefits in Ukraine for the period of 
1991-1999 is presented in Figure 3.32. 
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Figure 3.32. Number of unemployed persons in Ukraine, 
received benefits at the end of year (thousands) 1991-1999 
 
Data presented in Table 3.20 and in Figures 3.31 and 
3.32 demonstrate dramatic growth in the number of registered 
unemployed individuals in Ukraine during the period of 1990-
1999. The explanation for such a dramatic increase in registered 
unemployment is obvious. First of all, there was no registered or 
officially recognized unemployment in the USSR. At the same 
time there was hidden unemployment that became obvious once 
market reforms advanced and enterprises strived for higher 
efficiency in operation. More importantly, region-wide 
restructuring on both macro- and micro-level and breaks in the 
well-established economic ties between the enterprises have led 
to reduction in production or even closures and lockouts in 
virtually every enterprise. This process in turn led to rapid 
growth of unemployment in the former Soviet Bloc. 
Dynamics of economically active population in the CIS 
for the period of 1990-1999 are presented in Table 3.21. 
Dynamics of economically active population in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine for the period of 1990-1999 are 
presented in Table 3.22. 
 193 
TABLE 3.21 
 
Economically active population in the CIS (thousands), 1990-
1999 
 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Azerbaijan 3703 3734 3719 3748 
Armenia 1630 1628 1584 1484 
Belarus 5151 4882 4537 4542 
Georgia 2763 1920 2085 … 
Kazakhstan 7806 7004 7490 7055 
Kyrgyzstan 1748 1710 1792 1901 
Moldova 2071 1700 1686 1682 
Russia 75325 75170 72962 73227 
Tajikistan 1938 1876 1777 1780 
Uzbekistan 7941 8288 8595 8930 
Ukraine 25419 24029 25229 24523 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - 
Official Statistics. Retrieved from the database in August 8, 
2006. 
 
TABLE 3.22 
 
Economically active population in the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine (millions), 1990-1999 
 
Country 
 
 
 
1 
9 
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0 
1 
9 
9 
1 
1 
9 
9 
2 
1 
9 
9 
3 
1 
9 
9 
4 
1 
9 
9 
5 
1 
9 
9 
6 
1 
9 
9 
7 
1 
9 
9 
8 
1 
9 
9 
9 
Russia 75 73 76 75 73 72 72 72 72 73
Ukraine 25 25 24 24 23 25 25 24 25 24
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - 
Official Statistics. Retrieved from the database in August 8, 
2006. 
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Dynamics in the economically active population in 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine for the period of 1990-1999 
are presented in Figures 3.33 and 3.34. 
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Figure 3.33. Economically active population in the 
Russian Federation (thousand), 1990-1999 
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Figure 3.34. Economically active population in Ukraine 
(thousand), 1990-1999 
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Indicators of changes in the size of the economically 
active population in the Russian Federation and Ukraine for the 
period of 1990-1999 point to the fact that during the second part 
of the period the number of those who were economically active 
in both countries had stabilized. Nevertheless, in the Russian 
Federation it had stabilized at a significantly lower level than it 
was at the beginning of the reform in 1990 while in Ukraine the 
economically active population almost reached its initial size. 
Statistics on the recorded official unemployment as a 
percentage of total labor force in Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine for the period of 1991-2010 are 
presented in Table 3.23. 
Based on the Economist Intelligence Unit forecast, it is 
expected that the level of recorded official unemployment in 
2010 in Hungary will be equal to 6.4 percent; in Poland, 13.7 
percent; in the Russian Federation, 6.1 percent; and in Ukraine, 
4.8 percent. This shows that the official level of unemployment 
in Ukraine in the future will be equal to the level of 
unemployment in the US, which has always been traditionally 
low, and will be significantly lower than the analogous indicator 
in the Western European countries. 
An increase in unemployment negatively impacts the 
population’s personal income and accelerates socio-economic 
stratification. Along with redistribution of wealth during the 
quite contradictory process of privatization, an increase in 
unemployment led to an increase in socio-economic inequalities, 
including inequalities in income distribution, as reflected in the 
values of the Gini coefficient. 
Statistics on the Gini coefficient are presented in Table 1 
of Appendix IX. According to the data for 2003, the Gini 
coefficient for the CIS and Baltic states varied within the limits 
of 0.27 to 0.4; for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
from 0.26 to 0.39; and for the countries of Western Europe, 
from 0.25 to 0.36. 
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TABLE 3.23 
 
Recorded official unemployment as a percentage of total labor 
force in Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 
1991-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1991 ... 8.975 ... ... 
1992 9.941 12.925 ... ... 
1993 12.098 14.992 ... ... 
1994 10.982 16.492 7.017 ... 
1995 10.432 15.208 8.300 ... 
1996 10.109 14.292 9.258 1.300 
1997 8.912 11.492 10.808 2.300 
1998 7.926 9.975 11.875 3.700 
1999 7.057 11.992 12.617 4.200 
2000 6.440 14.008 10.492 4.100 
2001 5.765 18.000 9.033 3.600 
2002 5.870 19.700 8.133 3.700 
2003 5.932 19.900 8.625 3.500 
2004 6.084 19.600 8.175 3.500 
2005 7.278 18.200 7.583 3.100 
2006 7.200 16.900 7.000 3.500 
2007 7.700 16.000 6.600 3.800 
2008 7.400 15.200 6.400 4.100 
2009 6.800 14.600 6.300 4.400 
2010 6.400 13.700 6.100 4.800 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
Values of the Gini coefficient indicate that inequality in 
income distribution among different socio-economic strata of 
population in the CIS and Baltic states was analogous to income 
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inequalities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and was slightly higher than in the countries of Western Europe. 
The Gini coefficient in Ukraine was equal to the Gini 
coefficient in Germany and was lower than the average for the 
CIS countries as well as EU member countries. Hence, by the 
time Ukraine had successfully formed a predominantly market 
economy, inequality in income distribution was at a socially 
acceptable level and at par with the leading world economies. 
 
3.3. Macroeconomic and Social Indicators of the Former 
Soviet Bloc 
 
An analysis of the Gini coefficient is useful in making a 
transition to an analysis of statistical data on population’s 
income and well-being in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, 
Poland, and Hungary. 
 
3.3.1. Population Income in Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, Poland, and Hungary 
Statistics on personal disposable income in Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, Poland and Hungary for the period of 1991-
2010 are presented in tables 3.24-3.27. Personal disposable 
income in Poland and Hungary increased continuously during 
the period of 1991-2006 and according to forecasts will continue 
to do so at least till 2010. Personal disposable income in Ukraine 
has increased steadily since 2000 and in the Russian 
Federation—since 1999. Personal disposable income in Ukraine 
experienced a decline in 1998-1999 and bottomed out at 15.127 
billion USD in 2000. However, even this minimum was higher 
than the level of 1993, which was equivalent to 15.127 billion 
USD. Personal disposable income in the Russian Federation 
experienced a decline in 1998-1999, reaching a low of 114.180 
billion USD in 1999. As was the case with Ukraine, the 
minimum of 1999 in the Russian Federation was higher than the 
level of 1993, which was equivalent to 88.190 billion USD. 
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TABLE 3.24 
 
Personal disposable income, billion USD, in Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation, Poland and Hungary, 1991-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1991 26.972 50.260 … … 
1992 31.277 59.409 … … 
1993 31.266 60.121 88,190.800 15.127 
1994 33.536 65.897 147,103.100 17.916 
1995 34.116 85.986 188,855.500 19.864 
1996 34.479 97.799 246,190.300 30.812 
1997 34.101 99.861 283,778.200 34.235 
1998 35.655 110.099 180,462.100 27.460 
1999 35.707 109.915 114,180.000 18.062 
2000 34.406 114.829 135,613.700 17.216 
2001 39.487 132.043 170,262.300 22.160 
2002 50.754 134.270 201,126.200 26.539 
2003 67.128 146.006 262,608.900 30.487 
2004 80.500 163.890 337,685.900 38.839 
2005 89.695 197.188 426,308.800 54.322 
2006 91.500 219.900 539,735.900 69.600 
2007 112.600 251.700 646,821.900 80.600 
2008 120.100 261.200 714,170.700 93.600 
2009 128.500 274.100 782,416.400 106.300 
2010 135.300 288.000 855,000.800 119.700 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. 
 
Contrary to common belief, personal disposable income 
in Ukraine during the period of 1993 to 1996 was increasing, not 
decreasing. It more than doubled, growing from 15.127 billion 
USD to 34.235 billion USD. The same can be said about the 
Russian Federation, where personal disposable income has 
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tripled, increasing from 88.190 billion USD in 1993 to 
273.666 billion USD in 1996. 
 
TABLE 3.25 
 
Real personal disposable income (USD at 1996 prices) billion 
USD, in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland and Hungary, 
1991-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1991 33.557 83.995 … … 
1992 31.718 88.501 … … 
1993 32.868 91.495 295,092.800 38.382 
1994 34.400 94.689 266,419.800 36.130 
1995 34.177 91.777 240,806.800 34.057 
1996 34.479 97.799 246,190.300 30.812 
1997 35.338 105.842 273,666.800 29.620 
1998 37.229 112.325 239,651.200 28.417 
1999 37.396 119.740 218,659.100 25.320 
2000 39.244 124.736 243,289.200 26.275 
2001 42.256 130.244 264,439.600 29.166 
2002 46.436 127.748 290,107.800 34.566 
2003 50.458 131.912 329,192.900 37.981 
2004 52.403 135.052 355,966.900 44.528 
2005 54.434 141.089 391,612.000 52.810 
2006 56.300 149.900 435,599.600 58.000 
2007 57.900 157.100 481,819.300 63.100 
2008 59.100 164.100 527,411.600 68.900 
2009 61.700 171.200 575,480.000 76.200 
2010 63.500 178.300 625,769.300 83.500 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. 
 
According to the data and forecasts presented in Table 
3.25, real personal disposable income in Ukraine can double 
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during the period of 2004-2010 and reach 83.5 billion USD. 
Real personal disposable income in the Russian Federation can 
double as well, perhaps reaching as much as 625.769 billion 
USD in 2010. 
 
TABLE 3.26 
 
Real personal disposable income (percent change per annum) in 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland and Hungary, 1991-
2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1991 ... ... … … 
1992 -5.478 5.365 … … 
1993 3.623 3.382 ... ... 
1994 4.661 3.492 -9.717 -5.866 
1995 -0.648 -3.075 -9.614 -5.740 
1996 0.885 6.561 2.236 -9.526 
1997 2.492 8.224 11.161 -3.868 
1998 5.351 6.125 -12.430 -4.062 
1999 0.448 6.601 -8.759 -10.901 
2000 4.940 4.173 11.264 3.771 
2001 7.677 4.415 8.694 11.004 
2002 9.892 -1.916 9.707 18.514 
2003 8.661 3.260 13.473 9.880 
2004 3.855 2.381 8.133 17.239 
2005 3.876 4.470 10.014 18.599 
2006 3.500 6.300 11.200 9.900 
2007 2.700 4.800 10.600 8.700 
2008 2.200 4.500 9.500 9.200 
2009 4.300 4.300 9.100 10.600 
2010 3.000 4.100 8.700 9.600 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. 
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Data in Table 3.26 indicate significant and sustainable 
growth in real personal disposable income in Ukraine since 2000. 
Real personal disposable income in the Russian Federation has 
also increased steadily since 2000. An increase in real personal 
disposable income in Poland and Hungary has occurred since 
1996, but the rate of increase in these countries is significantly 
lower than in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in constant 
prices in Ukraine for the period of 1993-2010 is presented in 
Figure 3.35. 
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Figure 3.35. Real personal disposable income (USD at 
1996 prices), bln USD, in Ukraine, 1993-2010 
 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in Ukraine 
for the period of 1993-2010 is presented in Figure 3.36. 
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Figure 3.36. Real personal disposable income (percent 
change pa) in Ukraine, 1993-2010 
 
The high rate of increase in real personal disposable 
income in Ukraine that started in 2000 reached a phenomenal 
18.5 percent in 2002. This indicator is expected to stay at the 
average of 10 percent till 2010. 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in constant 
prices in the Russian Federation for the period of 1993-2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.37. 
 
 203 
0.00
100,000.00
200,000.00
300,000.00
400,000.00
500,000.00
600,000.00
700,000.00
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
 
Figure 3.37. Real personal disposable income (USD at 
1996 prices), bln USD, in the Russian Federation, 1993-2010 
 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in the 
Russian Federation for the period of 1993-2010 are presented in 
Figure 3.38. 
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Figure 3.38. Real personal disposable income (percent 
change pa) in the Russian Federation, 1993-2010 
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The high rate of increase in real personal disposable 
income in the Russian Federation that started in 2000 reached 
13.5 percent in 2003. This indicator is expected to stay at an 
average of 10 percent till 2010. The financial and currency crisis 
of 1998 in the Russian Federation is well-reflected as a 
percentage change in the dynamics of the real personal 
disposable income. The dramatic decline in real personal 
disposable income in the country was followed by a no less 
dramatic increase of 11.3 percent in 2000. 
The rate of increase in real personal disposable income 
in the Russian Federation was negative during the periods of 
1993 to 1995 and from 1998 to 1999. The latter period of 
decline is explained by the currency crisis, when the Russian 
economy experienced a more significant negative impact than 
did the Ukrainian economy. Dynamics of real personal 
disposable income in constant prices in Poland for the period of 
1993-2010 are presented in Figure 3.39. 
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Figure 3.39. Real personal disposable income (USD at 
1996 prices), bln USD, in Poland, 1991-2010 
 
 205 
Real personal disposable income in Poland 
experienced a stable increase since 1991, with only two short-
term periods of decline, specifically a decline of 3 percent in 
1995 and another decline of 2 percent in 2002. 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in Poland 
for the period of 1993-2010 are presented in Figure 3.40. 
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Figure 3.40. Real personal disposable income (percent 
change pa) in Poland, 1991-2010 
 
The rate of increase in real personal disposable income 
in Poland did not fluctuate as much as it did in Ukraine. The 
peak here was in 1997 and constituted an increase of 8 percent. 
Forecasts for the real personal disposable income in Poland are 
also much more modest than in Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation, with the annual rate of increase predicted to be 
around 4.5 percent. Dynamics of real personal disposable 
income in constant prices in Hungary for the period of 1993-
2010 are presented in Figure 3.41. Real personal disposable 
income in Hungary has experienced a stable increase since 1991, 
with only two short-term periods of negative growth, 
specifically a decline of 6 percent in 1992 and later a decline of 
less than 1 percent in 1995. 
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Figure 3.41. Real personal disposable income (USD at 
1996 prices), bln USD, in Hungary, 1991-2010 
 
Dynamics of real personal disposable income in Hungary 
for the period of 1993-2010 are presented in Figure 3.42. 
 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
 
Figure 3.42. Real personal disposable income (percent 
change pa) in Hungary, 1993-2010 
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The rate of increase in real personal disposable 
income in Hungary was at its highest in 1997 when it reached 10 
percent. Forecasts for the real personal disposable income in 
Hungary show an annual rate of increase of 2 to 4 percent. 
 
3.3.2. Dynamics of Personal Income and CPI in Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation, Poland, and Hungary 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Ukraine 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Table 3.27. 
Private consumption in Ukraine experienced an increase 
during the entire period of 1993-2006, except for 1998 and 1999, 
when it declined to 30.536 billion USD and 22.056 billion USD, 
respectively. Starting from 21.304 billion USD in 2000, private 
consumption grew to 57.47 billion USD in 2005. Increase in 
private consumption in the country is expected to reach 124.87 
billion USD by 2010. 
Real private consumption in constant prices of 1996 in 
Ukraine was equal to 58.326 billion USD in 1991. The recovery 
was achieved only in 2005 with 55.867 billion USD. This trend 
is expected to continue with real private consumption reaching 
87.159 billion USD in 2010, i.e. 1.5 times higher than in 1991. 
Dynamics of real private consumption in constant prices 
in Ukraine for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 
3.43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 208 
TABLE 3.27 
 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Ukraine, 1991-
2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Real private 
consumption 
(USD at 
1996 prices) 
 
Private 
consumption 
(% real 
change pa) 
 
Private 
consumption
, contribution 
to real GDP 
growth (%) 
Private 
consumption 
per head 
 
 
1991 58.326 -9.376 -4.537 ... 
1992 52.925 -9.259 -4.447 ... 
1993 39.185 -25.961 -12.559 297.80 
1994 35.713 -8.861 -3.699 344.00 
1995 35.032 -1.906 -0.941 400.00 
1996 31.703 -9.503 -5.239 626.10 
1997 31.185 -1.636 -0.907 717.30 
1998 31.601 1.334 0.750 612.60 
1999 30.919 -2.158 -1.253 446.00 
2000 32.513 5.157 2.936 434.50 
2001 34.299 5.492 3.105 540.20 
2002 37.557 9.500 5.200 603.40 
2003 42.215 12.400 7.000 714.20 
2004 47.914 13.500 7.900 887.30 
2005 55.867 16.600 9.800 1,229.30 
2006 60.908 9.000 6.100 1,570.00 
2007 66.086 8.500 5.900 1,830.00 
2008 72.033 9.000 6.400 2,130.00 
2009 79.597 10.500 7.700 2,420.00 
2010 87.159 9.500 7.200 2,740.00 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics, IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
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Figure 3.43. Real private consumption (USD at 1996 
prices), bln USD, in Ukraine, 1991-2010 
 
Dynamics of real private consumption in Ukraine for the 
period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.44. 
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Figure 3.44. Private consumption (percent real change 
per annum) in Ukraine, 1991-2010 
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The rate of growth of private consumption in Ukraine 
experienced a dramatic decline of 25.9 percent in 1993 but then 
increased continuing increase starting in 2000 with highs of 12.4, 
13.5, and 16.6 percent in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. It 
is expected to be positive and vary within the limits of 9 to 10 
percent per annum till 2010. 
Dynamics of private consumption per head in Ukraine 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.45. 
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Figure 3.45. Private consumption per head, USD, in 
Ukraine, 1991-2010 
 
Private consumption always played a significant role in 
the structure of GDP growth. Negative trends in private 
consumption in 1991-1999 should be correlated with the 
negative GDP growth. The impact of private consumption on 
GDP growth was less significant during its decline and more 
significant during its increase. It is expected that future GDP 
growth will rely heavily on an increase in private consumption. 
The contribution of private consumption to real GDP 
growth in Ukraine for the period of 1991-2010 is presented in 
Figure 3.46. 
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Figure 3.46. Private consumption, contribution to real 
GDP growth (percentage points), in Ukraine, 1991-2010 
 
Private consumption per capita in Ukraine increased 
from 297.8 USD in 1993 to 717.3 USD in 1997 and then 
declined to 434.5 USD in 2000. This decline was followed by an 
increase to 1229.3 USD in 2005. Private consumption per capita 
is expected to reach 2740 USD by 2010. 
Selected indicators of private consumption in the 
Russian Federation for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in 
Table 3.28. 
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TABLE 3.28 
 
Selected indicators of private consumption in the Russian 
Federation, 1991-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Real private 
consumption 
(USD at 
1996 prices) 
 
Private 
consumption 
(% real 
change pa) 
 
Private 
consumption
, contribution 
to real GDP 
growth (%) 
Private 
consumption 
per head 
 
 
1991 294.536 -2.761 -1.227 ... 
1992 274.961 -6.646 -3.024 ... 
1993 259.804 -5.512 -2.739 522.90 
1994 235.854 -9.218 -4.740 877.40 
1995 208.105 -11.766 -6.291 1,100.00 
1996 203.972 -1.986 -0.977 1,376.70 
1997 213.819 4.828 2.415 1,497.30 
1998 206.784 -3.290 -1.701 1,053.30 
1999 200.878 -2.856 -1.508 711.80 
2000 215.202 7.131 3.438 817.50 
2001 235.186 9.286 4.360 1,037.00 
2002 254.701 8.298 4.052 1,215.60 
2003 273.406 7.344 3.709 1,508.50 
2004 304.123 11.235 5.679 2,003.90 
2005 337.205 10.878 5.708 2,559.50 
2006 376.924 11.800 6.400 3,270.00 
2007 419.063 11.200 6.400 3,950.00 
2008 460.890 10.000 6.000 4,400.00 
2009 505.051 9.600 6.100 4,860.00 
2010 550.407 9.000 6.000 5,340.00 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics, IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
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Nominal private consumption in the Russian 
Federation has increased continuously since 1993, except for the 
crisis years of 1998 and 1999. It is expected that nominal private 
consumption in 2010 will be equal to 752.03 billion USD, i.e. 
ten times higher than it was in 1993. 
Real private consumption in 1996 prices in the Russian 
Federation was declining from 294.536 billion USD in 1991 to 
200.878 billion USD in 1999. After 1999 there was a steady 
increase in real private consumption. The level of private 
consumption in 1991 was achieved in 2003. It is expected that 
real private consumption in 2010 will be equal to 550.407 
billion USD, i.e. two times higher than it was in 1991. 
Dynamics of real private consumption in 1996 prices in 
the Russian Federation for the period of 1991-2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.47. 
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Figure 3.47. Real private consumption (USD at 1996 
prices), bln USD, in the Russian Federation, 1991-2010 
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Dynamics of percent change in private consumption 
in the Russian Federation for the period of 1991-2010 are 
presented in Figure 3.48. 
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Figure 3.48. Private consumption (percent real change 
per annum) in the Russian Federation, 1991-2010 
 
Private consumption in the Russian Federation declined 
starting in 1991, with its most significant decline of 11.766 
percent in 1995 and declines of 3.29 percent in 1998 and 2.856 
percent in 1999. Starting in 2000, however, there was an 
increase in private consumption, which reached an annual level 
of 11 to 12 percent in 2004-2007. 
Dynamics of private consumption per capita in the 
Russian Federation for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in 
Figure 3.49. 
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Figure 3.49. Private consumption per head, USD, in the 
Russian Federation, 1991-2010 
 
As is the case with Ukriane, in the Russian Federation 
private consumption has always played a significant role in the 
structure of GDP growth. Negative trends in private 
consumption in 1991-1999 should be correlated with the 
negative GDP growth. The impact of private consumption on 
GDP growth was less significant during its decline and more 
significant during its increase. It is expected that future GDP 
growth will rely heavily on an increase in private consumption. 
An increase of 6.4 percent in private consumption in 2006 
coincides with the highest level of GDP growth. 
Dynamics of contribution of private consumption to real 
GDP growth in the Russian Federation for the period of 1991-
2010 are presented in Figure 3.50. 
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Figure 3.50. Private consumption, contribution to real 
GDP growth (percentage points), in the Russian Federation, 
1991-2010 
 
Personal consumption per capita in the Russian 
Federation has reached 2559.5 USD in 2005 and is expected to 
grow to 5340 USD in 2010. 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Poland for 
the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Table 3.29. 
Except for the crisis year of 1998, when there was a 
slight decline from 105.8 billion USD to 104.5 billion USD, 
nominal personal consumption has increased continuously since 
1991, and reached 187.6 billion USD in 2005. It is expected that 
nominal private consumption in 2010 will be equal to 267.3 
billion USD, i.e. six times higher than it was in 1991. 
Real private consumption in 1996 prices in Poland was 
equal to 75.738 billion USD in 1991. A relatively slow but 
steady increase in real private consumption resulted in a total of 
146.467 billion USD in 2007. It is expected that real private 
consumption in 2010 will be equal to 165.522 billion USD, i.e. 
two times higher than it was in 1991. 
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TABLE 3.29 
 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Poland, 1991-
2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Real private 
consumption 
(USD at 
1996 prices) 
 
Private 
consumption 
(% real 
change pa) 
 
Private 
consumption
, contribution 
to real GDP 
growth (%) 
Private 
consumption 
per head 
 
 
1991 75.738 6.636 3.639 1,185.70 
1992 77.674 2.556 1.607 1,361.40 
1993 82.490 6.200 3.895 1,413.10 
1994 85.608 3.780 2.430 1,551.30 
1995 88.347 3.200 2.029 2,155.30 
1996 96.059 8.729 5.338 2,501.20 
1997 102.860 7.080 4.433 2,527.50 
1998 107.992 4.990 3.124 2,758.40 
1999 113.836 5.411 3.387 2,726.10 
2000 117.318 3.059 1.931 2,820.40 
2001 119.850 2.158 1.348 3,176.60 
2002 123.843 3.332 2.102 3,404.80 
2003 126.191 1.896 1.219 3,655.90 
2004 131.597 4.284 2.704 4,182.40 
2005 134.248 2.015 1.259 4,916.10 
2006 140.210 4.400 2.700 5,390.00 
2007 146.467 4.500 2.700 6,160.00 
2008 152.535 4.100 2.500 6,380.00 
2009 158.785 4.100 2.500 6,690.00 
2010 165.522 4.200 2.600 7,040.00 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics, IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
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Dynamics of real private consumption in 1996 prices 
in Poland for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 
3.51. 
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Figure 3.51. Real private consumption (USD at 1996 
prices), bln USD, in Poland, 1991-2010 
 
The most significant percentage increase of 8.729 
percent in real private consumption in Poland took place in 1996. 
The increase in personal consumption in Poland is uniform and 
not as rapid as in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Personal 
consumption in Poland is expected to grow at a rate of 4 to 4.5 
percent per annum starting in 2006. 
Dynamics of percent change in private consumption in 
Poland for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.52. 
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Figure 3.52. Private consumption (percent real change 
per annum) in Poland, 1991-2010 
 
Dynamics of private consumption per capita in Poland 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.53. 
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Figure 3.53. Private consumption per head, USD, in 
Poland, 1991-2010 
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Personal consumption per capita in Poland has 
doubled during the period of 1991-1996, increasing from 1185.7 
USD to 2501.2 USD, and has continued to grow, reaching 5390 
USD in 2006. Growth in per capita personal consumption is 
expected to continue till 2010 when it will reach 7040 USD. 
The contribution of private consumption was significant 
during the entire period of transition. Dynamics of contribution 
of private consumption to GDP growth in Poland for the period 
of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.54. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
 
Figure 3.54. Private consumption, contribution to real 
GDP growth (percentage points), in Poland, 1991-2010 
 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Hungary 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Table 3.30. 
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TABLE 3.30 
 
Selected indicators of private consumption in Hungary, 1991-
2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Real private 
consumption 
(USD at 
1996 prices) 
 
Private 
consumption 
(% real 
change pa) 
 
Private 
consumption
, contribution 
to real GDP 
growth (%) 
Private 
consumption 
per head 
 
 
1991 29.082 -10.060 -6.598 2,255.20 
1992 27.489 -5.478 -3.668 2,619.30 
1993 30.186 9.812 6.406 2,780.00 
1994 30.754 1.882 1.357 2,907.20 
1995 29.725 -3.347 -2.388 2,882.00 
1996 28.827 -3.022 -2.053 2,805.90 
1997 29.310 1.676 1.090 2,760.80 
1998 30.668 4.635 2.932 2,876.40 
1999 32.125 4.750 2.998 3,015.30 
2000 34.316 6.820 4.329 2,967.80 
2001 36.321 5.844 3.738 3,357.40 
2002 39.835 9.675 6.278 4,318.00 
2003 42.947 7.813 5.356 5,680.80 
2004 44.261 3.059 2.187 6,777.40 
2005 45.198 2.116 1.482 7,440.00 
2006 46.188 2.200 1.500 7,520.00 
2007 46.865 1.500 1.000 9,160.00 
2008 47.594 1.600 1.000 9,730.00 
2009 48.724 2.400 1.500 10,250.00 
2010 50.166 3.000 1.900 10,820.00 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics, IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
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Nominal personal consumption has increased 
continuously since 1991, except for the crisis years of 1995, 
1996, and 1997, when there was a slight decline from 29.981 
billion USD in 1994 to 28.283 billion USD in 1997. Starting 
from 29.371 billion USD in 1998, nominal personal 
consumption reached 74.47 billion USD in 2005, i.e. almost 
tripled. It is expected that nominal private consumption in 2010 
will be equal to 106.92 billion USD, i.e. four times higher than it 
was in 1991. Real private consumption in 1996 prices in 
Hungary was equal to 29.082 billion USD in 1991. Growth in 
real private consumption was interrupted slightly in 1992, 1995, 
and 1996. A relatively slow but steady increase in real private 
consumption resulted in a total of 46.865 billion USD in 2007. It 
is expected that real private consumption in 2010 will be equal 
to 50.166 billion USD, i.e. 1.7 times higher than it was in 1991. 
Dynamics of real private consumption in 1996 prices in 
Poland for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.55. 
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Figure 3.55. Real private consumption (USD at 1996 
prices), bln USD, in Hungary, 1991-2010 
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The most significant percentage decrease of 10.06 
percent in real private consumption in Hungary took place in 
1991. A significant percentage increase in personal consumption 
in Hungary started in 1993 with 9.8 percent. Declines in 1995 
and 1996 were followed by an especially high annual increase of 
6 to 9.7 percent during 2000-2003. Starting in 2006 the 
percentage increase in personal consumption is expected to vary 
within the limits of 1.5 to 3 percent per annum. 
Dynamics of percent change in private consumption in 
Poland for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.56. 
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Figure 3.56. Private consumption (percent real change 
per annum) in Hungary, 1991-2010 
 
Dynamics of private consumption per capita in Poland 
for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 3.57. 
Personal consumption per capita in Hungary increased 
from 2255.20 USD in 1991 to 7520 USD in 2006. Growth in per 
capita personal consumption is expected to continue till 2010 
when it will reach 10820 USD. 
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Figure 3.57. Private consumption per head, USD, in 
Hungary, 1991-2010 
 
The contribution of private consumption to GDP growth 
was significant during the entire period of transition. Dynamics 
of contribution of private consumption to GDP growth in 
Hungary for the period of 1991-2010 are presented in Figure 
3.58. 
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Figure 3.58. Private consumption, contribution to real 
GDP growth (percentage points), in Hungary, 1991-2010 
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The rate of increase in nominal private consumption in 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation is expected to be 
significantly higher than in Poland and Hungary. There is a 
certain degree of bias in inter-country statistics on private 
consumption as well as in other indicators. 
The bias in statistical data in inter-country analysis is 
commonplace and is normally checked based on purchasing 
power parity indicators as well as other specific comparisons. 
This makes inter-country comparisons difficult and somewhat 
biased. Hence, we focus on intra-country dynamics of countries 
in transition and not on absolute values of certain national 
macroeconomic indicators. Then we analyze inter-country 
dynamics of the previously defined macroeconomic indicators. 
Simple inter-country comparisons are less accurate and 
therefore less useful in the case of transition economies than in 
the case of Western European economies. Personal consumption 
per capita in Hungary in 1993 was equal to 2780 USD, i.e. nine 
times higher than in Ukraine. This demonstrates the partiality of 
simple comparisons. 
Problems with simple comparisons are not limited to 
transition economies and not unique. Such problems exist to a 
lesser degree in EU countries. For instance according to 
statistics per capita GDP in Luxemburg is 1.5 times higher than 
in Germany. GDP per capita in Japan in nominal USD is equal 
to 34000 USD in 2005 and is 1.5 times higher than in Canada 
(around 23000 USD). At the same time per capita GDP in terms 
of PPP in Japan and Canada are about the same and constitute 
around 77 percent of the US’s per capita GDP. 
Dynamics of the Consumer price index in Ukraine for 
the period of 1992 to 2010 are presented in Table 3.31. 
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TABLE 3.31 
 
Consumer Price Index in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Consumer 
price index 
(1996=100; 
average) 
Consumer 
price index 
(end-period) 
 
Consumer 
prices (% 
change pa; end-
period) 
1992 0.024 0.018 ... 
1993 1.173 1.875 10111.100 
1994 11.626 9.395 401.190 
1995 55.432 26.485 181.900 
1996 100.000 37.000 39.700 
1997 115.889 40.800 10.270 
1998 128.103 48.900 19.853 
1999 157.217 58.400 19.427 
2000 201.579 73.400 25.685 
2001 225.660 77.900 6.131 
2002 227.338 77.500 -0.513 
2003 239.181 83.900 8.258 
2004 260.794 94.200 12.277 
2005 296.126 103.900 10.297 
2006 319.900 112.700 8.500 
2007 348.700 121.800 8.000 
2008 373.100 130.000 6.800 
2009 397.400 138.200 6.300 
2010 421.200 146.200 5.800 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
 
The Consumer Price Index in Ukraine has grown during 
the entire period of 1992 to 2010. The most significant increase 
in consumer prices in terms of constant 1996 prices took place 
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in the early 1990s. The Consumer Price Index percentage 
change was especially significant during the period of high 
inflation in 1992-1996. It has declined from 10111 percent in 
1993 to 10 percent in 1997. Starting in 2001, when the CPI was 
equal to 6 percent, it has crossed the 10 percent threshold twice, 
amounting to 12.3 percent in 2004 and 10.3 percent in 2005. It is 
expected that the CPI will stay around 6 percent till 2010, which 
indicates stabilization in consumer prices. 
Dynamics of the Consumer Price Index in Ukraine for 
the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 3.59. 
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Figure 3.59. Dynamics of the Consumer Price Index in 
Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
Dynamics of the Consumer Price Index in the Russian 
Federation for the period of 1992 to 2010 are presented in Table 
3.32. 
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TABLE 3.32 
 
Consumer Price Index in the Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Consumer 
price index 
(1996=100; 
average) 
Consumer 
price index 
(end-period) 
 
Consumer 
prices (% 
change pa; end-
period) 
1991 0.034 ... ...
1992 0.572 ... ...
1993 5.577 1.800 ...
1994 22.727 5.700 216.667
1995 67.603 13.300 133.333
1996 100.000 16.200 21.805
1997 114.706 18.000 11.111
1998 146.478 33.200 84.444
1999 271.994 45.300 36.446
2000 328.558 54.400 20.088
2001 399.091 64.700 18.934
2002 462.119 74.500 15.147
2003 525.203 83.400 11.946
2004 582.509 93.100 11.631
2005 656.488 103.248 10.900
2006 720.700 113.100 9.500
2007 787.200 123.300 9.000
2008 850.600 133.100 8.000
2009 914.400 143.100 7.500
2010 979.900 153.200 7.000
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
State Committee of Statistics. 
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Dynamics of the Consumer Price Index in the Russian 
Federation for the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Figure 
3.59. 
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Figure 3.60. Dynamics of the Consumer Price Index in 
the Russian Federation, 1992-2010 
 
The CPI in the Russian Federation appears to have been 
less affected by inflation during the first half of the 1990s and to 
have grown more rapidly starting in 1997. 
 
3.3.3. Labor Productivity and Wages in Ukraine 
 
Selected indicators of productivity in Ukraine, including 
labor productivity and labor costs for the period of 1992-2010, 
are presented in Table 3.33. 
Annual indicators of average nominal and real wage in 
Ukraine for the period of 1992-2010 are presented in Tables 1 
and 2 of Appendix VI. Dynamics of the average nominal and 
real wage index in Ukraine for the period of 1992-2010 are 
presented in Figures 3.61-3.63. 
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ТABLE 3.33 
 
Selected indicators of productivity in Ukraine, including labor 
productivity and labor costs, 1992-2010 
 
Year Labor 
productivit
y growth 
(%) 
 
Labor 
costs per 
hour 
(USD) 
 
Annual 
change in 
average 
real wage 
(%) 
Index of 
average 
wage 
(1996=100) 
 
1991 -7.2 … … … 
1992 -8.4 0.69 … 261.063 
1993 -12.1 0.35 -46.539 139.567 
1994 -19.9 0.40 -16.547 116.473 
1995 -14.4 0.46 9.223 127.215 
1996 -8.1 0.51 -21.393 100.000 
1997 -0.4 0.59 -1.855 98.145 
1998 -0.6 0.47 -2.986 95.215 
1999 2.1 0.33 -5.762 89.728 
2000 14.4 0.32 1.107 90.721 
2001 10.3 0.44 20.751 109.500 
2002 4.6 0.54 20.098 131.500 
2003 9.2 0.66 16.739 153.600 
2004 11.4 0.85 16.980 179.600 
2005 0.7 1.20 20.413 216.300 
2006 4.8 1.50 13.900 246.300 
2007 5.5 1.70 4.600 257.600 
2008 5.4 1.92 6.500 274.500 
2009 5.8 2.14 5.200 288.600 
2010 5.5 2.38 5.700 305.000 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU 
calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; 
National Bank of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and 
UNDP. 
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Statistics indicate that the average wage index has 
stabilized in 1996 and increased significantly since 2000. A 
continuous increase in real wages is expected till 2010. 
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Figure 3.61. Average real wage index (LCU, 1996=100) 
in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
The rate of growth in average real wages varies year by 
year. Variation in the rate of growth of average real wages in 
Ukraine is presented in Figure 3.62. 
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Figure 3.62. Average real wages (percent change per 
annum) in Ukraine, 1992-2010 
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Dynamics of the unit labor cost index in Ukraine are 
presented in Figure 3.63. 
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Figure 3.63. Unit labor cost index (USD, 1996=100) in 
Ukraine, 1992-2010 
 
The trend in labor costs shows that labor becomes more 
expensive for businesses. We tend to consider such a trend as 
highly positive for the economy. 
 
3.4. Human Capital 
 
An analysis of macroeconomic indicators often 
underestimates qualitative characteristics. Macroeconomic 
indicators are aggregates that focus on the quantitative 
characteristics of national production. Arriving at more precise 
estimates of the economic situation in Ukraine as well as other 
transition economies, with their vectors and level of 
development over the last two decades, requires consideration of 
such fundamental socio-economic characteristics as education 
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and healthcare. Access to education and medical services is 
crucially important in characterizing living standards and the 
populaiton’s level of personal consumption. It is equally 
important in an analysis of the reproduction of human capital. 
Higher education and medical services are two 
technologically complex branches of the economy that 
characterize developed nations. Their complexity serves as an 
indicator of the level of economic development as well as the 
presence of conditions necessary for economic growth. 
 
3.4.1. Access to Education, Healthcare, and Housing 
The number of students in higher education institutions 
per 10000 population is chosen to analyze the population’s 
access to higher education. This indicator reflects the level or 
stock of human capital in the countries as well as the dynamics 
of reproduction of human capital during significant periods of 
time. The numbers of students in higher education institutions 
per 10000 population in the NIS for the selected years during the 
period of 1980-1999 are presented in Table 3.34. Detailed 
annual statistics for the NIS are presented in tables 1 and 2 of 
Appendix VII. 
Contrary to beliefs about the crisis situation in Ukraine, 
statistics point to continuous growth in the number of students in 
higher education institutions per 10000 population. While 
during independence and the beginning of market reforms in 
1991 this indicator in Ukraine was equal to 168, by the year 
1999 number of students enrolled in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population had reached 259. This 
indicator is slightly lower than in the Russian Federation, where 
the number of students per 10000 population grew from 186 in 
1991 to 280 in 1999 (see also Table 2 of Appendix VII). 
Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in the NIS for the period of 
1980-1989 are presented in Figure 3.64. 
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TABLE 3.34 
 
Number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 
population in NIS, 1980-1999 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Azerbaijan 172 158 146 128 147 
Armenia 189 163 191 97 160 
Belarus 183 181 184 191 258 
Georgia 168 167 190 231 248 
Kazakhstan 173 172 171 165 245 
Kyrgyzstan 151 144 133 142 325 
Moldova 127 126 125 149 212 
Russia 219 206 190 188 280 
Tajikistan 142 119 128 126 130 
Turkmenistan 124 119 113 70 … 
Uzbekistan 172 155 165 84 68 
Ukraine 176 167 170 180 259 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – 
Official Statistics, retrieved from the database in August 8, 2006. 
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Figure 3.64. Number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in NIS, 1980-1989 
 
Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine for the period of 
1980-1989 are presented in Figure 3.65. 
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Figure 3.65. Number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine, 1980-1989 
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Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in the NIS for the period of 
1990-1999 are presented in Figure 3.66. 
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Figure 3.66. Number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in NIS, 1990-1999 
 
Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine for the period of 
1990-1999 are presented in Figure 3.67. 
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Figure 3.67. Number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine, 1990-1999 
 
Data for Ukraine indicate that during the transition the 
total number of students in higher education institutions per 
every ten thousand in the population was increasing consistently 
since 1993 despite the decline in some other economic 
indicators. This not only proves the continuous presence of 
positive developments in the national system of higher 
education based on the market reforms, but also shows 
continuous growth in accumulation and concentration of human 
capital in the national economy. 
Positive trends in the development of higher education 
industry and increasing access of population to higher education 
characterize such countries as Ukraine, the Russian Federation, 
and Belarus, but are not necessarily characteristics of all the 
former soviet republics. For instance, in Azerbaijan the number 
of students in higher education institutions per every ten 
thousand in the population as an indicator of access to higher 
education declined till 1995 and returned to its 1991 level of 147 
students only in 1999. This indicator is almost twice lower than 
in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In Armenia the value of 
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this indicator declined from 191 in 1990 to 97 in 1995 and 
then increased to 160 in 1999. 
In terms of access to higher education some other former 
republics were not able to attain their 1991 levels. The indicator 
of the number of students in higher education institutions per 
every ten thousand in the population declined in Uzbekistan 
from 170 in 1990 to 68 in 1999, and in Turkmenistan from 113 
in 1990 to 62 in 1996. These statistics should always be 
correlated with demographic and migratory processes in the NIS. 
One should also account for students who receive their 
education in other countries, predominantly in other member 
countries of the NIS. 
The high degree of development of education industry 
and the educational level of the population in the former USSR 
is confirmed by the data on literacy, educational attainment, and 
educational levels presented in Tables 1-8 of Appendix VIII. 
The data indicate that despite economic difficulties 
during the transition period, the number of students in higher 
education institutions per every ten thousand of the population 
has increased consistently since 1993. This confirms not only 
continuous and consistent development of the education industry, 
but also a stable increase in the total volume and concentration 
of human capital in the country. 
The healthcare industry or the provision of medical 
services is, along with the education industry, considered one of 
the fundamental branches of the social sphere. The healthcare 
industry is one of the key industries that help accumulate and 
preserve human capital. 
One of the major international indicators of a country’s 
socio-economic development in general and people’s access to 
medical services is the number of physicians per ten thousand 
population. We offer this indicator as one of the major 
descriptive sources for the estimation of human capital stock and 
dynamics of its accumulation. 
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Dynamics of the number of physicians per ten 
thousand population in the CIS for the selected years during the 
period of 1980-1999 are presented in Table 3.35. Detailed 
annual statistics are presented in Tables 3 and 4 of Appendix VII. 
 
TABLE 3.35 
 
Number of physicians per 10000 population in the CIS, 1980-
1999 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Azerbaijan 33.4 37.8 38.7 37.8 35.5 
Armenia 35.3 37.9 40.5 33.6 33.2 
Belarus 33.8 37.8 40.5 43.6 47.8 
Georgia 47.9 53.5 57.9 42 … 
Kazakhstan 31.9 37.6 42.1 39.7 34.6 
Kyrgyzstan 29.1 33.5 36.7 33.2 30.3 
Moldova 31.1 36.8 40.0 39.6 36.7 
Russia 40.4 45.1 46.9 46.0 46.9 
Tajikistan 23.6 26.7 27.1 21.4 21.2 
Turkmenistan 28.4 32.6 34.6 31.4 … 
Uzbekistan 28.5 33.7 35.8 33.2 … 
Ukraine 36.5 41.3 44.0 45.1 46.0 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - 
Official Statistics. Retrieved from the database in August 8, 
2006. 
 
Contrary to beliefs about the critical economic situation 
in Ukraine, statistics point to the continuous growth in the 
number of physicians per 10000 population. While on the eve of 
independence and the beginning of market reforms in 1990 this 
indicator in Ukraine was equal to 44, by the year 1999 it had 
increased 5 percentage points, thus reaching 46. This indicator 
in Ukraine is slightly lower than in the Russian Federation and 
Belarus, where the number of physicians per 10000 thousand 
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population in 1999 was equal to 46.9 and 47.8, respectively. 
In contrast to Ukraine, in the Russian Federation this indicator 
did not increase since 1990, when it was equal to 46.9. 
Moreover, there was a slight decline in the value of this 
indicator during the period of 1991-1998 (see also Table 4 of 
Appendix VII). 
Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine for the period of 
1980-1989 are presented in Figure 3.68. 
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Figure 3.68. Number of physicians per 10000 population 
in Ukraine, 1980-1989 
 
Dynamics of the number of students in higher education 
institutions per 10000 population in Ukraine for the period of 
1990-1999 are presented in Figure 3.69. 
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Figure 3.69. Number of physicians per 10000 population 
in Ukraine, 1990-1999 
 
Data for Ukraine indicate that during the transition the 
total number of physicians per every ten thousand population 
increased consistently since 1994 despite the decline in some 
other economic indicators. The above diagram points to an 
insignificant decline in the indicator in 1992 and 1994. This 
insignificant decline could potentially be interpreted as a 
decrease in the capacities of the nation’s medical schools. 
However, that is not so. First, this decline may well be within 
the limits of statistical error. More importantly, the educational 
training of a physician takes at least six years. Accounting for 
the time lag suggests that the significant increase in the number 
of doctors per ten thousand population since 1997 was a result 
of an educational process that took place in the early 1990s. 
We should also doubt the claim that the decrease in total 
population was the major cause of the indicator’s growth. 
Indeed, the number of physicians per ten thousand population is 
a relative value that relates the number of physicians to the total 
population. However, one would reasonably expect the total 
number of physicians to decline proportionately to the decline in 
total population. The consistent increase in the number of 
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physicians per ten thousand population as a measure of 
access of the public to the medical services in Ukraine is evident. 
Continuous and persistent growth of the number of 
physicians per ten thousand population in Ukraine during the 
periods of 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 clearly indicates not only 
the presence of consistent and sufficient supply of medical 
services to the population and development of the national 
system of healthcare, but also stability in the functioning of 
medical higher education institutions, including first of all 
traditionally strong medical schools, as a part of the system of 
higher education. This demonstrates the presence of continuous 
positive developments in the national healthcare during the 
period of the market reforms, and it also shows continuous 
growth in accumulation and concentration of human capital in 
the national economy. 
Positive trends in the development of the healthcare 
industry and increasing the population’s access to medical 
services characterize such countries as Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, and Belarus, but are not necessarily characteristics 
of all the former soviet republics. In some other former republics 
situation with access to medical services did not regain its 
positions of 1991. For instance, in Azerbaijan the number of 
physicians per every ten thousand of the population as an 
indicator of access to healthcare has declined from 38.7 in 1991 
to 35.5 in 1999. In Uzbekistan the decline was from 35.8 in 
1990 to 34.3 in 1997, in Turkmenistan, from 34.6 in 1990 to 
29.8 in 1996, and in Tajikistan, from 27.1 in 1990 to 21.2 in 
1999. Similar negative trends characterize many other former 
republics, including Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Moldova. These statistics should always be correlated with 
demographic and migratory processes in the NIS. There is a 
trend toward the increasing migration of medical professionals 
from Central Asian states to certain regions in the Russian 
Federation. While such a trend may be of benefit to the under-
populated regions and rural areas in the Russian Federation, 
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where medical personnel are lacking, it is detrimental to the 
Asian republics and negatively affects the prospects of their 
future development. 
The data indicate that despite economic difficulties 
during the transition period, the number of physicians per ten 
thousand population increased consistently since 1994. This 
confirms the presence continuous and consistent development of 
the healthcare industry, increasing access to the medical services, 
development of medical education, and a stable increase in the 
total volume and concentration of human capital in the country. 
Statistics on the housing space in the CIS for the selected 
years during the period of 1990-1999 are presented in Table 
3.36. Detailed annual statistics on the housing space in the CIS 
are presented in Table 2 of Appendix IX. 
 
TABLE 3.36 
 
Average total housing space per inhabitant in the CIS, 1990-
1999 (square meters) 
 
Country 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Azerbaijan 12.5 12.0 12.2 12.0 
Armenia 15.0 15.2 15.5 … 
Belarus 17.9 19.3 19.7 20.8 
Georgia 18.8 19.1 20.0 … 
Kazakhstan 14.2 14.6 15.6 16.4 
Kyrgyzstan 12.1 12.8 12.6 12.5 
Moldova 17.9 18.4 20.1 20.7 
Russia 16.4 17.2 18.3 19.1 
Tajikistan 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.0 
Turkmenistan 11.1 11.5 11.1 … 
Uzbekistan 12.1 12.4 13.0 13.6 
Ukraine 17.8 18.5 19.2 … 
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - 
Official Statistics. Retrieved from the database August 8, 2006. 
 244 
 
Access to housing in Ukraine expressed in terms of 
square meters per capita was probably the highest among all the 
CIS countries in 1999. In Ukraine this indicator was equal to 
20.4 square meters per capita, and in the Russian Federation it 
was equal to 19.1 square meters per capita. 
Dynamics of the average total housing space per 
inhabitant in the CIS for the period of 1990-1999 are presented 
in Figure 3.70. 
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Figure 3.70. Average total housing space per inhabitant 
in the CIS, 1990-1999 (square meters) 
 
Dynamics of the average total housing space per 
inhabitant in Ukraine for the period of 1990-1999 are presented 
in Figure 3.71. 
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Figure 3.71. Average total housing space per inhabitant 
in Ukraine, 1990-1999 (square meters) 
 
Dynamics of the average total housing space per 
inhabitant in Ukraine were positive during the entire period of 
1990-1999, with an increase from 17.8 to 20.4 square meters per 
capita. Growth of this indicator in Ukraine continues thanks to 
an increase in construction capacities, growing demand for real 
estate, and an expanding real estate market. 
Access to education, healthcare, and housing facilitate 
accumulation and preservation of human capital. The quality of 
these services and the level of access to them are the key factors 
for the population’s life expectancy and quality of life. 
 
3.4.2. Life Expectancy 
One of the key socio-economic indicators is average life 
expectancy at birth. This indicator is to a large extent a function 
of the population’s well-being, including access to education, 
healthcare, housing, and personal consumption. At the same 
time, average life expectancy defines such economic 
determinants as economically active age, retirement age, and 
total labor force, as well as the country’s overall demographic 
situation. 
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Statistics on life expectancy at birth for the female 
populations in the NIS and selected CEE countries for the period 
of 1990-2004 are presented in Table 3.37. Detailed statistics are 
presented in Table 3 of Appendix IX. 
 
TABLE 3.37 
 
Life expectancy at birth for female population in NIS and 
selected CEE countries, 1990-2004, (years) 
 
Country 1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Armenia 71.5 73.0 73.7 74.3 - 74.6 74.7 74.8 
Azerbaijan 74.8 72.9 74.6 75.1 75.2 75.0 75.1 75.2 
Belarus 75.6 74.3 74.3 74.0 - 74.2 74.3 74.3 
Georgia 74.2 74.3 74.3 74.3 - 74.3 74.4 74.5 
Hungary 73.7 74.6 75.2 75.6 76.5 76.6 76.7 76.9 
Kazakhstan 73.1 70.4 70.2 71.2 71.3 71.5 71.5 71.1 
Kyrgyz Rep. 72.6 70.4 71.4 72.4 72.6 72.0 72.2 72.2 
Latvia 74.6 73.1 75.1 76.0 75.8 76.0 75.9 77.7 
Lithuania 76.2 75.1 76.6 77.4 77.5 77.5 77.7 77.8 
Moldova 71.8 69.7 70.3 71.7 71.8 71.1 71.5 71.9 
Poland 75.5 76.4 77.0 78.0 78.4 78.8 78.9 79.2 
Russia 74.3 72.5 73.2 72.0 72.3 72.0 72.0 72.0 
Tajikistan 65.9 65.9 66.0 66.2 - 66.3 66.4 66.6 
Turkmenistan 67.1 67.4 67.2 66.9 - 66.7 66.9 67.1 
Ukraine 74.9 72.7 73.0 73.6 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1 
Uzbekistan 72.4 - 72.4 71.1 - 70.3 70.3 70.3 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from 
the database in August 10, 2006. 
 
Life expectancy at birth for the female population in 
Ukraine stabilized by 1996 and has grown in a stable manner 
since 1997. Nevertheless, by the year 2007 Ukraine has not 
reached the level of 1989, when life expectancy at birth for the 
female population was equal to 75.2 years. 
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Dynamics of life expectancy at birth for the female 
population in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Hungary and 
Poland are presented in Figure 3.72. 
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Figure 3.72. Life expectancy at birth for female 
population in Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, 1989-2004, (years) 
 
Dynamics of life expectancy at birth for the female 
populations in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Hungary, and 
Poland are rather complex. In Poland and Hungary this indicator 
shows a slow but continuing increase. At the same time this 
indicator for Poland was always higher than in Hungary. In 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation the situation was more 
difficult. Contrary to some perceptions about a rapid decrease in 
life expectancy at birth for the female population in Ukraine, 
this indicator had its slight declines and slight increases during 
the whole period of transition and had stabilized by the end of 
2000. 
Statistics on life expectancy at birth for the male 
populations in the NIS and selected CEE countries for the period 
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of 1990-2004 are presented in Table 3.38. Detailed statistics 
are presented in Table 4 of Appendix IX. 
 
TABLE 3.38 
 
Life expectancy at birth for male population in NIS and selected 
CEE countries, 1989-2004, (years) 
 
Country 1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Armenia 65.6 66.3 66.9 67.5 - 67.9 68.0 68.1 
Azerbaijan 67.0 65.2 67.4 68.6 68.6 69.4 69.5 69.6 
Belarus 66.3 62.9 62.9 62.3 - 62.5 62.6 62.7 
Georgia 66.5 66.5 66.5 66.5 - 66.5 66.6 66.7 
Hungary 65.1 65.3 66.4 67.1 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.6 
Kazakhstan 63.8 59.7 59.0 60.4 60.5 60.7 60.5 60.1 
Kyrgyz Rep. 64.2 61.4 62.6 64.9 65.0 64.4 64.5 64.3 
Latvia 64.2 60.0 63.9 64.8 64.7 65.1 65.5 65.5 
Lithuania 66.4 63.3 65.5 66.8 66.0 66.3 66.3 66.4 
Moldova 65.0 61.8 62.9 64.4 64.5 64.4 64.5 64.9 
Poland 66.5 67.6 68.5 69.7 70.2 70.4 70.5 70.0 
Russia 63.8 58.3 61.0 59.0 59.0 58.5 58.8 58.8 
Tajikistan 60.7 60.6 60.7 60.9 - 61.0 61.1 61.3 
Turkmenistan 59.2 59.0 58.8 58.5 - 58.2 58.4 58.6 
Ukraine 65.6 61.8 61.9 62.4 62.8 62.7 62.6 62.6 
Uzbekistan 66.1 66.1 66.1 64.7 - 63.8 63.8 63.9 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from 
the database in August 10, 2006. 
 
Dynamics of life expectancy at birth for the male 
population in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Hungary, and 
Poland are presented in Figure 3.73. 
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Figure 3.73. Life expectancy at birth for male population 
in Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-
2004, (years) 
 
Dynamics of life expectancy at birth for the male 
population in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Hungary, and 
Poland are rather complex. In Poland and Hungary this indicator 
shows a slow but continuing increase during the entire period of 
transition. Specifically, in Hungary the value of this indicator 
grew from 65.3 years in 1989 to 68.6 years in 2004, and in 
Poland it went from 66.8 years in 1989 to 70 years in 2004. In 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation situation was more complex 
as was the case with the female population. Despite some 
people’s beliefs about a rapid decrease in life expectancy at birth 
for the male population in Ukraine and Russia, this indicator 
declined and increased only slightly during the whole period of 
transition and had stabilized by the end of 2000. However, in 
distinction from the analogous indicator for the female 
population, stabilization of life expectancy at birth for the male 
population occurred on a lower level than the one achieved 
before the transition. 
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In the Russian Federation life expectancy at birth for 
the male population declined from 64.2 years in 1989 to its 
lowest level of 57.6 years in 1994 and then stabilized at a level 
of around 59 years, settling at 58.8 years in 2004. In Ukraine life 
expectancy at birth for the male population declined from 66.1 
years in 1989 to its lowest of 61.8 years in 1995 and then 
stabilized at a level of around 63 years, settling at 62.6 years in 
2004. Life expectancy at birth for Ukraine’s male population 
was higher than life expectancy at birth for the Russian 
Federation’s male population during the entire period of 
transition. 
Despite continuing growth in access to education, 
healthcare, and housing, as well as phenomenal growth in the 
service industries, Ukraine and the Russian Federation 
experienced negative trends in demographics, including birth 
rate and life expectancy for the female and male populations. 
Such negative trends may be explained to a large extent by 
social problems, including alcohol drinking, increased use of 
drugs, an unhealthy lifestyle, psychological stress, economic 
instability during the transition period, increased work loads, an 
increase in traffic accidences (including fatal ones), etc. 
Life expectancy at birth appears to be at an 
unsatisfactory level for both Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 
A life expectancy at birth of 59 years for the male population in 
the Russian Federation is alarming and certainly below the value 
of the same indicators for other developed nations. It is socially 
and economically unacceptable. While the positive trends are 
present, the pace of positive changes is slow. 
 
3.4.3. Socio-Economic Progress: Openness and Well-
Being 
Dynamics of an increase in openness of Ukrainian 
society and the population’s well-being will help us better 
understand progress in the social and economic life of the 
country during transition and post-transition development. 
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Primary attention will be paid to an increase in consumption 
of technologically sophisticated or hi-tech products and services. 
Indicators of the openness of Ukrainian society—
including access to newspapers, the internet, and phone 
communications—for the period of 1993-2004 are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix X. The number of internet users 
increased from 400 in 1993 to 3750000 in 2004, reaching a level 
of 79 users per thousand population. International Internet 
bandwidth increased from 15.3 Mbps to 814 Mbps. International 
tourism and international voice traffic have also increased 
dramatically. The umber of newspapers per thousand population 
increased from 68.66 in 1997 to 174.75 in 2000. 
The number of mobile phone subscribers reached 
13700000 in 2004, comprising 289.5 mobile phone subscribers 
per thousand population. The market of mobile communication 
has experienced a real boom since 2000. The number of phone 
lines increased from 6684200 in 1989 to 12100000 in 2004. The 
indicator for the number of phone lines per thousand population 
grew from 129 in 1989 to 256 in 2004. 
The number of personal computers in the country 
increased from 100000 in 1990 to 1327000 in 2004. The 
indicator for the number of personal computers per thousand 
population grew from 1.9 in 1989 to 28 in 2004. The number of 
personal computers used by businesses and individuals 
increased consistently at a constant rate during the entire period 
of transition. This indicates that the economic transformation in 
Ukraine was a productive one. 
The number of passenger cars increased from 63 per 
thousand population in 1990 to 114 in 2003 and practically 
doubled during the period of 1990 to 2004. 
Selected indicators of the increasing well-being of 
Ukrainian society, including consumption of hi-tech products 
and services for the period of 1989-2004, are presented in 
Figures 3.74-3.77. 
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Figure 3.74. Selected indicators of the increasing well-
being of the Ukrainian society, including consumption of hi-tech 
products and services (mobile phone subscribers per 1000 
people), 1989-2004 
 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
 
Figure 3.75. Selected indicators of the increasing well-
being of Ukrainian society, including consumption of hi-tech 
products and services (personal computers per 1000 people), 
1989-2004 
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Figure 3.76. Selected indicators of the increasing well-
being of Ukrainian society, including consumption of hi-tech 
products and services (passenger cars per 1000), 1989-2004 
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Figure 3.77. Selected indicators of the increasing well-
being of Ukrainian society, including consumption of hi-tech 
products and services (telephone lines per 1000 people), 1989-
2004 
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The data presented point to revolutionary changes in 
the sphere of telecommunications, the society’s openness, and 
consumption of hi-tech goods and services. Traffic congestion, 
information security, and other such problems, previously 
unknown to the country, are insignificant as compared to the 
level of openness the society achieved during the period of 
transition. 
The idea of following the dynamics of consumption of 
certain goods and services in order to demonstrate that positive 
changes have occurred in the society is not new. It has been 
widely used before. Shleifer says of the 1990s in Russia: 
Average living standards fell little during the decade, and, 
in some important respects, improved. Retail trade (in 
constant prices) rose 16 percent between 1990 and 
2002… Goskomstat’s figures for final consumption of 
households (in constant prices) rose by about 3 percent 
during 1990-2002. Average living space increased from 
16 square meters per person in 1990 to 19 in 2000, and 
the share of this living space owned by citizens doubled 
during the decade, from 26 to 58 percent (Goskomstat 
Rossii, 2001, p. 200). The number of Russians traveling 
abroad as tourists rose from 1.6 million in 1993 to 4.3 
million in 2000. The shares of households with radios, 
televisions, tape recorders, refrigerators, washing 
machines, and electric vacuum cleaners all increased 
between 1991 and 2000. Private ownership of cars 
doubled, rising from 14 cars per 100 households in 1991 
to 27 in 2000, with large increases occurring in almost 
all regions (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001, p. 193-194). 
(Shleifer, 2005, p. 159) 
 
Shleifer also comments on the population’s health, life 
expectancy, and other social indicators: 
In 1992-93, as the death rate jumped sharply, the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey found no evidence of 
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serious malnutrition in Russia. In fact, the proportion 
of people whose body weight increased during these 
years exceeded the share that lost weight (Shkolnikov et 
al., 1998)… The number of doctors per capita, already 
one of the highest in the world, rose still higher in the 
1990s (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001, p. 242). Infant 
mortality—one indicator of the effectiveness of basic 
health care—although rising a little initially, fell during 
the decade, from 17.4 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 
15.3 in 2000 (Goskomstat Rossii, 2001, p. 127). (Shleifer, 
2005, p. 161) 
 
Shleifer concludes that “considering the distorted 
demand, inflated accounting, and uselessness of much of the 
pre-reform output, Russians today are probably on average 
better off than they were in 1990.” (Shleifer, 2005, p. 163) 
One might argue that radios, televisions, and tape 
recorders are no longer good indicators of a population’s well-
being and that weight loss is rather healthy while gaining weight 
may be the result of a poor diet, but the point in general is well 
taken—the crisis was not as harsh as it might have appeared to 
some in 1990s. 
 
3.4.4. R&D in Ukraine 
The provision of quality higher education services was 
on the rise during the entire period of transition and continues to 
grow after 2005, but the situation in the R&D sector in Ukraine 
was more complex. Heyets notes: “Science and education are 
traditionally assigned the role of facilitators for the high-tech 
industries; their development moves at a slow pace, one can feel 
the loss of personnel with high level qualifications.” (Heyets, 
2001, p. 1) The R&D sector in Ukraine as well as in other 
former soviet republics lost some of its high-skilled employees. 
One should admit that during the transition the industrial model 
has experienced certain difficulties, even exhibiting trends 
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toward deindustrialization in some regions and branches of 
the economy, including the reemergence of primitive forms of 
production in rural areas. 
Dynamics of the R&D situation in Ukraine by categories 
of employees and academics for the period of 1989-1999 are 
presented in Figure 3.78. Detailed statistics on employment in 
R&D are presented in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 of Appendix 
XI. 
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Figure 3.78. R&D situation in Ukraine by categories of 
employees and academics, 1989-1999 
 
The above diagram points to a decrease in the total 
number of R&D employees in Ukraine during the period of 
transition. The decline was from 348645 employees in 1989 to 
126045 employees in 1999. This significant decline was not 
proportionate for all of the categories of employees. The number 
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of specialists declined from 292840 to 94726, and the 
number of staff declined from 111165 to 40552. The number of 
technical personnel experienced a less significant decline, from 
55805 employees to 31273 employees. 
The total number of R&D employees has decreased, but 
this decrease was partially compensated for by the new category 
of employees, namely, higher education faculty working part-
time in R&D. The number of employees in this category grew 
from 35995 in 1990 to 48414 in 1999. The explanation for this 
growth is that with the demand for R&D declining sharply 
during the 1990s, many R&D specialists with doctoral degrees 
moved into the rapidly growing industry of higher education 
services. Moreover, they have retained their work places in the 
research institutes. 
The decline in the number of Ph.D. holders working in 
R&D, from 31819 in 1989 to 19720 in 1999, is explained by 
their employment in educational institutions and private 
businesses. At the same time the number of R&D employees 
with a D.Sc. degree (which is a second doctorate, the highest 
doctoral degree in the country) has increased from 3299 in 1989 
to 4610 in 1999. 
The diagrams presented in Appendix XI show that 
contrary to commonly held opinions, changes in the number of 
R&D employees in different categories were smooth rather than 
sharp and unexpected. Dynamics within each category of R&D 
employees points toward a general decline in the total number of 
employees with a simultaneous increase in the quality of the 
total body in proportion to the different categories. This process 
is still incomplete. Further development of the market economy 
and market-based relations will lead to an increase in the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the national research institutes. 
Positive trends that take place in science and education in 
Ukraine may be sufficient to maintain the pace of reforms and 
facilitate industrial development. 
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3.6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, we have proven statistically, that the 
output decline in Ukraine was not as dramatic, as it often 
appears on the official reports, including those presented by the 
IMF, the World Bank, and such, and lasted for a lesser period 
than is normally perceived. Official data about cumulative 
output decline and its continuity should be approached critically. 
In our view, consecutive output decline in Ukraine continued for 
no more than six years and the decline itself was significantly 
smaller than 59 percent of GDP. This statement is proven 
statistically, when the output decline of 59 percent during the 
period of 1990 to 1999 is combined with the reported share of 
the unofficial or shadow economy, which constituted 48.9 
percent in 1995. 
Based on the extended analysis of statistical data for 
Ukraine and other NIS, it is possible to conclude that the so-
called economic crisis in Ukraine was to a large extent a myth 
rather than an adequate description of the economic reality. 
Indeed, the large scale economic restructuring, privatization, and 
institutional changes do not offer enough evidence to conclude 
that the process of transition has resulted in a full-scale 
continuous economic crisis. Data on electricity consumption and 
energy consumption confirm our statement that the output 
decline in Ukraine during the 1990s was not as significant, as it 
is presented in the literature. 
The dynamics in the structure of the real GDP during the 
period of 1991 to 2007 points to the increasing role of personal 
consumption and investments in the GDP growth. Growing 
volumes of personal consumption and investments have positive 
influence on the GDP per capita growth, while the role of the 
state spending is less significant and declining. Investments 
played the positive role starting 1997. The trade balance may 
have a negative impact on the GDP per capita growth. Further 
development of the domestic market along with the process of 
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reinvestment will slowly replace government spending as 
determinants of future economic growth in Ukraine. The data 
points to the sustainability of economic growth in Ukraine. In 
the Russian Federation, the rapid GDP per capita growth over 
the last eight years takes place thanks, in part, to the high prices 
on carbohydrates. In Ukraine, the rapid economic growth is a 
result of the endogenous economic change. 
The national economy is still experiencing a certain dis-
balance between the rate of increase in consumer prices and the 
rate of increase in salaries and wages. Such a dis-balance 
confirms our thesis about the mismatch in pace of economic 
reforms and commoditization of labor. Formation of the labor 
market lags behind the commodity market. 
The higher education sector in Ukraine undergoes a 
rapid development since 1991 and points to the continuous 
process of accumulation of human capital in the national 
economy. The reduction in unemployment helps involve the 
accumulated human capital in the process of production. The 
high tech industries of higher education and healthcare indicate 
stable growth in the total social welfare. The increasing 
openness of the economy and the society, development of the 
mass media, mobile communications, housing market, and such 
are all indicators of sustainable economic growth. 
Among the remaining problems, we would like to 
underline the decline in population that Ukraine experiences 
since independence. While the life expectancy at birth for 
female and male population has stabilized and continues to 
increase, the birthrate remains one of the lowest in the world. 
Unless this trend is reversed, there will be an inevitable 
demographic problem in the foreseen future. The proportion of 
people who reached the retirement age increases. The 
demographic problem will eventually impact the growth rate. 
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PART IV 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
This study analyses the role and impact of human capital 
on per capita economic growth in transition economies in 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The 
factors that are associated with the human capital in terms of 
education levels are analyzed in order to measure this impact. 
Our approach is to estimate the significance of educational 
levels for initiating substantial economic growth. The model 
tests empirically the hypothesis that human capital has a positive 
impact on per capita economic growth in transition economies. 
We also estimate a system of linear and log-linear equations 
accounting for different time lags in the possible impact of 
human capital on economic growth. 
 
4.1. The Endogenous Model of Economic Growth 
 
For deeper investigation of the potential sources of 
economic growth in Ukraine and other post-transition 
economies, we choose an endogenous model of economic 
growth because the exogenous models of Solow-Swan and 
Leontief do not adequately describe the transition experience. 
The debate on whether the accumulation of human capital 
contributes positively towards raising per capita income growth 
has reemerged along with the renewed emphasis on the 
determinants of long-term economic growth. 
An endogenous model of economic growth appears to be 
the most appropriate for our evaluation. First, such model may 
be applied for cross sectional analysis, which is probably the 
best way to analyze economic growth in the countries in 
transition. Second, the model shows the influence and 
importance of human capital relative to other key inputs on 
economic growth and to differences across countries. 
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Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) note that, while both 
intuition and several theories of endogenous growth point 
towards a positive effect of human capital on economic growth, 
empirical evidence on this issue has been mixed (Kalaitzidakis 
et al., 2001). The purpose of the study is to provide a systematic 
investigation of the human capital--economic growth nexus. The 
impact of human capital on economic growth is incorporated 
according to the Mankiw et al. (1992) framework. 
Mankiw et al. assume a production function of the form 
given below: 
 
( )Y K H A Lt t t t= − − −α β α β1                                      (29) 
 
where Y, K, H, and L represent total output, physical 
capital stock, human capital stock and labor, respectively. A is a 
technological parameter. Technology is assumed to grow 
exponentially at the rate φ . 
Kalaitzidakis et al. model is in some sense a continuation 
of the Durlauf and Johnson (1995) work but extends their work 
in one significant direction. Durlauf and Johnson focus on 
identifying homogenous subgroups of countries, and they 
assume that the contribution of human capital to economic 
growth is the same for all countries within each subgroup. 
Kalaitzidakis et al. allow the effect of human capital to differ 
both across countries and also across time. A variety of 
measures of human capital frequently used in applied growth 
studies is employed. 
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) estimate the unrestricted 
growth model as follows (30): 
 
( )y a a D a D a S a n a X a hit t j itk it it it it= + + + + + + + + + +0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln lnα δ γ ε  
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Where  refers to the growth rate of income per capita 
during each period, 
yit
S k  is the share of output devoted to 
physical capital accumulation,  is the rate of growth of the 
labor force, 
nit
α  is the rate of technical exogenous progress that is 
constant for all countries in all periods, δ  is the depreciation 
rate of human capital, γ  is the depreciation rate of physical 
capital,  is per capita income at the beginning of each period, 
 is human capital measured either as a stock or as a flow. D  
and  are dummy variables for each period and country, i.e. 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 
respectively. 
Xit
hit t
Dj
The model considers a wide variety of measures of 
education capital; health and other forms of human capital are 
not measured. The first measure of education human capital 
presented by the authors is mean years of schooling for the 
whole population. This measure is used most frequently in the 
modern literature on growth. They also examine educational 
attainment of males and females at the primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary or tertiary levels. They include educational 
achievement at the secondary and tertiary level for a number of 
reasons: “(i) a number of countries have very low or zero values 
for educational achievement at the tertiary level; (ii) to limit the 
number of measures of human capital; and (iii) the theoretical 
mechanisms that link human capital of different educational 
levels to economic growth draw a distinction between basic 
education (primary) and education that enables the diffusion of 
ideas (post primary). Finally, for the purposes of comparison 
with the early literature on human capital, we consider 
enrollment rates both at the primary and secondary level and by 
gender.” (Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001, p. 234) 
Human capital in the model is expressed in terms of 
education only. The rate of depreciation of human capital can be 
interpreted as a function of healthcare expenditures. It is not an 
objective of the model to suggest whether the rate of human 
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capital depreciation is linearly related to healthcare 
expenditures, but the model assumes that higher per capita 
health care expenditures lead to lower rates of human capital 
depreciation. 
 
4.2. Calculations without the time lag 
 
4.2.1. The Data 
The data used in the empirical study are for Hungary, 
Poland, Russia, and Ukraine and cover the period of 1990-1999. 
Selected macroeconomic indicators for Hungary used in the 
research are presented in Table 4.1. 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Hungary, 1990-1999 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
GDP per 
capita 
growth, % 
 
 
GNI per 
capita, 
USD 
 
 
Savings as 
% of GDP 
 
 
 
Labor 
force, 
people 
 
 
  Rate of 
unemploy 
    ment 
 
 
People 
employed 
 
 
 
Rate of 
growth of 
labor force 
(employed), 
% 
1990  -2.788720 2880 27.99973 4736805  1.7 4656279 … 
1991 -11.365300 2790 19.48406 4748814  8.5 4345165 0.933184 
1992  -2.194320 3180 15.80715 4769688  9.8 4302259 0.990126 
1993   0.007814 3510 11.75122 4776416 11.9 4208023 0.978096 
1994   2.923398 3880 15.71617 4791887 10.7 4279155 1.016904 
1995   1.085993 4140 22.66437 4808100 10.2 4317674 1.009001 
1996   2.571891 4350 26.11790 4800903  9.9 4325614 1.001839 
1997   5.060354 4510 27.74745 4803268  8.7 4385383 1.013818 
1998   4.297205 4480 27.55985 4804150  7.8 4429426 1.010043 
1999   5.635093 4640 26.33028 4802436 ... … … 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and World Development Database 
 
The trend in GDP per capita growth in Hungary is 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. GDP per capita growth in Hungary in 1990-
1999 
 
The data presented in Figure 4.1 demonstrate negative 
GDP per capita growth in Hungary for the period of 1990-1993 
and then substantial per capita economic growth up to 5.635 
percent in 1999. 
Selected macroeconomic indicators for Poland used in the 
research are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
TABLE 4.2 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Poland, 1990-1999 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
GDP per 
capita 
growth, % 
 
 
GNI per 
capita, 
USD 
 
 
Savings as 
% of GDP 
 
 
 
Labor 
force, 
people 
 
 
  Rate of 
unemploy 
    ment 
 
 
People 
employed 
 
 
 
Rate of 
growth of 
labor force 
(employed), 
% 
1990 ... ... 31.56716 18716330   6.5 17499769 … 
1991 -3.901430 ... 17.05243 18854490 11.8 16629660 0.950279 
1992  2.688715 1900 15.75936 18952162 13.6 16374668 0.984666 
1993  3.977723 2260 16.52728 19075664 14.0 16405071 1.001857 
1994 -2.519590 2370 19.87484 19156170 14.4 16397682 0.999550 
1995 10.195640 2770 22.05144 19255212 13.3 16694269 1.018087 
1996 11.575260 3330 20.31483 19386236 12.3 17001729 1.018417 
1997  6.486091 3610 20.24529 19518250 11.2 17332206 1.019438 
1998  7.517256 3920 20.95529 19642404 10.5 17579952 1.014294 
1999  3.432484 4070 20.00919 19752194 ... … … 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and World Development Database 
The trend in GDP per capita growth in Poland is 
presented in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. GDP per capita growth in Poland in 1991-
1999 
 
Data presented in Figure 4.2 demonstrate definite 
fluctuations in GDP per capita growth in Poland. Within the 
observation period, GDP per capita growth is negative in 1991 
and 1994. It is positive for the periods of 1992-1993 and 1995-
1999. However, in contrast to Hungary, GDP per capita growth 
in Poland is not very substantial since it increases from 10.1956 
percent in 1995 to 11.575 percent in 1996 and then decreases to 
3.4324 percent in 1999. Projected GDP growth in Poland for 
2001 is 4.0 percent. 
Selected macroeconomic indicators for the Russian 
Federation used in the research are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
TABLE 4.3 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in the Russian Federation, 1990-1999 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
GDP per 
capita 
growth, % 
 
 
GNI per 
capita, 
USD 
 
 
Savings as 
% of GDP 
 
 
 
Labor 
force, 
people 
 
 
  Rate of 
unemploy 
   ment 
 
People 
employed 
 
 
 
Rate of 
growth of 
labor force 
(employed), 
% 
1990  -3.49759 .. 30.34711 77111840 .. - - 
1991  -5.46733 3830 36.55293 77284480  0.08 77222652 - 
1992 -15.34420 3150 39.74930 77318280  5.20 73297730 0.949174 
1993  -8.35636 2770 30.88723 77230400  5.90 72673806 0.991488 
1994 -12.53670 2310 29.49503 77134720  8.10 70886807 0.975411 
1995  -4.36170 2250 28.77231 77033320  9.50 69715155 0.983471 
1996  -3.46114 2350 28.89521 77267496  9.70 69772549 1.000823 
1997   0.71743 2600 25.47482 77481904 11.80 68339039 0.979455 
1998  -6.49414 2250 20.43118 77510400 13.30 67201517 0.983355 
1999   0.63349 2250 32.99949 77632200 .. - - 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and World Development Database 
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The trend in GDP per capita growth in the Russian 
Federation is presented in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. GDP per capita growth in the Russian 
Federation in 1990-1999 
 
The trend in GDP per capita growth for the Russian 
Federation is almost always below the zero line that indicates 
negative per capita economic growth for the period of 1990-
1999. The only two exceptions are 1997 and 1999 with positive 
GDP per capita growth of 0.717 and 0.633, respectively. The 
negative trend until 1996 may be explained by the transition 
crisis and negative GDP per capita growth in 1998 is a 
consequence of the world currency crisis of 1997-1998. Since 
1999 the Russian Federation indicates substantial economic 
growth of up to 6.4 percent in 2001. 
Selected macroeconomic indicators for Ukraine used in 
the research are presented in Table 8. 
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TABLE 4.4 
 
Selected macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine, 1990-1999 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
GDP per 
capita 
growth, % 
 
 
GNI 
per capita, 
USD 
 
 
Savings as 
% of GDP 
 
 
 
Labor 
force, 
people 
 
 
  Rate of 
unemploy 
   ment 
 
People 
employed 
 
 
 
Rate of 
growth of 
labor force 
(employed), 
% 
1990  -4.46342 1610 26.38680 26049784 .. … … 
1991  -9.00188 1580 28.52009 26052500 .. … … 
1992 -12.14400 1600 36.44327 26127652 .. … … 
1993 -16.13570 1370 35.97958 26089500 .. … … 
1994 -21.28000 1100 32.16514 25960500 .. … … 
1995 -12.38860 950 23.60001 25713968  5.6 24273986 … 
1996  -9.00166 960 20.11801 25608114  7.6 23661897 0.974784 
1997  -2.20390 1010 18.38698 25450396  8.9 23185311 0.979858 
1998  -1.94956 970 18.54317 25348680 11.3 22484279 0.969764 
1999  -0.61219 840 20.86513 25274700 .. … … 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and World Development Database 
 271 
 
The trend in GDP per capita growth in Ukraine is 
presented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. GDP per capita growth in Ukraine in 1990-
1999 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4, GDP per capita growth in 
Ukraine remained negative for the period of 1990-1999. It starts 
from –4.463 percent in 1990 to –0.612 percent in 1999 with the 
lowest of –21.28 in 1994. Starting in 2000 the economy of 
Ukraine demonstrates positive real GDP growth of 4.2 percent 
in 2000, with projected 6.2 percent in 2001, and projected 4.0 to 
6.2 percent for 2002 (IMF, 2001). Assuming constant population 
decrease, it demonstrates substantial GDP per capita growth. 
All the data for human capital are from Barro (2000), 
Barro and Lee (1996) databases, UNESCO, and countries’ 
Ministries of Education databases. Indicators for human capital 
are measured as the average number of schooling years per 
person 25 years old and older, and the average number of 
schooling years per person 15 years old and older. Human 
capital is also measured as the share of workers with completed 
secondary education in the labor force. 
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4.2.2. Empirical results 
This section details the findings from the estimation of 
the model. The empirical results are summarized in Table 4.5. 
Unlike Kalaitzidakis et al., we include savings as a 
percent of GDP instead of the share of output devoted to 
physical capital accumulation, (the ratio of investment to GDP). 
The model is estimated using Pooled Least Squares for the 
growth equation. First, we present results for the model 
including the share of workers with completed secondary 
education in the total labor force as our measure of human 
capital. The regression results for Hungary, Poland, and the 
Russian Federation are presented in Table 4.5, column (1). 
The coefficient of the human capital variable is negative 
but statistically insignificant. Savings as a share of GDP has a 
negative correlation with GDP per capita growth. Increase in 
savings by one percent leads to a decrease in GDP per capita of 
2.282 percent. However, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. 
A one percent increase in the gross national income per 
capita increases GDP per capita growth by 3.372 percent. The 
coefficient for gross national income per capita is positive but 
statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient for the logarithm of the sum of the rate of 
growth of the labor force, the rate of technical exogenous 
progress, and the depreciation rate for human and physical 
capital is positive and statistically significant at the five percent 
level of significance. The rate of growth of the labor force is 
presented as growth of employment only. The rate of technical 
exogenous progress that is constant for all countries is taken as 
α =1. The depreciation rate for human and physical capital is 
taken as δ =0.1. The coefficient size of 211.7 shows a large 
effect of growth through employment growths, technical 
progress, and depreciation on GDP per capita growth. Fixed 
country effects are negative. 
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Table 4.5 
Regression results for Hungary, Poland, and the Russian 
Federation 
Dependent Variable: GNP per capita growth 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(GDP) -2.281950 -4.130292 -3.049124 -1.898404 
log(n+a+delta) 211.7075 284.1125 324.8825 468.8184 
log(GNIPC) 3.372103 10.60201 8.409283 21.52700 
log(SecEd) -2.432554 - - - 
log(Ed15) - -92.03441 -87.10878 - 
log(Ed25) - - - 0.586599 
Y1993 - - 1.150828 - 
Y1997 - - 1.323753 - 
HungaryY1993 - - - 5.921217 
PolandY1993 - - - 7.003009 
RussiaY1993 - - - -6.587396 
HungaryY1997 - - - 0.435318 
PolandY1997 - - - -6.885087 
RussiaY1997 - - - 1.095112 
Fixed Effects     
Hungary -30.12454 -90.42709 -118.2021 -534.4805 
Poland -25.88381 -76.90207 -105.8910 -522.5860 
Russia -33.83000 -78.51058 -107.8946 -525.3103 
Ukraine - -69.59642 -100.5148 - 
R-squared 0.883036 0.868996 0.874926 0.933623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.824554 0.815053 0.799882 0.800869 
S.E. of regression 3.040127 3.001439 3.122116 3.238834 
Log likelihood -43.72036 -58.12998 -44.66185 -23.35189 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.735736 2.437320 2.459151 3.042483 
Mean dependent var -0.062002 -0.827354 -0.827354 -0.062002 
S.D. dependent var 7.258046 6.979211 6.979211 7.258046 
Sum squared resid 110.9085 153.1468 146.2141 62.94029 
F-statistic 30.19851 37.58905 20.98589 9.376994 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007 0.000000 0.000003 0.006563 
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Average years of schooling per person 15 years old 
and older is the measure of human capital in the GDP per capita 
growth model for Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine 
presented in Table 4.5, column (2). 
The coefficient on average years of schooling per person 
15 years old and older is negative and insignificant at the five 
percent level of significance. Savings as a share of GDP 
demonstrates a negative correlation with GDP per capita growth. 
Increasing savings by one percent leads to a decrease in GDP 
per capita of 4.13 percent. However, the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. 
A one percent increase in the gross national income per 
capita increases GDP per capita growth by 10.6 percent. The 
coefficient of gross national income per capita is positive and 
statistically significant at the six percent level. 
The coefficient for the logarithm of the sum of the rate of 
growth of the labor force, rate of technical exogenous progress, 
and the depreciation rate for human and physical capital is 
positive and statistically significant at the five percent level of 
significance. The coefficient size of 211.7 shows a large effect 
of labor growth on GDP per capita growth. 
Fixed country effects are negative. 
The regression with the average years of schooling per 
person 25 years old and older as the measure of human capital 
gives similar results. For the regressions presented in Tables 4.7 
and 4.8, we include two dummy variables in the model to test 
for shifts in growth over time. Year 1993 is equal to years one 
for the 1993 and earlier and is equal to 0 for other years. Year 
1997 is equal to one for the years 1997 and later and is equal to 
0 for other years. 
We estimate the impact of average years of schooling per 
person 15 years old and older as the measure of human capital 
on the GDP per capita growth in the regression model for 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. The results are presented 
in Table 4.5, column (3). 
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The coefficient of average years of schooling per 
person 15 years old and older measure of human capital is 
negative and insignificant at the five percent level of 
significance. Coefficients for both dummy variables are 
insignificant at the five percent level of significance. This 
indicates that there is no significant difference for these 
countries between the periods of time before 1993, from 1993 
till 1997, and after 1997 in the GDP per capita growth model. 
Regression results for Hungary, Poland, Russia, and 
Ukraine using the share of workers with completed secondary 
education in the total labor force as our measure of human 
capital are presented in Table 4.5, column (4). In addition, we 
test interaction of the countries’ fixed effects with the time 
variables. The coefficient for the share of workers with 
completed secondary education in the total labor force is 
negative and insignificant at the five percent level of 
significance. Coefficients for both dummy variables are 
insignificant at the five percent level of significance. This 
indicates that there is no significant difference for each country 
between the periods of time before 1993, from 1993 till 1997, 
and after 1997 in the GDP per capita growth model. Regressions 
with average years of schooling per person 25 years old and 
older measure of human capital give similar results. 
 
4.3. Calculations with the time lag 
 
4.3.1. The Data 
The data used in the empirical study are selected 
macroeconomic indicators for Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine and cover the period of 1989-2010. 
Selected macroeconomic indicators for Hungary used in the 
research are presented in Tables 4.6 – 4.9. GDP per capita 
growth for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 is presented in Table 4.6. 
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TABLE 4.6 
 
Real GDP growth per head (percent per annum) in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1989 0.999 - - - 
1990 -2.893 -11.900 - -4.241 
1991 -11.831 -7.200 -5.267 -8.954 
1992 -2.914 2.400 -14.586 -10.225 
1993 -0.387 3.600 -8.669 -13.985 
1994 3.110 5.100 -12.659 -22.322 
1995 1.654 7.001 -4.065 -11.522 
1996 1.539 6.198 -3.460 -9.217 
1997 4.863 7.124 1.457 -2.240 
1998 5.204 5.061 -5.139 -1.124 
1999 4.546 4.616 6.730 0.597 
2000 6.371 4.305 10.478 6.806 
2001 4.619 1.210 5.613 11.001 
2002 4.086 1.455 5.242 6.198 
2003 3.645 3.869 7.757 10.398 
2004 5.484 5.360 7.611 12.913 
2005 4.400 3.447 6.823 3.371 
2006 4.200 5.100 6.700 6.100 
2007 3.800 4.800 6.100 6.400 
2008 4.000 4.400 5.400 6.500 
2009 4.200 4.100 4.900 6.700 
2010 4.200 4.100 4.600 6.300 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU calculations, 
US Census Bureau, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, State Committee of Statistics, 
RosStat, Poland Quarterly Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, UN, IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Trajectories of the indicators overtime taken as logs 
are presented in Figures 4.6, 4.8, 4.10, and 4.12. Dynamics of 
the GDP per capita growth for Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 is 
presented in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Real GDP per capita growth in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Dynamics of the GDP per capita growth for Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the period of 
1989-2010 that accounts for the log trajectories is presented in 
Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6. Real GDP per capita growth in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (with the log 
trajectories), 1989-2010 
 
As shown in Figure 4.6, that uses trajectories of the logs, 
GDP per capita growth in Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine was in the different initial position in 
each country, The convergence of the GDP per capita growth 
rate in these countries occurs during the period of 1989-2010. 
Gross fixed investment annual change for Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the period of 
1989-2010 is presented in Table 4.7. 
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TABLE 4.7 
 
Gross fixed investment (percent real change per annum) in 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-
2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1989 6.990 -2.145 - - 
1990 -7.136 -9.776 - - 
1991 -10.427 -4.404 -15.600 - 
1992 -2.639 2.326 -41.500 -13.030 
1993 2.031 2.900 -25.800 -34.626 
1994 12.470 9.201 -26.000 -50.263 
1995 -6.753 16.500 -15.267 -9.960 
1996 6.747 19.700 -21.200 -20.036 
1997 9.158 21.800 -7.900 3.636 
1998 13.234 14.000 -12.400 4.316 
1999 5.893 6.600 6.400 0.720 
2000 7.665 2.700 18.100 12.650 
2001 5.929 -9.700 10.200 9.350 
2002 9.294 -6.300 2.800 3.400 
2003 2.450 -0.100 12.800 15.800 
2004 8.400 6.400 11.290 20.500 
2005 6.558 6.500 10.499 -0.300 
2006 5.500 8.000 10.200 5.000 
2007 5.200 8.000 11.000 9.000 
2008 5.000 7.000 10.600 10.000 
2009 5.500 7.000 10.900 7.500 
2010 6.000 7.000 10.000 8.500 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU calculations, 
US Census Bureau, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, State Committee of Statistics, 
RosStat, Poland Quarterly Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, UN, IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Dynamics of the gross fixed investment annual 
change for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 is presented in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Investment in constant capital in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Dynamics of the gross fixed investment annual change 
for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for 
the period of 1989-2010 that accounts for the log trajectories is 
presented in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8. Investment in constant capital in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (with the log 
trajectories), 1989-2010 
 
As shown in Figure 4.8 that uses trajectories of the logs, 
levels of the gross fixed investment in Hungary, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine were in the different initial 
positions in each country. However, gross fixed investment rates 
converge. The convergence of the gross fixed investment rates 
in these countries occurs during the period of 1989-2010. Gross 
fixed investment rates in Poland and Hungary were higher than 
in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The process of 
convergence of the growth gross fixed investment rate coincides 
with the convergence of the GDP per capita growth in these 
countries that occurs during the period of 1989-2010. This 
confirms significant and positive effect of the investment on 
growth. 
Savings rate annual change for Hungary, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 is 
presented in Table 4.8. 
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TABLE 4.8 
 
Gross national savings rate (percent) in Hungary, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1989 26.971 44.082 - - 
1990 26.537 30.219 - - 
1991 21.662 17.380 - - 
1992 17.021 12.030 - - 
1993 8.910 10.237 31.334 - 
1994 12.427 14.014 28.358 32.659 
1995 18.908 19.307 27.662 23.675 
1996 21.591 18.772 26.434 20.037 
1997 22.022 19.753 21.957 18.759 
1998 21.644 21.030 15.044 17.667 
1999 20.867 17.786 27.393 22.729 
2000 21.378 19.003 36.729 24.494 
2001 20.308 17.937 32.972 25.482 
2002 17.877 16.087 28.502 27.700 
2003 15.739 16.642 29.010 27.800 
2004 16.787 15.931 30.997 31.800 
2005 16.384 17.629 31.833 25.200 
2006 17.600 18.600 31.400 20.000 
2007 18.400 19.100 30.200 19.600 
2008 18.000 19.500 27.400 19.500 
2009 18.300 19.800 26.100 19.600 
2010 19.100 19.700 26.300 21.700 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU calculations, 
US Census Bureau, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, State Committee of Statistics 
RosStat, Poland Quarterly Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, UN, IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Dynamics of the savings rate annual change for 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the 
period of 1989-2010 is presented in Figure 4.9. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine
 
Figure 4.9. Savings rate in Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Dynamics of the savings rate annual change for Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the period of 
1989-2010 that accounts for the log trajectories is presented in 
Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10. Savings rate in Hungary, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine (with the log trajectories), 
1989-2010 
 
As shown in the Figure 4.10 that uses trajectories of the 
logs, levels of the savings rate in Hungary, Poland, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine have not changed significantly during 
the period of 1989-2010. Sharp decline of the savings rate in the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine in 1999 can possibly be 
explained by the world financial crisis of 1997-1998. 
Official rate of unemployment annual change for 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine for the 
period of 1989-2010 is presented in Table 4.9. 
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TABLE 4.9 
 
Recorded unemployment (percent) in Hungary, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Year Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine 
1989 - - - - 
1990 - 3.433 - - 
1991 - 8.975 - - 
1992 9.941 12.925 - - 
1993 12.098 14.992 - - 
1994 10.982 16.492 7.017 - 
1995 10.432 15.208 8.300 - 
1996 10.109 14.292 9.258 1.300 
1997 8.912 11.492 10.808 2.300 
1998 7.926 9.975 11.875 3.700 
1999 7.057 11.992 12.617 4.200 
2000 6.440 14.008 10.492 4.100 
2001 5.765 18.000 9.033 3.600 
2002 5.870 19.700 8.133 3.700 
2003 5.932 19.900 8.625 3.500 
2004 6.084 19.600 8.175 3.500 
2005 7.278 18.200 7.583 3.100 
2006 7.200 16.900 7.000 3.500 
2007 7.700 16.000 6.600 3.800 
2008 7.400 15.200 6.400 4.100 
2009 6.800 14.600 6.300 4.400 
2010 6.400 13.700 6.100 4.800 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the 
database in August 12, 2006. Composed based on EIU calculations, 
US Census Bureau, Ministry of Economy and European Integration, 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, State Committee of Statistics 
RosStat, Poland Quarterly Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, UN, IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
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Dynamics of the official rate of unemployment 
annual change for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 is presented in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. Registered level of unemployment in 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 1989-
2010 
 
Dynamics of the official rate of unemployment annual 
change for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine for the period of 1989-2010 that accounts for the log 
trajectories is presented in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12. Registered level of unemployment in 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (with the 
log trajectories), 1989-2010 
 
As shown in the Figure 4.12 that uses trajectories of the 
logs, levels of the official unemployment rate in Hungary, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have risen 
dramatically in early 1990s and have stabilized later. Such a 
sharp increase in unemployment may be explained in part by the 
absence of the official unemployment in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe. Relatively low level of the registered unemployment in 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 1990s should be 
considered critically as it appears to be much lower than the real 
unemployment rate. 
 
 288 
4.3.2. Empirical results 
The presented calculations are based on the estimation of 
the system of linear and log-linear equations that account for 
changes in investment, savings, unemployment, education, and 
medical services. The independent variables were dropped 
consequently and the time lags were taken as five-, six, seven, 
and ten-year time lags. We comment only on the coefficients 
with 5 percent level of significance. Regression results of GDP 
per capita growth to investment, savings, and unemployment for 
Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, for the 
period of 1990-2010 are presented in Table 4.10. 
Regression results indicate positive effects of 
investments on the GDP per capita growth rate. Contribution of 
investments to the GDP per capita growth in the Russian 
Federation is more significant than in Hungary and Poland. 
Positive effect of investment on per capita GDP growth in 
Ukraine is more significant than that in the Russian Federation, 
Poland, and Hungary. 
The results support theoretical statement made earlier 
that in transition and post-transition economies savings are not 
analogous to investments. This means that savings are not 
necessarily invested in the national economy at full scale. 
Process of reinvestment is weak. This finding makes obvious 
underdevelopment of the national stock markets and proves 
necessity for further development of the capital market, 
including institutional reform and strengthening of the national 
banking sector. 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, and unemployment for Hungary, Poland, 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, for the period of 1990-2010 
with the constant coefficient are presented in Table 4.11. 
 289 
TABLE 4.10 
 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
unemployment for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, 1990-2010 
Hungary Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.244502 0.068874 3.549997 0.0027 
Savings 0.256641 0.055916 4.589727 0.0003 
Unemployment -0.324814 0.111661 -2.908932 0.0102 
R-squared 0.669189 Mean dependent var 3.506316 
Adjusted R-sq 0.627837 S.D. dependent var 2.184843 
Poland Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.370721 0.045376 8.169967 0.0000 
Savings -0.290290 0.051233 -5.666129 0.0000 
Unemployment 0.435232 0.063468 6.857488 0.0000 
R-squared 0.866775 Mean dependent var 3.054571 
Adjusted R-sq 0.851973 S.D. dependent var 4.511474 
Russia Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.435921 0.036696 11.87911 0.0000 
Savings -0.014688 0.055328 -0.265479 0.7945 
Unemployment 0.303229 0.176305 1.719908 0.1075 
R-squared 0.923170 Mean dependent var 3.181647 
Adjusted R-sq 0.912194 S.D. dependent var 6.022545 
Ukraine Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.537728 0.089562 6.003988 0.0001 
Savings 0.112958 0.113220 0.997691 0.3381 
Unemployment -0.265566 0.755503 -0.351509 0.7313 
R-squared 0.805419 Mean dependent var 4.713533 
Adjusted R-sq 0.772989 S.D. dependent var 5.702856 
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TABLE 4.11 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
unemployment for Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, 1990-2010 
Hungary Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.218044 0.065923 3.307547 0.0048 
Savings 0.102020 0.099344 1.026938 0.3207 
Unemployment -0.579068 0.173741 -3.332936 0.0045 
C 5.009459 2.738086 1.829548 0.0873 
R-squared 0.729541 Mean dependent var 3.506316 
Adjusted R-sq 0.675450 S.D. dependent var 2.184843 
Poland Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.377018 0.044253 8.519573 0.0000 
Savings -0.130255 0.120908 -1.077306 0.2964 
Unemployment 0.580495 0.117482 4.941147 0.0001 
C -5.103586 3.514660 -1.452085 0.1647 
R-squared 0.881476 Mean dependent var 3.054571 
Adjusted R-sq 0.860560 S.D. dependent var 4.511474 
Russia Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.418878 0.038128 10.98601 0.0000 
Savings 0.113487 0.112216 1.011325 0.3303 
Unemployment 0.504945 0.231460 2.181564 0.0481 
C -5.333275 4.093082 -1.302997 0.2152 
R-squared 0.932045 Mean dependent var 3.181647 
Adjusted R-sq 0.916363 S.D. dependent var 6.022545 
Ukraine Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Investment 0.375891 0.106429 3.531853 0.0047 
Savings 0.449317 0.180289 2.492201 0.0299 
Unemployment 1.454577 1.013559 1.435119 0.1791 
C -12.98688 5.837625 -2.224685 0.0480 
R-squared 0.865800 Mean dependent var 4.713533 
Adjusted R-sq 0.829200 S.D. dependent var 5.702856 
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Regression results presented in Table 4.11 indicate 
positive effects of investments on the GDP per capita growth 
rate. Contribution of investments to the GDP per capita growth 
in Ukraine is somewhat lower than in the Russian Federation 
and is on the same level as in Poland. Increases in savings and 
investment have positive effect on per capita GDP growth in 
Ukraine. One percent increase in investment leads to GDP per 
capita growth of 0.38 percent. One percent increase in savings 
rate leads to GDP per capita growth of 0.45 percent. The results 
present empirical evidence in support of the theoretical findings 
about the necessity of continuing increase of investment in 
production. This will lead to sustainable economic growth. 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, unemployment, education and healthcare 
for the Russian Federation and Ukraine for the period of 1990-
2010 with the constant coefficient (1) and without the constant 
coefficient (2) are presented in Table 4.12. Indicators of the 
level of access to higher education and medical services are 
taken with the five year time lag. 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, education, and healthcare for the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine for the period of 1990-2010 with the 
constant coefficient (1) and without the constant coefficient (2) 
are presented in Table 4.14. Indicators of the level of access to 
higher education and medical services are taken with the six 
year time lag. 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, and education for the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine for the period of 1990-2010 with the constant 
coefficient (1) and without the constant coefficient (2) are 
presented in Table 4.15. Indicators of the level of access to 
higher education are taken with the five year time lag. 
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TABLE 4.12 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, 
unemployment, education and healthcare for the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, 1990-2010 
     
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable     
Investment 
 
 
0.544219** 
(0.151921) 
[3.582251] 
0.349321* 
(0.088695) 
[3.938462] 
0.341820** 
(0.153252) 
[2.230438] 
0.384583** 
(0.142531) 
[2.698245] 
Savings 
 
 
-0.038764 
(0.260842) 
[-0.148611] 
0.226039 
(0.213105) 
[1.060695] 
0.901649 
(0.728499) 
[1.237682] 
1.196193 
(0.637364) 
[1.876784] 
Unemployment 
 
 
-1.156294 
(1.554713) 
[-0.743735] 
1.021889 
(0.645762) 
[1.582455] 
0.410878 
(1.675531) 
[0.245223] 
0.130104 
(1.609592) 
[0.080831] 
Education 
 
 
-0.014755 
(0.050371) 
[-0.292917] 
0.041590 
(0.037368) 
[1.112996] 
-0.066783 
(0.089199) 
[-0.748699] 
-0.060944 
(0.086963) 
[-0.700799] 
Healthcare 
 
 
-2.180633 
(1.176011) 
[-1.854263] 
-0.474601 
(0.366858) 
[-1.29369] 
2.500816 
(3.148024) 
[0.794408] 
-0.346361 
(0.212904) 
[-1.626842] 
     
R-squared 0.959353 0.941654 0.954202 0.941654 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.918707 0.883307 0.877871 0.883307 
Mean 
dependent var 1.778636 1.778636 3.925778 3.925778 
S.D. dependent 
var 7.173865 7.173865 7.361281 7.361281 
     
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, unemployment, education, and healthcare. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
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TABLE 4.13 
 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, 
unemployment, education and healthcare for the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, 1990-2010 
     
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable     
Investment 
 
 
0.430864* 
(0.042274) 
[10.19206] 
0.448183* 
(0.052814) 
[8.486119] 
0.416201* 
(0.042274) 
[3.862983] 
0.516480* 
(0.105189) 
[4.910021] 
Savings 
 
 
0.133635 
(0.128833) 
[1.037277] 
0.015774 
(0.151186) 
[0.104332] 
0.200090 
(0.128833) 
[0.453996] 
0.394320 
(0.488916) 
[0.806520] 
Education 
 
 
0.017864 
(0.022262) 
[0.802457] 
-0.001487 
(0.026335) 
[-0.056456] 
-0.040690 
(0.022262) 
[-0.500659] 
0.021822 
(0.083934) 
[0.259988] 
Healthcare 
 
 
-1.484476*** 
(0.645769) 
[0.05510] 
0.053926 
(0.143247) 
[0.376454] 
5.761747 
(0.645769) 
[1.692321] 
-0.298297 
(0.186454) 
[-1.599844] 
R-squared 0.961679 0.929628 0.950381 0.924120 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.939781 0.903239 0.917301 0.891600 
Mean 
dependent var 0.908000 0.908000 0.135273 0.135273 
S.D. 
dependent var 7.475416 7.475416 10.96832 10.96832 
     
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, education, and healthcare. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
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TABLE 4.14 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
education and healthcare for the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
1990-2010 
     
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable     
Investment 
 
 
0.452827* 
(0.053285) 
[8.498240] 
0.454333* 
(0.046954) 
[9.676147] 
0.430281* 
(0.066924) 
[6.429377] 
0.523992* 
(0.065638) 
[7.983083] 
Savings 
 
 
-0.014128 
(0.155924) 
[-0.090609] 
-0.018440 
(0.137815) 
[-0.133805] 
0.472994* 
(0.222495) 
[2.125865] 
0.420083 
(0.273993) 
[1.533188] 
Education 
 
 
-0.004705 
(0.027358) 
[-0.171966] 
-0.005694 
(0.022957) 
[-0.248051] 
-0.076373 
(0.055225) 
[-1.382946] 
0.021073 
(0.043700) 
[-0.248051] 
Healthcare 
 
 
0.029059 
(0.818807) 
[0.035490] 
0.092991 
(0.131469) 
[0.707324] 
5.349698*** 
(2.468013) 
[2.167614] 
-
0.303923*** 
(0.168933) 
[0.109700] 
     
R-squared 0.935410 0.935359 0.953802 0.919064 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.903115 0.913812 0.927403 0.888713 
Mean 
dependent 
var 1.363000 1.363000 0.404917 0.404917 
S.D. 
dependent 
var 7.342776 7.342776 10.49951 10.49951 
     
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, education, and healthcare. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
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TABLE 4.15 
 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
education for the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 1990-2010 
     
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable     
Investment 
 
 
0.456769* 
(0.050490) 
[9.046741] 
0.436670* 
(0.040954) 
[10.66238] 
0.507771* 
(0.104841) 
[4.843235] 
0.596913* 
(0.101002) 
[5.909940] 
Savings 
 
 
-0.004268 
(0.141282) 
[-0.030207] 
0.048580 
(0.117505) 
[0.413427] 
0.376908 
(0.481814) 
[0.782269] 
0.562421 
(0.521962) 
[1.077514] 
Education 
 
 
-0.006527 
(0.024251) 
[-0.269131] 
0.005975 
(0.016493) 
[0.362271] 
0.022592 
(0.081200) 
[0.278230] 
-0.068311 
(0.068011) 
[-1.004410] 
     
R-squared 0.932750 0.928382 0.926696 0.896375 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.907531 0.912466 0.895280 0.870469 
Mean 
dependent var 0.908000 0.908000 0.135273 0.135273 
S.D. 
dependent var 7.475416 7.475416 10.968320 10.96832 
     
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, and education. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, and education for the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine for the period of 1990-2010 with the constant 
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coefficient are presented in Table 4.16. Indicators of the level 
of access to higher education are taken with the six year time lag 
(1) and with the seven year time lag (2). 
 
TABLE 4.16 
 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
education for the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 1990-2010 
     
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable     
Investment 
 
 
0.451999* 
(0.045165) 
[10.00766] 
0.449635* 
(0.041511) 
[10.83167] 
0.517551* 
(0.064646) 
[8.005908] 
0.513473* 
(0.054756) 
[9.377552] 
Savings 
 
 
-0.011663 
(0.131625) 
[-0.088608] 
-0.014491 
(0.124123) 
[-0.116749] 
0.431738 
(0.268069) 
[1.610548] 
0.384124*** 
(0.204437) 
[1.878933] 
Education 
 
 
-0.004157 
(0.021306) 
[-0.195124] 
-0.004167 
(0.019454) 
[-0.214207] 
0.018197 
(0.040943) 
[0.444446] 
0.042449 
(0.030395) 
[1.396600] 
     
R-squared 0.935400 0.935400 0.922793 0.922793 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.913866 0.913866 0.893841 0.893841 
Mean 
dependent var 1.363000 1.363000 0.404917 0.404917 
S.D. 
dependent var 7.342776 7.342776 10.499510 10.499510 
     
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, and education. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
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Regression results indicate positive effects of 
investments on the GDP per capita growth rate. An increase in 
investment leads to an increase in per capita GDP growth in all 
the countries. Other variables are not statistically significant. 
Effects of the variables that represent access of population to 
higher education and medical services are within the limits of 
statistical error. This statement holds when indicators of the 
level of access to higher education and medical services are 
taken with the five, six, and seven year time lags. 
Positive effects of investment in fixed capital in the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine are higher than in Poland and 
Hungary. One percent increase in investments in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine leads to an increase of the per capita 
GDP within the limits of 0.37 to 0.55 percent. While in Poland 
and Hungary this indicator stays within the limits of 0.22 to 0.37 
percent. 
The dependency between the per capita GDP growth and 
the independent variables we use in the regressions may be 
nonlinear. We test system of log-linear equations, where all 
independent variables are taken as logarithms. Initially, we 
estimate an equation that includes logarithms of all independent 
variables, including investment, savings, unemployment, 
education, and health. Then variables of unemployment and 
health are consequently taken out from the equations. Indicators 
of the level of access of population to higher education and 
medical services are taken consequently with the five, six, seven, 
and ten year time lags for all the equations. All combinations of 
log-linear equations are estimated with and without the constant 
coefficient. 
Regression results indicate positive effects of an increase 
in investment on the per capita GDP growth in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine. Investment coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant in all of the equations with the goodness 
of fit within the limits of 0.8 to 0.95. The complete records of 
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the regression results can be obtained from the author. We 
will consider the most interesting results. 
Regression results of per capita GDP growth to 
logarithms of investment, savings, and education with the 
constant coefficient in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, for 
the period of 1990-2010, presented in Table 9, indicate positive 
effect of an increase in investment in fixed capital, savings, and 
access to education on the per capita GDP growth. All 
coefficients of the independent variables are statistically 
significant. Indicators of the level of access of population to 
higher education are taken with the ten year time lag. 
Regression results of GDP per capita growth to 
investment, savings, and education for the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine for the period of 1990-2010 with the constant 
coefficient (1) and without the constant coefficient (2) are 
presented in Table 4.17. Indicators of the level of access to 
higher education are taken with the ten year time lag. 
Estimation of the equations that consider indicators of 
access to higher education and medical services with the seven 
year time lag does not bring statistically significant results. This 
supports our suggestion that an increase in access of population 
to higher education does not bring positive results for the per 
capita GDP growth in the short term. Moreover, enrollment in a 
higher education institution equates to temporary withdrawal 
from the work force. Both the level of unemployment and the 
opportunity costs of obtaining education are of certain concern 
here. However, an increase in access of population to higher 
education brings positive results for the per capita GDP growth 
in the long term. Increasing number of college-educated 
specialists leads to sustainable economic growth. Apparently, 
background for the 2000-2005 rapid economic growth in 
Ukraine and in the Russian Federation was laid down in early 
1990s. This contradicts commonly accepted perception about 
the crisis decade of 1990s. 
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TABLE 4.17 
 
Regression results of GDP growth to investment, savings, and 
education in Ukraine, 1990-2010 
    
Country Russian Federation Ukraine 
 (2) (1) (2) 
Estimation 
method OLS OLS OLS 
Independent 
variable    
Investment 
 
 
1.461792*** 
(0.708749) 
[2.062496] 
2.141293** 
(0.698971) 
[3.063492] 
3.389514* 
(1.035916) 
[3.271996] 
Savings 
 
 
6.209534** 
(1.937277) 
[3.205291] 
19.06934* 
(3.728733) 
[5.114161] 
6.853271*** 
(3.637917) 
[1.883845] 
Education 
 
 
-3.356831** 
(1.194651) 
[-2.809885] 
11.31633** 
(4.021590) 
[2.813894] 
-4.170212*** 
(2.113641) 
[-1.972999] 
    
R-squared 0.674533 0.893438 0.673608 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.593166 0.853477 0.601077 
Mean dependent 
var 6.668545 5.854083 5.854083 
S.D. dependent 
var 1.575530 4.683886 4.683886 
    
Notes: each column is a separate regression of the growth rate on investment, 
savings, and education. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. t-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. 
Asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-
percent level, and *** at the 10-percent level. 
 
Estimation of the system of equations, where all the 
variables—dependent and independent—were presented in the 
form of logarithms, confirms positive effect of an increase in 
investment and per capita GDP growth. For instance, one 
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percent increase in investment in fixed capital in Ukraine 
leads to 0.639 percent increase in per capita GDP growth. 
Results of the Vector Autoregression Estimates (VAR), 
and Impulse Response Function indicate generally positive 
effects of investment on per capita GDP growth in the short run. 
In the long run a most significant positive influence of 
investment in fixed capital on per capita GDP growth occurs 
during the first two years and then diminishes. 
 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
 
As follows from the regression results, presented in this 
chapter, investments in fixed capital have positive effect on the 
GDP per capita growth rate. Contribution of investments to the 
GDP per capita growth in the Russian Federation is more 
significant than in Hungary and Poland. Positive effect of 
investment on per capita GDP growth in Ukraine is more 
significant than that in the Russian Federation, Poland, and 
Hungary. Regressions that use average number of schooling 
years per person 25 years old and older or the average number 
of schooling years per person 15 years old and older as the 
human capital measure demonstrate a positive correlation in 
Poland but a negative correlation in Hungary, even though 
Hungary has the most sustainable GNP per capita growth. We 
also show that there is no significant difference in the basic 
growth model over time. These trend effects did not differ 
across countries. 
Coefficients for total savings as a share of GDP in the 
regressions indicate a negative but insignificant effect on GNP 
per capita growth. It confirms our prediction that savings of the 
population are not invested in production and cannot be 
considered as a share of output devoted to physical capital 
accumulation. This reflects the problem of underinvestment in 
production in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 
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Gross national income per capita has a positive and 
significant effect on per capita GNP growth. An increase in 
income per capita leads to a higher level of growth. This 
contrasts to the convergence hypothesis presented in the 
reviewed literature. The empirical model did not examine 
threshold levels of human capital, but the growth experience of a 
country may well differ according to which side of the threshold 
of human capital it is on. This should be examined in the future. 
The results support theoretical statement made earlier 
that in transition and post-transition economies savings are not 
analogous to investments. This means that savings are not 
necessarily invested in the national economy at full scale. 
Process of reinvestment is weak. This finding makes obvious 
underdevelopment of the national stock markets and proves 
necessity for further development of the capital market, 
including institutional reform and strengthening of the national 
banking sector. 
Regression results of per capita GDP growth to 
logarithms of investment, savings, and education with the 
constant coefficient in the Russian Federation and Ukraine for 
the period of 1990-2010 indicate positive effect of an increase in 
investment in fixed capital, savings, and access to education on 
the per capita GDP growth when indicators of the level of access 
of population to higher education are taken with the ten year 
time lag. An increase in access of population to higher education 
brings positive results for the per capita GDP growth in the long 
term. Increasing number of college-educated specialists leads to 
sustainable economic growth. Apparently, background for the 
2000-2005 rapid economic growth in Ukraine and in the Russian 
Federation was laid down in early 1990s. This contradicts 
commonly accepted perception about the crisis decade of 1990s. 
Results of the Vector Autoregression Estimates (VAR), 
and Impulse Response Function indicate generally positive 
effects of investment on per capita GDP growth in the short run. 
In the long run a most significant positive influence of 
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investment in fixed capital on per capita GDP growth occurs 
during the first two years and then diminishes. The regression 
results present strong empirical evidence in support of 
continuing investment in fixed capital in order to sustain 
economic growth. Investments in fixed capital are backed by the 
growing education quality of the work force. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The impact of human capital accumulation on economic 
growth remains controversial. In different research, conclusions 
reached depend on the definition of human capital, the 
methodology used and the time period and set of countries over 
which the model is estimated. Our objective in this research is to 
present a study of the possible link between human capital 
accumulation and GDP per capita growth in Ukriane and other 
countries in transition, by using an extended set of 
macroeconomic indicators and alternative definitions of human 
capital. As anticipated, parametric estimates reveal no link 
between the two variables: for different measures of human 
capital, there is no significant growth effect. The empirical 
results are supportive of the predictions from the original growth 
models (Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001): an increase in human capital 
does not correlate with per capita economic growth in countries 
with a high level of human capital. 
Substantial GDP per capita growth in Hungary and 
Poland in the late 1990s may well be explained by the success in 
economic restructuring and institutional reform. The slow initial 
process of restructuring and institutional changes in the Russian 
Federaiton and Ukraine led to a low level of GDP per capita 
growth. Nevertheless, positive changes in the economy and the 
society overall are the result of the structural changes in the 
economy, institutional reforms, development of the market type 
of behavior among population, development of market 
infrastructure, improved management, regional diversification, 
stabilization of the national currency, slowdown in both “brain 
drain” and capital outflow, and high level of human capital that 
served as a ground for economic growth. The consecutive output 
decline in Ukraine continued for no more than six years and the 
decline itself was significantly smaller than often stated. The so-
called economic crisis in Ukraine was to a large extent a myth. 
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The state did not hold the initiative in the process of 
transition, including the social sphere. Poor people, amny of 
who were poor in Soviet times, were left aside and failed to 
integrate in the newly emerging market economic. Hidden 
poverty came to the surfice. As a result, there was an impression 
about the deep socio-economic crisis in the nation. Income 
differentiation and growing corruption in public sector led to an 
increase in the number of poor families. This process was 
unavoidable due to the transition to the market. However, the 
social consequences of the reform could have been mitigated, if 
the government would have a well-developed economic 
program. 
The state has concentrated on such aspects of the reform, 
as privatization and investments, as well as a fundamental 
political reform. Such a prioritization led to the high social price 
of the reform. In part, the exogenous type of transformation, i.e. 
an attempt to rebuild the system from the outside, by using 
external forces, was responsible for economic difficulties that 
were experienced by the large part of population. Continuing 
political instability in Ukraine is a natural aprt of the process of 
democratization. Corruption, however, may be a challenge. The 
shift from exogenous to endogenous forms of transformation 
will lead to the weakening role of the state in the economy. As a 
result, political instability will have a lesser impact on the 
development of the antionla economy. 
As indicated by the data in Tables 1 through 8 of the 
Appendix VIII, educational level of population in the former 
Soviet Union was higher than in Poland and Hungary. 
Educational attainment in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and 
other countries of Eastern Europe was among the highest in the 
world for decades, being on par and sometimes even higher than 
in such developed Western democracies as France, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom and way above educational level of 
population in such developing countries as Brazil and China (see 
Appendix VIII). 
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An increase in access of population to higher 
education brings positive results for the per capita GDP growth 
in the long term. Increasing number of college-educated 
specialists employed in the industry leads to sustainable 
economic growth. Apparently, background for the 2000-2005 
rapid economic growth in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation 
was laid down in early 1990s. This contradicts commonly 
accepted perception about the crisis decade of 1990s. 
Overall, results of the study offer policy directions for 
Ukraine and other transition economies. High level of human 
capital in Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine needs to be 
reproduced on an increasing scale. The process of accumulation 
of human capital will have a positive impact on GDP per capita 
growth in the long run. 
While the exogenous resource of economic transition is 
depleted and the exogenous-type forms of transition are no 
longer effective, the exogenous growth still has a certain 
potential in Ukraine. This is explained by the fact that there are 
still unused labor resources as well as labor migration abroad 
and capital flight. Repatriation and legalization of capital, return 
of the labor migrants, and full employment will support 
economic growth in the short run. However, the sustainable 
growth will only be possible thanks to technological 
advancements and innovations. This anticipates endogenous 
growth. 
Among the major tasks of post-transition development in 
Ukraine are strengthening of the labor market and creation of 
the stock market. Such developments will facilitate better 
distribution of property and lead to an increase in labor 
productivity. This will eventually bring higher rate of GDP per 
capita growth and higher living standards of the population. 
The slowdown in the accumulation of amortization funds 
during 1990s along with the growing depreciation of principal 
capital was considered as a time bomb for the industry. A 
significant renovation of principal capital is necessary. During 
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the next decade, i.e. from 2007 to 2017, Ukraine will have to 
renovate at least third of its principal capital. 
If a massive technical renovation and incremental growth 
in production capacities will take place right after the period of 
significant growth of 2004-2006, then the national economy will 
enter the stage of cyclical development earlier. If, however, the 
massive renovation of principal capital will be preceded by the 
period of economic growth slowdown, predicted for 2007-2010, 
then the nation’s economy will enter the cycle later. 
We tend to consider the second scenario as more viable 
and likely to take place in Ukraine. The slowdown in economic 
growth will indicate stabilization of the system. Later, based on 
this already achieved stabilization, renovation of principal 
capital will began. This renovation will start from the most 
viable, economically effective and profitable industries, which 
are, nevertheless, were utilizing old and morally outdated 
machinery and equipment. Technological changes will be 
accompanied with the incremental increase in principal capital 
based on reinvestment of profits, earned in these industries over 
the last decade. 
We believe that the next advancement will become 
possible based on the process of renovation and investment into 
principal capital. The process of renovation itself will result in 
the continuation of strong economic growth. After the 
renovation, the economy will continue to grow on the basis of 
new production capacities, technological advancements, and 
further accumulation of human capital to serve new equipment 
and technologies. From this perspective, we suggest further 
institutional and structural changes in the economies. It will 
increase domestic and foreign investment, further develop 
domestic market, and sustain already achieved substantial GDP 
per capita growth. 
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Appendix I 
 
Unofficial GDP in the Eastern European countries and the former USSR for 1989-1995, as well as 
selected indicators for electricity and energy production and consumption in Ukraine for 1992-2003 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Unofficial GDP in the Eastern European countries, 1989-1995 
 
Country Share of unofficial GDP in total GDP, percent Index GDP, 
1994 
Index GDP, 
1995 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Official Total Official Total 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak Repub. 
 
22.8 
6.0 
27.0 
15.7 
22.3 
6.0 
 
25.1 
6.7 
28.0 
19.6 
13.7 
7.7 
 
23.9 
12.9 
32.9 
23.5 
15.7 
15.1 
 
25.0 
16.9 
30.6 
19.7 
18.0 
17.6 
 
29.9 
16.9 
28.5 
18.5 
16.4 
16.2 
 
29.1 
17.6 
27.7 
15.2 
17.4 
14.6 
 
36.2 
11.3 
29.0 
12.6 
19.1 
5.8 
 
72.3 
81.0 
83.4 
92.0 
72.7 
77.9 
 
78.7 
92.4 
84.3 
91.4 
68.4 
85.8 
 
73.7 
84.3 
84.7 
98.3 
77.7 
83.1 
 
89.2 
89.3 
87.1 
94.9 
74.7 
82.9 
Source: Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Gjourgyan and Mirzoyan (2000), Shleifer (2005). 
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TABLE 2 
 
Unofficial GDP in the former USSR, 1989-1995 
 
Country Share of unofficial GDP in total GDP, percent Index GDP, 1994 Index GDP, 1995 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Official Total Official Total 
USSR 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
 
16.1 
21.9 
15.4 
19.9 
24.9 
17.0 
12.8 
11.3 
18.1 
14.7 
16.3 
11.4 
 
20.2 
22.7 
16.6 
26.2 
36.0 
19.7 
19.0 
21.8 
27.1 
23.5 
25.6 
7.8 
 
22.0 
39.2 
13.2 
25.4 
52.3 
24.9 
34.3 
39.2 
37.3 
32.8 
33.6 
11.7 
 
23.0 
51.2 
11.0 
24.1 
61.0 
27.2 
31.0 
31.7 
34.0 
36.7 
38.0 
10.1 
 
27.0 
58.0 
18.9 
25.1 
63.5 
34.1 
34.2 
28.7 
39.7 
40.3 
45.7 
9.5 
 
31.6 
60.6 
19.3 
11.8 
62.6 
34.3 
35.3 
21.6 
35.7 
41.6 
48.9 
6.5 
 
60.1 
30.1 
62.5 
67.1 
15.6 
51.0 
48.1 
43.9 
41.7 
51.3 
44.2 
85.0 
 
 
71.5 
67.8 
78.8 
37.6 
68.2 
64.3 
54.1 
60.9 
75.5 
71.6 
82.6 
 
61.2 
31.4 
56.1 
69.1 
16.0 
46.5 
47.3 
45.1 
43.0 
49.1 
39.0 
84.0 
 
 
70.1 
61.2 
68.9 
37.6 
62.3 
62.3 
50.6 
58.8 
74.0 
67.0 
79.0 
Source: Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Gjourgyan and Mirzoyan (2000), Shleifer (2005). 
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TABLE 3 
 
Selected indicators for electricity and energy production and consumption in Ukraine, 1992-1997 
 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Electric power consumption (kWh 
per capita) 4307.974 3947.971 3469.518 3343.571 3163.629 2960.385
Electric power consumption (kWh) 2.25E+11 2.06E+11 1.80E+11 1.72E+11 1.62E+11 1.50E+11
Electric power transmission and 
distribution losses (% of output) 9.019736 9.734532 10.72403 9.715665 13.67508 15.97460
Electricity production (kWh) 2.53E+11 2.30E+11 2.03E+11 1.94E+11 1.83E+11 1.78E+11
Electricity production from nuclear 
sources (% of total) 29.19802 32.75594 33.96329 36.38564 43.53585 44.66895
Energy imports, net (% of energy 
use) 49.55032 48.5783 47.42668 49.84413 52.00154 49.19622
Energy production (kt of oil 
equivalent) 110170 100225 86869 83020 70935 71455
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per 
capita) 4187.438 3735.357 3182.409 3213.291 2894.519 2779.948
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent) 218376 194908 165234 165524 147786 140649
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006.
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TABLE 4 
 
Selected indicators for electricity and energy production and consumption in Ukraine, 1998-2003 
 
Indicator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Electric power consumption (kWh 
per capita) 2772.917 2787.189 2773.435 2790.534 2843.537 2997.873
Electric power consumption (kWh) 1.39E+11 1.38E+11 1.36E+11 1.36E+11 1.37E+11 1.43E+11
Electric power transmission and 
distribution losses (% of output) 17.36642 17.56333 18.20409 19.70996 19.29596 17.80189
Electricity production (kWh) 1.73E+11 1.72E+11 1.71E+11 1.73E+11 1.74E+11 1.80E+11
Electricity production from nuclear 
sources (% of total) 43.53554 41.86905 45.08735 44.07903 44.93288 45.17536
Energy imports, net (% of energy 
use) 46.33653 45.47789 44.36479 44.67668 44.86455 43.0146
Energy production (kt of oil 
equivalent) 71110 71756 72328 71995 72781 75537
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per 
capita) 2642.613 2649.489 2643.656 2673.062 2737.304 2772.388
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent) 132511 131609 130004 130135 132004 132555
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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Appendix II 
 
GDP per capita growth in the in the Central and Eastern European countries and the former USSR for 
1989-2004 according to World Development Indicators methodology, as well as real GDP per capita 
growth in the in the countries of the former USSR for 1991-2000 according to Penn World Tables 
methodology 
 
 313
TABLE 1 
 
GDP per capita growth in the NIS and CEE countries, 1989-1996 (annual percent change) 
 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Armenia .. .. -10.88910 -40.75950 -6.66407 7.92383 9.08475 7.49574 
Azerbaijan .. .. -2.22959 -23.76380 -24.25940 -20.77810 -12.81000 0.28217 
Belarus .. .. -1.24847 -9.79468 -7.80756 -11.59640 -10.11000 3.14401 
Georgia -7.60712 -14.64490 -20.40770 -44.06640 -27.92940 -8.57907 4.51016 12.97227 
Hungary 1.17239 -3.18942 -11.73020 -2.85762 -0.28636 3.27824 1.80702 1.67659 
Kazakhstan .. .. -11.55450 -5.23430 -8.59574 -11.32270 -6.57726 2.03372 
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.84764 3.71923 -9.32709 -14.85480 -15.40350 -20.03240 -6.45203 5.54159 
Latvia 5.05549 -7.48512 -12.30960 -31.34490 -3.29281 3.71394 0.35498 4.79089 
Lithuania .. .. -5.82846 -21.17390 -15.84020 -9.14936 4.02949 5.46120 
Moldova 4.42051 -2.77460 -16.13940 -29.07700 -1.02120 -30.72280 -1.12771 -4.93707 
Poland .. .. -7.30543 2.27828 3.54549 4.96910 6.87799 5.91654 
Russia .. -3.37349 -5.25906 -14.56840 -8.56461 -12.46130 -4.01735 -3.33770 
Tajikistan -9.16156 -3.08362 -9.07438 -30.28300 -17.71330 -22.43990 -13.63280 -17.85890 
Turkmenistan -6.71076 -1.94781 -7.36389 -8.01543 -12.51560 -19.40630 -9.23495 -8.38468 
Ukraine 3.36751 -6.56001 -8.60169 -9.95838 -14.27370 -22.55080 -11.50330 -9.19777 
Uzbekistan 0.65818 -0.78637 -2.82857 -13.26720 -4.50021 -7.19708 -2.80287 -5.09000 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
 314
TABLE 2 
 
GDP per capita growth in the NIS and CEE countries, 1997-2004 (annual percent change) 
 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Armenia 4.47080 8.16901 3.93089 6.62080 10.17418 13.40822 14.37812 7.39263 
Azerbaijan 4.78763 8.95741 6.45825 10.19537 9.05170 9.77781 10.36072 9.22415 
Belarus 11.87348 8.91675 3.75033 6.11723 5.09021 5.52430 7.59642 11.59918 
Georgia 12.03807 4.34428 4.04866 2.99955 6.00316 6.68616 12.30461 7.29727 
Hungary 4.95918 5.28451 4.62847 6.46820 2.66074 4.10215 3.69470 4.88081 
Kazakhstan 3.31959 -0.19201 3.68290 10.13077 13.69281 9.79520 8.93349 8.78317 
Kyrgyz Rep. 8.33332 0.58905 2.21536 4.35562 4.48742 -0.78627 6.06591 5.93741 
Latvia 10.09487 6.46092 4.15124 7.70275 8.60470 7.40345 7.79689 8.90686 
Lithuania 7.75511 8.03369 -1.02755 4.85244 6.93392 7.13757 10.16636 7.24767 
Moldova 1.89016 -6.22572 -3.10236 2.43334 6.46148 8.17064 6.95878 7.64027 
Poland 6.71159 4.75625 4.12193 3.97790 2.06496 1.42045 3.93548 5.48004 
Russia 1.69944 -5.03891 6.82906 10.00451 5.34647 5.21216 7.86771 7.70229 
Tajikistan 0.31857 3.91586 2.40589 7.03137 8.99007 7.95287 9.04633 9.38949 
Turkmenistan -12.61530 5.63697 15.07709 17.08336 18.75855 .. .. .. 
Ukraine -2.11217 -1.01931 0.74547 6.97137 10.30354 6.20298 10.34161 12.95349 
Uzbekistan 3.56561 2.79826 2.84094 2.33658 2.70548 2.49454 2.68234 6.13382 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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TABLE 3 
Real GDP per capita growth in the NIS, 1991-2000 (annual percent change)* 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Armenia … … -1.34 -6.16 9.19 4.58 -1.7 7.34 4.73 5.57
Azerbaijan … … … … -14.46 -5.80 2.14 14.39 5.96 10.40
Belarus -3.58 -9.59 -14.95 -9.80 -8.12 2.59 15.55 7.18 7.87 11.19
Estonia … … 2.25 0.03 6.42 0.08 9.60 4.88 4.63 6.16
Georg  ia … … … … … … 64 71 .4 .22
an … … … … … … 35 25 .60 .56
an … … … … … … … … … …
 11.  -3.  17 3 -13
Kazakhstan … … … … -1.85 2.31 1.23 -4.15 20.05 7.87
Kyrgyz Republic … … … … -10.72 2.27 7.43 2.24 0.88 4.80
Latvia … … … -4.59 -2.17 4.21 5.09 6.72 -5.29 5.13
Lithuania -8.52 -32.05 -6.75 1.81 1.91 3.61 8.14 2.34 3.69 7.67
Moldova … … … … … -4.82 3.56 -8.49 -4.52 1.81
Russia … -5.75 0.10 -11.27 -6.75 -0.96 0.60 -2.82 3.48 11.40
Tajikist   25.  -2.  2 6
Turkmenist     
Ukraine -8.32 -9.66 -13.17 -23.54 -10.95 -9.19 -1.02 1.17 1.45 3.35
Uzbekistan … … … … -2.54 10.24 … … … …
Source: Heston, A., Summers, R., and B. Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. Retrieved from 
the database: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php  Accessed in August 12, 2006. 
* In Penn World Table data Real GDP means GDP measured in PPP (purchasing power parity), not in 
constant prices (adjusted for inflation) as it is normally the case for term “real” in economic literature. 
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Appendix III 
 
Major GDP indicators in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Poland, and Hungary for 1989-2006 and in 
the forecasts till 2010 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Selected indicators of GDP in Ukraine, 1989-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$ at 
PPP) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
bln UAH 
 
 
 
Real GDP 
(PPP 
US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Real GDP 
(US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Nominal 
GDP bln 
UAH 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
at factor 
cost bln 
UAH 
 
1989 373.629 118.856 448.236 107.942 ... ... ...
1990 374.084 114.102 430.307 103.624 ... ... ...
1991 353.486 104.175 392.870 94.609 ... ... 2.001
1992 325.816 93.861 353.976 85.242 ... ... 1.729
1993 286.006 80.533 303.711 73.138 1.500 33.094 1.482
1994 225.197 62.091 234.161 56.389 12.000 36.639 1.142
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1995 201.768 54.516 205.594 49.510 54.500 36.997 1.002
1996 185.034 49.064 185.034 44.559 81.519 44.559 0.903
1997 182.470 47.592 179.483 43.222 93.365 50.151 0.875
1998 180.988 46.688 176.073 42.401 102.593 41.883 0.859
1999 183.240 46.594 175.721 42.316 130.442 31.581 0.856
2000 198.279 49.344 186.088 44.813 170.070 31.261 0.797
2001 221.716 53.884 203.209 48.936 204.190 38.009 0.867
2002 237.098 56.686 213.775 51.480 225.810 42.393 0.937
2003 264.061 62.127 234.298 56.422 267.344 50.133 1.020
2004 300.825 69.645 262.648 63.249 345.113 64.881 1.146
2005 317.266 71.455 269.477 64.894 424.741 82.881 1.187
2006 343.948 75.386 284.298 68.463 464.876 92.055 1.265
2007 375.248 79.758 300.787 72.434 492.751 96.998 1.351
2008 410.882 84.543 318.834 76.780 571.732 111.666 1.445
2009 449.150 89.785 338.601 81.540 653.722 126.690 1.549
2010 488.671 94.992 358.239 86.269 754.717 145.418 1.655
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Selected indicators of GDP in the Russian Federation, 1989-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$ at 
PPP) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
bln UAH 
 
 
 
Real GDP 
(PPP 
US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Real GDP 
(US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Nominal 
GDP bln 
UAH 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
at factor 
cost bln 
UAH 
 
1989 1,269.07 ... ... ... ... ... ...
1990 1,265.35 16,681.84 1,454.93 655.11 ... ... ...
1991 1,244.13 15,847.75 1,382.19 622.35 ... ... ...
1992 1,088.20 13,549.83 1,181.77 532.11 ... ... ...
1993 1,016.47 12,370.99 1,078.95 485.82 171.50 172.93 ...
1994 906.23 10,799.88 941.93 424.12 610.70 278.76 ...
1995 888.19 10,357.08 903.31 406.73 1,428.50 313.32 9,292.34
1996 870.78 9,984.23 870.79 392.09 2,007.80 392.09 9,034.82
1997 899.11 10,124.01 882.98 397.58 2,342.50 404.94 9,162.19
1998 859.57 9,587.43 836.18 376.50 2,629.60 270.95 8,694.47
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1999 926.10 10,201.03 889.70 400.60 4,823.20 195.91 9,187.24
2000 1,045.21 11,221.13 978.67 440.66 7,305.60 259.71 9,638.14
2001 1,124.78 11,793.41 1,028.58 463.13 8,943.60 306.62 10,089.17
2002 1,196.83 12,347.70 1,076.92 484.90 10,817.50 345.07 10,847.60
2003 1,308.33 13,243.20 1,155.03 520.07 13,243.20 431.49 11,654.80
2004 1,419.07 14,190.80 1,237.67 557.28 16,966.40 588.83 12,445.60
2005 1,552.22 15,100.70 1,317.03 593.01 21,598.00 763.60 13,223.20
2006 1,696.93 16,048.02 1,399.65 630.22 26,746.91 972.61 14,052.74
2007 1,846.57 16,971.21 1,480.17 666.47 30,729.27 1,123.56 14,861.15
2008 1,999.85 17,817.83 1,554.01 699.72 34,642.23 1,215.52 15,602.51
2009 2,149.39 18,614.87 1,623.53 731.02 38,590.52 1,312.60 16,300.46
2010 2,301.73 19,398.82 1,691.90 761.80 42,640.25 1,411.93 16,986.96
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Selected indicators of GDP in Poland, 1989-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$ at 
PPP) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
bln UAH 
 
 
 
Real GDP 
(PPP 
US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Real GDP 
(US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Nominal 
GDP bln 
UAH 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
at factor 
cost bln 
UAH 
 
1989 234.514 312.451 279.647 149.618 11.830 82.36730 ...
1990 215.315 276.208 247.209 132.263 56.027 58.9759 ...
1991 207.308 256.949 229.972 123.041 80.883 76.3647 ...
1992 217.646 263.698 236.012 126.273 114.944 84.4660 ...
1993 231.131 273.715 244.977 131.069 155.780 85.9871 ...
1994 248.318 287.948 257.716 137.885 210.407 92.5885 ...
1995 271.136 308.104 275.756 147.537 337.222 139.0893 297.295
1996 292.853 327.206 292.853 156.684 422.436 156.6840 313.052
1997 317.972 350.438 313.646 167.809 515.353 157.1834 334.026
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1998 336.930 367.960 329.328 176.199 600.902 172.0496 350.059
1999 355.820 384.518 344.148 184.128 666.308 167.9441 365.112
2000 378.116 400.668 358.602 191.861 744.622 171.3580 379.351
2001 391.059 405.075 362.547 193.972 779.205 190.1899 383.903
2002 403.084 410.746 367.622 196.687 807.859 197.9963 388.894
2003 426.069 426.355 381.592 204.162 842.120 216.5349 402.894
2004 456.867 448.952 401.816 214.982 923.248 252.5986 423.442
2005 485.592 464.216 415.478 222.292 980.334 303.1507 436.992
2006 524.279 487.219 436.066 233.307 1,040.010 334.4080 458.646
2007 564.603 509.912 456.376 244.173 1,108.830 382.3550 480.008
2008 607.218 531.628 475.813 254.572 1,182.160 396.6990 500.451
2009 649.704 552.923 494.872 264.769 1,257.100 414.8850 520.498
2010 694.327 575.029 514.657 275.355 1,331.060 433.5710 541.307
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Selected indicators of GDP in Hungary, 1989-2010 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$ at 
PPP) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
bln UAH 
 
 
 
Real GDP 
(PPP 
US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Real GDP 
(US$ at 
1996 
prices) bln 
USD 
Nominal 
GDP bln 
UAH 
 
 
Nominal 
GDP 
(US$) bln 
USD 
 
Real GDP 
at factor 
cost bln 
UAH 
 
1989 92.3327 12,638.99 110.311 52.065 1,722.83 29.1676 ...
1990 92.5411 12,196.63 106.450 50.243 2,089.31 33.0561 ...
1991 84.3881 10,746.20 93.791 44.268 2,498.32 33.4290 ...
1992 83.6838 10,416.92 90.917 42.912 2,942.67 37.2545 ...
1993 85.1231 10,356.91 90.393 42.664 3,548.26 38.5957 ...
1994 89.4943 10,662.14 93.057 43.922 4,364.81 41.5215 4,941.95
1995 92.6839 10,820.80 94.442 44.575 5,614.00 44.6560 9,393.54
1996 95.6877 10,963.50 95.688 45.163 6,894.00 45.1631 9,600.32
1997 101.7220 11,464.30 100.059 47.226 8,540.70 45.7237 10,049.48
1998 107.8486 12,021.40 104.921 49.521 10,087.50 47.0495 10,519.46
 323
1999 113.9537 12,520.60 109.278 51.577 11,393.60 48.0447 10,955.68
2000 122.4963 13,272.17 115.837 54.673 13,272.10 47.0343 11,306.11
2001 130.2635 13,846.89 120.853 57.041 14,989.80 52.3222 11,829.46
2002 137.0482 14,375.37 125.466 59.218 16,915.30 65.5920 12,238.56
2003 143.8156 14,861.64 129.710 61.221 18,650.70 83.1482 12,568.41
2004 152.3315 15,637.07 136.478 64.415 20,429.40 100.7636 13,265.48
2005 163.0302 16,280.67 142.095 67.067 21,802.20 109.2390 13,824.96
2006 174.2670 16,917.40 147.652 69.690 23,212.88 109.7550 14,394.29
2007 185.6010 17,510.09 152.825 72.131 25,154.43 136.6230 14,967.40
2008 198.5480 18,158.74 158.487 74.803 26,420.79 144.1630 15,498.68
2009 212.2360 18,867.93 164.676 77.725 28,355.98 154.2330 16,000.48
2010 226.6840 19,611.16 171.163 80.786 30,470.65 163.0090 16,503.75
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations. 
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Appendix IV 
 
Contribution to real GDP growth in Ukraine for 1991-2010 
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Figure 1. Contribution to real GDP growth in Ukraine, percentage points, 1991-2010 
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Figure 2. Contribution to real GDP in Ukraine, percent, 1993-2010 
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Figure 3. Contribution of private consumption, government consumption, gross fixed investment and 
stockbuilding to real GDP in Ukraine, percent, 1993-2010 
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Appendix V 
Selected indicators of the forming labor market in the NIS for 1991-1999, including level of 
unemployment, as well as indicators for the average wages in Ukraine for 1992-2010 
 
TABLE 1 
Number of unemployed persons in the CIS, received benefits at the end of year (thousands) 1991-1999 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Azerbaijan … 6.2 4.4 3.5 4.0 3.3 3.2 2.3 2.3
Armenia … 35.3 33.1 22.9 41.6 40.8 20.6 20.6 30.5
Belarus 1.5 19.9 34.5 52.2 68.7 84.7 49.4 40.9 35.6
Georgia … … … … … 8.0 5.0 3.0 1.8
Kazakhstan 1.0 18.2 15.4 33.2 73.5 172.8 176.7 149.2 25.7
Kyrgyzstan 0.1 1.5 1.7 7.9 28.9 25.2 20.3 19.7 5.4
Moldova … 4.0 4.1 6.3 8.0 7.0 7.5 8.1 11.4
Russia 11.9 371.3 550.4 1395.5 2025.9 2264.7 1771.1 1756.4 1090.2
Tajikistan … 4.7 5.0 3.8 19.9 27.1 37.1 41.0 34.7
Turkmenist  an … … … … … … … … …  
Uzbekistan … 7.1 7.6 12.3 12.5 13.9 16.9 20.6 21.8
Ukraine 5.5 52.5 40.0 47.7 74.4 214.6 361.6 532.8 620.6
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Economically active population in the CIS (thousands), 1990-1999 
 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Azerbaijan 3703 3736 3728 3734 3655 3641 3719 3732 3744 3748
Armenia 1630 1671 1634 1628 1593 1582 1584 1538 1476 1484
Belarus 5151 5025 4901 4882 4790 4524 4537 4528 4528 4542
Georgia 2763 2524 2032 1920 1814 1794 2085 2351 2373 …
Kazakhstan 7806 7720 7606 7004 7118 7360 7490 7440 7053 7055
Kyrgyzstan 1748 1731 1838 1710 1716 1742 1792 1792 1811 1901
Moldova 2071 2070 2058 1700 1699 1696 1686 1671 1809 1682
Russia 75325 73910 76008 75170 73952 72639 72962 72482 72229 73227
Tajikistan 1938 1970 1915 1876 1887 1890 1777 1842 1850 1780
Uzbekistan 7941 8255 8291 8288 8408 8480 8595 8715 8840 8930
Ukraine 25419 25002 24576 24029 23107 25162 25229 24928 25286 24523
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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Figure 1. Economically active population in the CIS (thousands), 1990-1999 
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TABLE 3 
 
Selected indicators for the average wages in Ukraine, 1992-2000 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Average 
nominal wage 
index (LCU, 
1996=100) 
Average 
nominal wages 
(% change pa) 
Average real 
wage index 
(LCU, 
1996=100) 
Average real 
wages (% 
change pa) 
Unit labor cost 
index (US$, 
1996=100) 
1992 0.064 700.00 261.063 … … 
1993 1.637 2475.00 139.567 -46.539 31.417 
1994 13.541 727.18 116.473 -16.547 48.646 
1995 70.518 420.77 127.215 9.223 66.730 
1996 100.000 41.81 100.000 -21.393 100.000 
1997 113.740 13.74 98.145 -1.855 111.847 
1998 121.972 7.24 95.215 -2.986 85.851 
1999 141.068 15.66 89.728 -5.762 56.432 
2000 182.875 29.64 90.721 1.107 51.535 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Selected indicators for the average wages in Ukraine, 2001-2010* 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Average 
nominal wage 
index (LCU, 
1996=100) 
Average 
nominal wages 
(% change pa) 
Average real 
wage index 
(LCU, 
1996=100) 
Average real 
wages (% 
change pa) 
Unit labor cost 
index (US$, 
1996=100) 
2001 247 35.176 109.5 20.751 64.0 
2002 299 20.991 131.5 20.098 74.6 
2003 367 22.820 153.6 16.739 83.8 
2004 469 27.551 179.6 16.980 96.3 
2005 641 36.726 216.3 20.413 135.7 
2006 788 23.000 246.3 13.900 161.6 
2007 898 14.000 257.6 4.600 173.6 
2008 1024 14.000 274.5 6.500 186.4 
2009 1147 12.000 288.6 5.200 195.8 
2010 1285 12.000 305.0 5.700 206.7 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
*Data for 2006-2010 are based on prognosis made by the IMF in cooperation with the National 
Bank of Ukraine. 
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Appendix VI 
 
Selected indicators of productivity in Ukraine, including total factor productivity, labor productivity, 
as well as labor force and labor cost per hour, for 1991-2010 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Selected indicators of productivity in Ukraine, including labor productivity and labor cost, 1991-2000 
 
Year 
 
Labor productivity 
growth (%) 
Total factor productivity 
growth (%) 
Labor costs per 
hour (USD) 
Labor force 
(million) 
1991 -7.2 -15.8 … … 
1992 -8.4 -13.9 0.69 … 
1993 -12.1 -14.4 0.35 … 
1994 -19.9 -20 0.4 23.193 
1995 -14.4 -13.3 0.46 23.795 
1996 -8.1 -7.7 0.51 23.436 
1997 -0.4 -0.5 0.59 23.128 
1998 -0.6 -0.3 0.47 23.125 
1999 2.1 2 0.33 22.907 
2000 14.4 11.2 0.32 21.353 
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; National Bank 
of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and UNDP 
Longer definitions for the indicators: 
Efficiency of labor measured in terms of output per worker (real GDP per person employed); 
Total factor productivity (TFP* or multifactor productivity) is the part of economic output 
growth not accounted for by the growth in inputs (labor and capital); 
Average cost of labor per hour (pay and non pay costs); 
Economically active population; 
* TFP growth cannot be measured directly. It is calculated by dividing GDP growth by 
employment growth and estimated growth in the capital stock. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Selected indicators of productivity in Ukraine, including labor productivity and labor cost, 2001-2010 
 
Year 
 
Labor productivity 
growth (%) 
Total factor productivity 
growth (%) 
Labor costs per 
hour (USD) 
Labor force 
(million) 
1991 10.3 10.1 0.44 21.029 
1992 4.6 4.9 0.54 21.120 
1993 9.2 9.3 0.66 21.186 
1994 11.4 10.9 0.85 21.271 
1995 0.7 0.8 1.20 21.568 
1996 4.8 4.3 1.50 21.689 
1997 5.5 4.6 1.70 21.827 
1998 5.4 4.4 1.92 21.979 
1999 5.8 4.6 2.14 22.132 
2000 5.5 4.1 2.38 22.286 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from the database in August 12, 2006. 
Composed based on EIU calculations, Ministry of Economy and European Integration; National Bank 
of Ukraine, State Committee of Statistics, and UNDP 
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Figure 1. Labor productivity growth in Ukraine, percent, 1991-2010 
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Figure 2. Total factor productivity growth in Ukraine, percent, 1991-2010 
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Figure 3. Labor cost per hour (USD) in Ukraine, 1991-2010 
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Figure 4. Total labor force in Ukraine, (million), 1991-2010 
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Appendix VII 
Selected indicators of reproduction of human capital in the USSR and the NIS, including access to 
higher education and health services for 1980-1999 
 
TABLE 1 
Number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 population in NIS, 1980-1989 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Azerbaijan 172 172 172 169 163 158 155 149 140 140
Armenia 189 188 189 183 173 163 160 161 168 186
Belarus 183 183 185 185 186 181 179 177 175 185
Georgia 168 170 172 172 169 167 160 160 157 171
Kazakhstan 173 176 179 181 180 172 170 168 167 171
Kyrgyzstan 151 154 154 151 148 144 142 136 133 136
Moldova 127 129 130 128 128 126 123 121 122 127
Russia 219 219 218 216 213 206 200 194 190 193
Tajikistan 142 138 137 133 131 119 115 114 115 125
Turkmenistan 124 125 127 126 122 119 117 117 112 116
Uzbekistan 172 172 170 165 162 155 154 155 155 163
Ukraine 176 175 175 174 173 167 166 166 165 171
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics, retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
 340
TABLE 2 
 
Number of students in higher education institutions per 10000 population in NIS, 1990-1999 
 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Azerbaijan 146 147 134 125 117 128 132 127 134 147
Armenia 191 181 156 124 97 97 142 149 157 160
Belarus 184 180 179 169 181 191 203 219 239 258
Georgia 190 188 167 168 251 231 239 234 236 248
Kazakhstan 171 170 165 163 165 165 176 188 206 245
Kyrgyzstan 133 129 119 117 129 142 169 210 274 325
Moldova 125 120 109 108 114 149 159 180 199 212
Russia 190 186 177 171 171 188 201 221 245 280
Tajikistan 128 124 127 121 127 126 127 126 123 130
Turkmenistan 113 104 96 90 86 70 62 … … …
Uzbekistan 165 159 146 123 102 84 71 66 65 68
Ukraine 170 168 164 159 172 180 192 220 242 259
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics, retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Number of physicians per 10000 population in the CIS, 1980-1989 
 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Azerbaijan 33.4 33.9 35.9 36.1 36.9 37.8 38.4 38.8 39.4 39.0
Armenia 35.3 35.5 36.8 37.8 38.3 37.9 38.6 39.2 39.9 40.3
Belarus 33.8 34.4 35.3 36.0 36.6 37.8 38.4 39.2 39.9 40.6
Georgia 47.9 49.3 50.5 50.9 52.0 53.5 54.6 55.8 56.9 58.5
Kazakhstan 31.9 32.9 33.9 35.4 36.6 37.6 38.5 39.2 40.0 40.9
Kyrgyzstan 29.1 30.0 30.9 31.7 32.5 33.5 34.5 35.5 36.2 36.6
Moldova 31.1 32.2 33.4 34.6 35.6 36.8 37.6 38.6 39.4 40.1
Russia 40.4 41.5 42.6 43.4 44.3 45.1 45.8 46.4 46.8 47.3
Tajikistan 23.6 24.3 25.2 25.6 26.1 26.7 27.1 27.4 28.6 28.5
Turkmenistan 28.4 28.7 29.2 30.4 31.2 32.6 33.9 34.9 35.1 35.5
Uzbekistan 28.5 29.8 30.8 31.9 32.9 33.7 34.4 35.1 35.5 35.8
Ukraine 36.5 37.7 38.8 39.6 40.4 41.3 41.8 42.6 43.1 43.9
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Number of physicians per 10000 population in the CIS, 1990-1999 
 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Azerbaijan 38.7 38.4 39.2 38.2 37.7 37.8 37.4 36.7 35.8 35.5
Armenia 40.5 40.5 39.3 36.9 34.5 33.6 34.0 34.4 34.3 33.2
Belarus 40.5 40.7 41.4 42.5 43.3 43.6 44.8 45.6 46.3 47.8
Georgia 57.9 39.4 46.2 42.4 38.2 42 41.0 40.5 38.5 …
Kazakhstan 42.1 41.1 41.8 41.0 39.1 39.7 38.5 36.7 36.3 34.6
Kyrgyzstan 36.7 36.8 34.9 33.4 33.0 33.2 34.3 32.7 32.1 30.3
Moldova 40.0 39.2 39.6 39.9 40.1 39.6 39.9 40.2 40.6 36.7
Russia 46.9 44.3 44.7 45.2 45.1 46.0 47.4 47.6 46.7 46.9
Tajikistan 27.1 25.5 24.3 23.3 22.7 21.4 20.9 20.1 20.6 21.2
Turkmenistan 34.6 34.7 33.5 32.9 32.2 31.4 30.2 29.8 … …
Uzbekistan 35.8 35.5 35.5 35.2 33.8 33.2 33.4 34.3 … …
Ukraine 44.0 44.4 43.8 44.4 44.1 45.1 45.2 45.1 45.5 46.0
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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Appendix VIII 
Major indicators of literacy and educational attainment of the total population aged 25 and over in the 
USSR, Poland, Hungary, United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Brazil, and China for 1960-2000 
 
TABLE 1 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in the USSR 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 113705 1.5  68.8  35.4  25.6 10.1  4.2  3.6  7.59  
1965 128811 1.5  58.2  30.0  35.0 13.8  5.3  4.6  8.14  
1970 132128 0.5  47.9  24.8  44.4 17.5  7.2  6.2  8.83  
1975 141265 1.4  45.9  23.9  43.4 17.1  9.3  8.1  8.94  
1980 151526 1.6  45.8  24.4  43.5 17.1  9.1  7.9  8.93  
1985 163255 1.4  40.1  22.7  47.6 18.7  10.9  9.4  9.36  
1990 172997 0.0  22.8  14.9  63.3 24.9  13.9  12.0  10.52  
1995 95210 0.0  33.9  22.2  48.6 19.1  17.5  15.1  10.24  
2000 96348 0.0  31.0  20.3  48.9 19.2  20.1  17.4  10.49  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
For years 1995 and 2000 the data is for the Russian Federation only. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in Poland 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 15500 8.6  71.7  38.0  16.6  9.3  3.2  2.8  6.74  
1965 16889 7.5  69.9  38.9  18.9  7.4  3.7  3.2  6.97  
1970 17470 5.2  68.7  43.2  20.7  8.2  5.4  4.7  7.56  
1975 19000 5.6  62.2  43.1  25.5  10.0  6.7  5.8  8.02  
1980 20834 2.8  57.6  44.9  33.9  13.3  5.7  4.9  8.65  
1985 22445 3.0  52.8  38.7  36.7  14.5  7.5  6.4  8.80  
1990 23226 1.5  42.8  37.2  47.8  18.8  7.9  6.8  9.60  
1995 23582 1.7  40.5  35.2  48.5  19.1  9.3  8.0  9.73  
2000 24307 1.7  37.7  32.8  49.5  19.5  11.1  9.6  9.90  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 3 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in Hungary 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 6022 3.7  86.4  47.7  6.5  2.6  3.4  3.3  6.65  
1965 6244 3.0  85.6  52.7  7.9  3.1  3.5  3.4  6.99  
1970 6462 2.4  81.8  64.6  10.8  4.3  5.1  4.9  7.90  
1975 6676 2.5  76.4  55.0  15.4  6.1  5.7  5.5  7.91  
1980 6930 1.3  68.2  57.0  23.6  9.3  7.0  6.8  8.81  
1985 6962 1.9  63.9  35.0  26.5  10.4  7.7  7.4  8.20  
1990 6789 1.3  59.6  35.3  29.0  11.4  10.1  9.7  8.71  
1995 6681 1.7  56.0  24.5  31.8  12.5  10.5  10.1  8.52  
2000 6702 2.0  51.3  22.4  34.7  13.6  12.0  11.6  8.81  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 4 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in the UK 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1955 32427 0.0  78.9  65.6  19.5  1.7  1.6  0.9  7.32  
1960 33228 2.0  71.7  67.1  24.5  2.3  1.8  1.0  7.67  
1965 33784 1.8  69.2  44.5  26.5  4.5  2.5  1.4  7.17  
1970 33964 1.6  61.6  32.7  28.9  6.4  7.9  4.5  7.66  
1975 35054 2.4  55.6  27.1  31.0  8.0  11.0  6.2  8.01  
1980 35838 3.0  52.3  24.6  32.9  9.3  11.8  6.7  8.17  
1985 36435 2.9  48.7  22.6  35.7  10.7  12.8  7.2  8.44  
1990 38018 2.8  44.9  20.7  38.5  12.1  13.9  7.9  8.74  
1995 39299 2.9  41.4  19.1  39.9  12.5  15.8  9.0  9.03  
2000 40211 2.9  38.9  17.9  39.1  12.3  19.1  10.8  9.35  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 5 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in France 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1955 26838 . . . 10.3  2.6  1.8  0.9  . 
1960 27972 0.0  72.3  42.0  25.7  9.6  2.1  1.1  5.78  
1965 29210 0.0  71.6  41.3  25.8  10.4  2.7  1.4  5.86  
1970 29849 0.5  70.5  39.7  26.0  10.6  3.0  1.5  5.86  
1975 31622 0.9  67.2  35.4  26.8  11.0  5.2  2.7  6.08  
1980 33347 1.0  56.0  24.0  34.5  12.9  8.5  4.4  6.77  
1985 34911 1.1  52.1  23.3  36.3  19.1  10.5  5.4  7.31  
1990 36721 0.6  51.1  23.2  36.9  22.1  11.4  5.8  7.56  
1995 38509 0.5  47.6  21.7  37.3  22.4  14.5  7.4  7.94  
2000 40157 0.7  43.7  19.8  37.3  22.4  18.4  9.4  8.37  
Source: UNESCO. 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 6 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in Switzerland 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 3271 0.2  68.6  37.9  21.8  9.5  9.4  5.3  7.30  
1965 3479 0.2  68.4  37.8  22.3  10.7  9.1  5.1  7.32  
1970 3762 5.1  47.9  26.4  38.0  20.8  9.0  5.1  8.28  
1975 3989 4.4  50.0  27.6  36.4  23.4  9.1  5.2  8.27  
1980 4101 3.0  31.7  17.5  54.3  42.5  11.0  6.2  10.07  
1985 4381 4.6  30.0  16.6  53.6  35.0  11.8  6.7  9.90  
1990 4724 5.2  28.0  15.5  53.8  30.2  13.0  7.4  9.92  
1995 5081 4.9  25.9  14.3  54.8  30.8  14.5  8.2  10.18  
2000 5304 4.6  24.4  13.5  55.0  30.8  16.0  9.1  10.39  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 7 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in Brazil 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 27799 43.2  43.5  11.8  11.3  4.0  2.0  1.4  2.83  
1965 32009 43.5  44.4  13.8  10.1  3.7  2.0  1.3  2.78  
1970 36675 42.6  46.1  19.4  9.6  3.7  2.0  1.4  2.92  
1975 42610 32.7  57.3  4.3  5.7  2.2  4.3  2.9  2.78  
1980 49980 32.9  55.3  4.9  6.9  2.7  5.0  3.4  2.98  
1985 58632 32.2  55.3  9.4  6.1  2.5  6.4  4.3  3.22  
1990 68736 22.4  61.3  12.4  9.1  3.7  7.2  4.9  3.76  
1995 78620 22.1  58.8  11.9  11.2  4.5  7.9  5.3  4.17  
2000 89021 21.2  56.8  11.5  13.5  5.4  8.4  5.7  4.56  
Source: UNESCO. 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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TABLE 8 
 
Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over in China 
 
Year Population 
over age 
25, 
thousands 
Highest Level Attained Average 
years of 
school 
No 
schooling 
First level Second level Post-secondary 
total complete total complete total complete 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
1960 296043 . . . . . 1.1  0.9  . 
1965 315192 . . . . . 1.0  0.9  . 
1970 342432 . . . . . 1.0  0.8  . 
1975 383910 52.0  25.5  9.6  21.5  8.5  1.0  0.8  3.40  
1980 447766 44.9  32.3  12.2  21.7  5.6  1.0  0.9  3.61  
1985 508245 40.0  33.3  12.6  25.6  10.1  1.1  0.9  4.15  
1990 584658 29.3  34.3  12.9  34.4  13.5  2.0  1.7  5.23  
1995 677734 24.0  39.3  14.8  34.6  13.6  2.2  1.9  5.48  
2000 761566 20.9  40.7  15.3  35.7  14.1  2.7  2.3  5.74  
Source: UNESCO, 2004. Retrieved from: www.unesco.org 
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Appendix IX 
 
Selected indicators of socio-economic development in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, 
including the Gini coefficient in the NIS, CEE and selected Western European countries in 2003, 
average total housing space per inhabitant in the CIS for 1990-1999, and life expectancy at birth for 
male and female population in the NIS and selected CEE countries, for 1989-2004 
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TABLE 1 
GINI coefficient in the NIS, CEE and selected Western European countries, 2003* 
Country GINI Country GINI Country GINI 
Armenia 34 Albania 28 Austria 29 
Azerbaijan 37 Bosnia and Herzegovina 26 Belgium 33 
Belarus 30 Bulgaria 29 UK 36 
Estonia 36 Hungary 27 Denmark 30 
Georgia 40 Macedonia 39 Finland 27 
Kazakhstan 34 Poland 34 France 27 
Kyrgyz Republic 30 Romania 31 Germany 28 
Latvia 38 Slovenia 28 Greece 34 
Lithuania 36 Croatia 29 Ireland 34 
Moldova 33 Czech Republic 26 Spain 35 
Russian Federation 40   Italy 36 
Tajikistan 33   Netherlands 31 
Turkmenistan 40   Norway 26 
Ukraine 28   Portugal 32 
Uzbekistan 27   Sweden 25 
    Switzerland 34 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
* The data is available within the period of 2000-2003 with most of the data for 2003. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Average total housing space per inhabitant in the CIS, 1990-1999 (square meters) 
 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Azerbaijan 12.5 12.2 12.5 12.0 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.2 11.9 12.0
Armenia 15.0 15.8 14.9 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.5 15.7 16.1 …
Belarus 17.9 18.3 18.9 19.3 19.5 19.5 19.7 20.0 20.3 20.8
Georgia 18.8 18.4 19.2 19.1 19.4 19.7 20.0 20.2 20.2 …
Kazakhstan 14.2 14.4 14.5 14.6 15.1 15.4 15.6 16.2 16.3 16.4
Kyrgyzstan 12.1 12.3 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.5
Moldova 17.9 18.2 18.4 18.4 19.5 19.9 20.1 20.0 20.4 20.7
Russia 16.4 16.5 16.8 17.2 17.7 18.1 18.3 18.6 18.9 19.1
Tajikistan 9.3 9.5 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.0
Turkmenistan 11.1 11.2 11.4 11.5 11.7 10.8 11.1 11.4 12.3 …
Uzbekistan 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.6
Ukraine 17.8 18.0 18.2 18.5 18.7 19.2 19.2 20.0 20.2 20.4
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Life expectancy at birth for female population in NIS and selected CEE countries, 1989-2004, (years) 
 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Armenia - 71.5 - 72.1 - - 73.0 -
Azerbaijan 74.2 74.8 74.5 73.9 73.9 73.9 72.9 73.8
Belarus 76.3 75.6 75.5 75.4 74.4 74.3 74.3 74.4
Georgia - 74.2 - 74.3 - - 74.3 -
Hungary 73.8 73.7 73.9 73.9 73.9 74.3 74.6 74.8
Kazakhstan 72.9 73.1 72.9 72.7 71.9 71.0 70.4 70.0
Kyrgyz Rep. 71.8 72.6 72.7 72.2 71.7 70.7 70.4 71.0
Latvia 75.2 74.6 74.6 74.4 73.3 72.6 73.1 74.8
Lithuania 76.2 76.2 75.9 75.9 74.9 74.8 75.1 75.9
Moldova 72.3 71.8 71 71.9 71.0 69.8 69.7 70.4
Poland 75.5 75.5 75.3 75.7 76.0 76.1 76.4 76.6
Russia 74.4 74.3 73.8 71.9 71.2 71.7 72.5 72.9
Tajikistan - 65.9 - 65.7 - - 65.9 -
Turkmenistan - 67.1 - 67.6 - - 67.4 -
Ukraine 75.2 74.9 74.0 74.0 73.0 73.2 72.7 73.0
Uzbekistan 72.1 72.4 - - - - - -
Continues on the next page 
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Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Armenia 73.7 .. .. 74.3 .. 74.6 74.7 74.8
Azerbaijan 74.6 75.0 75.1 75.1 75.2 75.0 75.1 75.2
Belarus 74.3 74.4 73.9 74.0 .. 74.2 74.3 74.3
Georgia 74.3 .. .. 74.3 .. 74.3 74.4 74.5
Hungary 75.2 75.2 75.2 75.6 76.5 76.6 76.7 76.9
Kazakhstan 70.2 70.4 71.0 71.2 71.3 71.5 71.5 71.1
Kyrgyz Rep. 71.4 71.2 71.1 72.4 72.6 72.0 72.2 72.2
Latvia 75.1 74.8 75.3 76.0 75.8 76.0 75.9 77.7
Lithuania 76.6 76.6 77.0 77.4 77.5 77.5 77.7 77.8
Moldova 70.3 70.3 71.5 71.7 71.8 71.1 71.5 71.9
Poland 77.0 77.3 77.5 78.0 78.4 78.8 78.9 79.2
Russia 73.2 72.5 72.4 72.0 72.3 72.0 72.0 72.0
Tajikistan 66.0 .. .. 66.2 .. 66.3 66.4 66.6
Turkmenistan 67.2 .. .. 66.9 .. 66.7 66.9 67.1
Ukraine 73.0 73.5 73.7 73.6 74.1 74.1 74.1 74.1
Uzbekistan 72.4 .. .. 71.1 .. 70.3 70.3 70.3
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Life expectancy at birth for male population in NIS and selected CEE countries, 1989-2004, (years) 
 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Armenia - 65.6 - 65.3 - - 66.3 -
Azerbaijan 66.6 67.0 66.3 65.4 65.2 65.2 65.2 66.3
Belarus 67.1 66.3 65.5 64.9 63.8 63.5 62.9 63.1
Georgia - 66.5 - 66.5 - - 66.5 -
Hungary 65.3 65.1 65.1 64.6 64.6 64.9 65.3 66.1
Kazakhstan 63.9 63.8 63.3 63.0 61.8 60.6 59.7 58.5
Kyrgyz Rep. 64.2 64.2 64.6 64.2 62.9 61.6 61.4 62.3
Latvia 65.4 64.2 63.7 62.6 60.4 59.0 60.0 63.0
Lithuania 66.8 66.4 65.1 64.8 63.1 62.5 63.3 64.6
Moldova 65.5 65.0 64.3 63.9 64.0 62.3 61.8 62.9
Poland 66.8 66.5 66.1 66.7 67.4 67.5 67.6 68.1
Russia 64.2 63.8 63.5 62.0 59.0 57.6 58.3 59.8
Tajikistan - 60.7 - 60.5 - - 60.6 -
Turkmenistan - 59.2 - 59.2 - - 59.0 -
Ukraine 66.1 65.6 64.0 64.0 63.0 62.8 61.8 61.9
Uzbekistan 66.0 66.1 - 66.1 - - 66.1 -
Continues on the next page 
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Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Armenia 66.9 - - 67.5 - 67.9 68.0 68.1
Azerbaijan 67.4 67.9 68.1 68.6 68.6 69.4 69.5 69.6
Belarus 62.9 62.7 62.2 62.3 - 62.5 62.6 62.7
Georgia 66.5 - - 66.5 - 66.5 66.6 66.7
Hungary 66.4 66.2 66.4 67.1 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.6
Kazakhstan 59.0 59.0 60.3 60.4 60.5 60.7 60.5 60.1
Kyrgyz Rep. 62.6 63.1 63.1 64.9 65.0 64.4 64.5 64.3
Latvia 63.9 63.5 64.5 64.8 64.7 65.1 65.5 65.5
Lithuania 65.5 66.0 66.4 66.8 66.0 66.3 66.3 66.4
Moldova 62.9 62.9 64.2 64.4 64.5 64.4 64.5 64.9
Poland 68.5 68.9 68.8 69.7 70.2 70.4 70.5 70.0
Russia 61.0 61.3 60.0 59.0 59.0 58.5 58.8 58.8
Tajikistan 60.7 - - 60.9 - 61.0 61.1 61.3
Turkmenistan 58.8 - - 58.5 - 58.2 58.4 58.6
Ukraine 61.9 62.7 63.0 62.4 62.8 62.7 62.6 62.6
Uzbekistan 66.1 - - 64.7 - 63.8 63.8 63.9
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006.
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Appendix X 
 
Selected indicators of openness of the Ukrainian society, including access to newspapers, internet and 
phone lines, as well as selected indicators of the increasing well-being of the population, including 
consumption of hi-tech products and services, for 1989-2004 
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TABLE 1 
Selected indicators of openness of the Ukrainian society, including access to newspapers, 1993-1998 
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 
Broadband subscribers .. .. ..
Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people) .. .. ..
International Internet bandwidth (bits per person) .. .. ..
International Internet bandwidth (Mbps) .. .. ..
International tourism, number of departures (thousand) .. .. 6552000
International voice traffic (minutes per person) .. .. ..
International voice traffic (out and in, minutes) .. .. ..
Internet users 400 7000 22000
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 7.67E-03 0.13482 0.427083
Indicators 1996 1997 1998 
Broadband subscribers .. .. ..
Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people) .. 68.66 100.16
International Internet bandwidth (bits per person) .. .. ..
International Internet bandwidth (Mbps) .. .. ..
International tourism, number of departures (thousand) 6004000 9632000 7773000
International voice traffic (minutes per person) .. .. ..
International voice traffic (out and in, minutes) .. .. ..
Internet users 50000 100000 150000
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 0.979294 1.976515 2.991389
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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TABLE 2 
Selected indicators of openness of the Ukrainian society, including access to newspapers, 1999-2004 
Indicators 1999 2000 2001
Broadband subscribers .. 0 0
Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people) 121.91 174.75 ..
International Internet bandwidth (bits per person) 0.308012 0.599888 4.457329
International Internet bandwidth (Mbps) 15.3 29.5 217
International tourism, number of departures (thousand) 7399000 1.34E+07 1.48E+07
International voice traffic (minutes per person) .. 13.26871 26.01696
International voice traffic (out and in, minutes) .. 6.53E+08 1.27E+09
Internet users 200000 350000 600000
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 4.026304 7.117315 12.32441
Indicators 2002 2003 2004
Broadband subscribers 0 .. ..
Daily newspapers (per 1,000 people) .. .. ..
International Internet bandwidth (bits per person) 6.513342 10.81306 17.15443
International Internet bandwidth (Mbps) 314.1 517 814
International tourism, number of departures (thousand) 1.47E+07 1.48E+07 1.51E+07
International voice traffic (minutes per person) 28.65769 35.88549 ..
International voice traffic (out and in, minutes) 1.38E+09 1.72E+09 ..
Internet users 900000 2500000 3750000
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 18.66287 52.28751 79.0284
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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TABLE 3 
Selected indicators of the increasing well-being of the Ukrainian society, 1989-1996 
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 
International tourism, number of departures .. .. .. ..
Mobile phone subscribers 0 0 0 0
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 0 0 0 0
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people) .. 63.05 68.65 72.62
Personal computers .. 100000 140000 200000
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) .. 1.927079 2.692283 3.835072
Telephone mainlines 6684200 7028300 7344100 7577900
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 129.1059 135.4409 141.2314 145.3089
Indicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 
International tourism, number of departures .. .. 6552000 6004000
Mobile phone subscribers 65 5000 14000 30000
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 1.25E-03 9.63E-02 0.27178 0.587576
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people) 77.84 82.05 86.72 92.66
Personal computers 300000 360000 430000 510000
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 5.749416 6.933605 8.347521 9.988799
Telephone mainlines 7820400 8066000 8311000 9241000
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 149.8758 155.3513 161.3401 180.9931
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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TABLE 4 
Selected indicators of the increasing well-being of the Ukrainian society, 1997-2004 
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 
International tourism, number of departures 9632000 7773000 7399000 1.34E+07
Mobile phone subscribers 57200 115500 216567 818524
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 1.130566 2.303369 4.359823 16.64484
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people) 96 100 104.4118 106.0611
Personal computers 600000 710000 800000 890000
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 11.85909 14.15924 16.10522 18.09832
Telephone mainlines 9410000 9698200 1.01E+07 1.04E+07
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 185.9901 193.4072 202.8049 211.8316
Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 
International tourism, number of departures 1.48E+07 1.47E+07 1.48E+07 …
Mobile phone subscribers 2224600 3692700 6498423 1.37E+07
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 45.69481 76.57376 135.9145 289.4547
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people) 108.2153 110.8436 114.2463 118,4235
Personal computers 920000 951000 1123220 1327000
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 18.89743 19.72043 23.49215 27.96552
Telephone mainlines 1.07E+07 1.08E+07 1.11E+07 1.21E+07
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 219.1609 224.645 232.3552 255.8825
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database in August 10, 2006. 
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Figure 1. Selected indicators of the increasing well-being of the Ukrainian society, including 
consumption of hi-tech products and services, 1989-2004 
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Appendix XI 
Situation in R&D in Ukraine by categories of employees, scientists and academics, for 1989-1999 as 
one of the major indicators of utilization of human capital in production 
TABLE 1 
Situation in R&D in Ukraine by categories of employees, scientists and academics, 1989-1999 
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total number of specialists in R&D 348645 313079 295010 248445 222127 207436
Number of R&D specialists 292840 262134 243019 208058 189445 171926
Number of R&D technicians 55805 50945 51991 40397 32682 35510
Higher education faculty in R&D, part-time … 35995 36098 39012 39201 40034
R&D specialists, D.Sc. 3299 3192 3432 3843 4023 3995
R&D specialists, Ph.D. 31819 29320 27843 27410 25960 24277
Supporting staff 111165 111924 103068 89563 76876 76325
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  
Total number of specialists in R&D 179799 160103 142532 134413 126045
Number of R&D specialists 154253 137497 124340 100912 94726
Number of R&D technicians 25546 22606 17841 33501 31273
Higher education faculty in R&D, part-time 41677 45395 46801 48760 48414
R&D specialists, D.Sc. 4099 4151 4309 4510 4610
R&D specialists, Ph.D. 22860 21357 20637 19824 19720
Supporting staff 62765 55681 51345 45422 40552
Source: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - Official Statistics. Retrieved from the 
database in August 8, 2006.
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Figure 1. Situation in R&D in Ukraine by categories of employees, 
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Figure 2. Situation in R&D in Ukraine by categories of employees, 
scientists and academics, 1989-1999 
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Appendix XII 
Major macroeconomic and demographic indicators in Ukraine in 
1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030, including 
GDP growth, components of GDP, expenditures, foreign trade, 
dynamics of population, labor force and labor productivity 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of GDP (percent real change per annum) in 
Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of GDP per head in USD and GDP per head in 
USD at PPP in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 
2030 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of real GDP growth per head, (percent change per 
annum) in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 
2030 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of real GDP (billion USD at 1996 prices) and real 
GDP (PPP billion USD at 1996 prices) in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and 
in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 5. Dynamics of real GDP by its structural components, 
including real private consumption (billion UAH) real gross fixed 
investment (billion UAH), and real government consumption (billion 
UAH), in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 6. Dynamics of foreign trade, including real imports and 
exports of G&S, (billion UAH), in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the 
long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 7. Dynamics of growth of real capital stock (percent change) in 
Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 8. Dynamics of real GDP by its structural components, 
including real government consumption (billion USD), real gross 
fixed investment (billion USD), and real private consumption (billion 
USD) in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 9. Dynamics of foreign trade, including real exports 
and imports of G&S, (billion USD), in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in 
the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Figure 10. Dynamics of population (million) and total labor force 
(million) in Ukraine in 1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 
2030 
 374 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9
201
1
201
3
201
5
201
7
201
9
202
1
202
3
202
5
202
7
202
9
Рост производительности труда, процентов Рост общей факторной производительности, процентов
 
Figure 11. Dynamics of labor productivity growth (percent change) 
and total factor productivity growth (percent change) in Ukraine in 
1989-2006 and in the long run forecasts till 2030 
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Appendix XIII 
Understanding WTO: The Organization Members and 
Observers 
The WTO has 149 members as of December 11, 2005 
TABLE 1 
The WTO countries-members and dates of membership 
Albania 2000 
Angola 1996 
Antigua and Barbuda 1995 
Argentina 1995 
Armenia 2003 
Australia 1995 
Austria 1995 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 1995 
Bangladesh 1995 
Barbados 1995 
Belgium 1995 
Belize 1995 
Benin 1996 
Bolivia 1995 
Botswana 1995 
Brazil 1995 
Brunei Darussalam 1995 
Bulgaria 1996 
Burkina Faso 1995 
Burundi 1995 
Cambodia 2004 
Cameroon 1995 
Canada 1995 
Central African Republic 1995
Chad 1996 
Chile 1995 
China 2001 
Colombia 1995 
Congo 1997 
Kuwait 1995 
Kyrgyz Republic 1998 
Latvia 1999 
Lesotho 1995 
Liechtenstein 1995 
Lithuania 2001 
Luxembourg 1995 
Macao, China 1995 
Madagascar 1995 
Malawi 1995 
Malaysia 1995 
Maldives 1995 
Mali 1995 
Malta 1995 
Mauritania 1995 
Mauritius 1995 
Mexico 1995 
Moldova 2001 
Mongolia 1997 
Morocco 1995 
Mozambique 1995 
Myanmar 1995 
Namibia 1995 
Nepal 2004 
Netherlands 1995 
New Zealand 1995 
Nicaragua 1995 
Niger 1996 
Nigeria 1995 
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Costa Rica 1995 
Côte d'Ivoire 1995 
Croatia 2000 
Cuba 1995 
Cyprus 1995 
Czech Republic 1995 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 1997 
Denmark 1995 
Djibouti 1995 
Dominica 1995 
Dominican Republic 1995 
Ecuador 1996 
Egypt 1995 
El Salvador 1995 
Estonia 1999 
European Communities 1995  
Fiji 1996 
Finland 1995 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) 2003 
France 1995 
Gabon 1995 
The Gambia 1996 
Georgia 2000 
Germany 1995 
Ghana 1995 
Greece 1995 
Grenada 1996 
Guatemala 1995 
Guinea 1995 
Guinea Bissau 1995 
Guyana 1995 
Haiti 1996 
Honduras 1995 
Norway 1995 
Oman 2000 
Pakistan 1995 
Panama 1997 
Papua New Guinea 1996 
Paraguay 1995 
Peru 1995 
Philippines 1995 
Poland 1995 
Portugal 1995 
Qatar 1996 
Romania 1995 
Rwanda 1996 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1996 
Saint Lucia 1995 
Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines 1995 
Saudi Arabia 2005 
Senegal 1995 
Sierra Leone 1995 
Singapore 1995 
Slovak Republic 1995 
Slovenia 1995 
Solomon Islands 1996 
South Africa 1995 
Spain 1995 
Sri Lanka 1995 
Suriname 1995 
Swaziland 1995 
Sweden 1995 
Switzerland 1995 
Chinese Taipei 2002 
Tanzania 1995 
Thailand 1995 
Togo 1995 
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Hong Kong, China 1995 
Hungary 1995 
Iceland 1995 
India 1995 
Indonesia 1995 
Ireland 1995 
Israel 1995 
Italy 1995 
Jamaica 1995 
Japan 1995 
Jordan 2000 
Kenya 1995 
Korea, Republic of 1995 
Trinidad and Tobago 1995 
Tunisia 1995 
Turkey 1995 
Uganda 1995 
United Arab Emirates 1996 
United Kingdom 1995 
United States of America 
1995 
Uruguay 1995 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1995 
Zambia 1995 
Zimbabwe 1995 
Source: Understanding WTO: The Organization 
Members and Observers. Retrieved from www.wto.org 
Accessed in August 15, 2006 
 
TABLE 2 
The WTO members: Least-developed countries 
Angola 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African Rep 
Chad 
Congo 
Djibouti 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Haiti 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Retrieved from www.wto.org Accessed in August 15, 2006 
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